











































































































caused	 by	 change	 and	 by	 the	 conditioned	 mind,	 all	 of	 which	 manifest	 at	 different	 levels	 of	






the	 opportunity	 for	 reflection	 and	 contemplation	 on	 what	 suffering	 is:	 insight,	 understanding	 and	
knowing	the	causes	of	our	suffering,	together	with	recognising	that	there	 is	a	way	out	of	our	suffering	
and	a	path	of	reflective	exercise,	practice	and	training	to	cease	our	suffering.	
Secondly	 our	 investigation	 into	 Epictetus	 and	 suffering	 involves	 consideration	 of	 the	 language	 of	
suffering,	in	particular	the	role	of	different	aspects	of	language	used	in	Epictetus,	and	how,	through	the	
use	of	language,	experience	and	knowing	of	suffering	comes	about,	and	how	such	language	becomes	a	
tool	 for	 philosophical	 inquiry	 into	 that	 suffering.	 	 Thirdly	 our	 investigation	 looks	 at	 the	 pathological	
aspects	of	suffering	and	the	language	of	moral	choice.		Throughout	this	thesis	I	maintain	Epictetus’	claim	
that	 to	 be	 educated	 is	 to	 discover	 the	 truth	 about	 our	 suffering	 and	 the	 ethical	 imperative	 of	 being	
liberated	from	that	suffering.	
This	thesis	is	an	original	contribution	to	the	current	body	of	knowledge	and	understanding	concerning	
human	suffering	and	the	human	condition	 in	the	context	of	Epictetus.	 	 I	shall,	 in	this	thesis,	argue	the	

















Thanks	 also	 go	 to	my	Buddhist	 teacher,	Dhyana	Master	 Trung	Quang	Nhat	Hanh	 (also	 known	as	
Thich	Nhat	Hanh)	for	his	Buddhist	guidance,	instruction	and	moral	practice	for	the	last	11	years.		


















































































































































































































































































This	 thesis	addresses	human	suffering,	 specifically	 in	 regard	 to	 the	 teachings	of	Epictetus,	with	
some	comparative	discussions	and	support	from	the	Buddhist	canon.		The	issue	of	human	suffering	is	
not	 new	 to	 Stoic	 thinking,	 it	 has	 always	 been	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 it,	 specifically	 regarding	 their	
discussions	 on	 the	 emotions	 and	 passions.	 	 In	 this	 thesis	 I	 present	 a	 re-examination	 of	 Epictetus’	
response	to	human	suffering	taking	a	broader	look	at	its	meaning	and	nature.		This	refers	not	only	to	
ordinary	 suffering,	 but	 also	 suffering	 caused	 by	 change	 as	 well	 as	 that	 concerned	 with	 the	






that	 stops	 us	 achieving	 this	 goal.	 	 This	 thesis	 will	 refocus	 our	 understanding	 of	 Epictetus	 on	 the	








many	 aspects	 in	 common,	 and	 they	 are	 both	 said	 to	 be	 representative	 of	 Western	 and	 Eastern	
philosophical	approaches	to	the	problem	of	human	suffering.	 	The	two	doctrines,	however,	are	not	
wholly	 compatible	 with	 each	 other;	 for	 example	 they	 diverge	 in	 areas	 of	 metaphysics	 and	 logic.		
There	is,	however,	commonality	in	areas	of	ethics	and	moral	conduct;	specifically	views	and	thinking	










In	 this	 thesis	 I	 shall	 also	explore	 the	 language	of	 suffering	 in	 terms	of	our	being	and	existence.		
This	aspect	 looks	at	 the	role	of	 language	 in	Epictetus	 in	discovering	the	truth	behind	our	suffering,	
the	process	of	knowing	what	our	 suffering	 is	 through	 inquiry	by	 language,	acquiring	knowledge	of	
the	 cause	 of	 our	 suffering.	 	 Suffering	 is	 caused	mainly	 by	 our	 ignorance;	 language	 is	 a	 means	 of	
recognising	 and	 knowing	 about	 our	 suffering;	 and	 it	 is	 through	 the	 medium	 of	 language	 that	
Epictetus	brings	to	life	and	enlightens	us	as	to	the	truths	behind	man’s	suffering.				
The	 originality	 of	 this	 thesis	 lies	 in	 its	 contribution	 to	 the	 current	 body	 of	 knowledge	 and	
understanding	concerning	human	suffering	and	the	human	condition	 in	 the	context	of	Epictetus.	 	 I	
shall,	 in	 this	 thesis,	 argue	 the	 case	 that	 re-casting	 his	 teaching	 in	 the	 form	 of	 a	 ‘theory	 of	 human	
suffering’	 contributes	 a	 fresh	 interpretation	 of	 his	 extant	 works	 in	 the	 broader	 context	 of	 human	
suffering.		It	will	also	allow	us	to	respond	to	these	questions:	To	what	extent	does	Epictetus’	teaching	
live	up	to	the	challenge	of	the	broader	meaning	of	human	suffering?	How	well	does	it	deal	with	this	




When	we	 talk	 about	 suffering	we	may	 be	 referring	 to	 it	 in	 a	 broad	 everyday	 sense	 to	mean	 a	
general	 experience	 and	 sensation	 of	 dissatisfaction,	 unpleasantness	 or	 pain.	 	 Equally	we	might	 be	
referring	to	suffering	of	the	body,	suffering	of	the	mind,	or	suffering	of	both	body	and	mind;	in	fact	
our	experiences	and	sensations	can	be	a	combined	suffering	of	body	and	mind	due	to	the	fact	that	
our	physiological	and	psychological	 conditions	can	have	an	effect	on	each	other.	 	We	also	 find	 the	
terms	 ‘suffering’	 and	 ‘pain’	 are	 sometimes	 used	 interchangeably,	 without	 distinguishing	 any	
difference	 between	 suffering	 and	 pain,	 as	 synonyms	 for	 each	 other.	 	 Suffering	 of	 the	 body	 is	
considered	in	a	narrow	sense	as	undergoing	physical	pain;	this	often	includes	physical	illness	or	injury	
and	 diseases	 of	 the	 body	 that	 cause	 unpleasant	 physical	 sensations	 such	 as	 soreness,	 aches,	
discomfort,	irritations.	 	Suffering	of	the	mind	is	the	mental,	emotional	or	psychological	pain	caused	
by	 distress	 and	 sorrow,	 and	 many	 of	 the	 hardships	 of	 life	 that	 affect	 our	 feelings,	 moods,	
temperament,	frame	of	mind	or	emotional	well-being.	
Review	of	literature	and	research		







thinking	 in	 terms	 of	 the	 Four	 Noble	 Truths	 and	 secondly	 for	 general	 comparative	 purposes.	 	 It	 is	
important	to	note	that	there	 is	a	 large	 library	of	Buddhist	material	and	so	the	selection	of	research	
material	for	this	thesis	has	been	restricted,	with	a	strict	focus	on	the	purposes	mentioned,	and	not	for	
a	comprehensive	study	of	Buddhism.		The	selection	of	material	related	to	Epictetus	has	involved	an	
extensive	 review	 of	 literature	 and	 research	 scholarship:	 both	 primary	 and	 secondary,	 ancient	 and	
modern.	
Ancient	 Greek	 and	 Roman	writings	 addressed	 suffering	 in	 a	more	 general	 sense	 (for	 example,	
through	use	of	the	word	paschō),	particularising	it	to	issues	such	as:	anger,	hate,	greed	and	fear;	the	
study	of	passions,	attaining	virtue,	ethical	conduct,	and	moral	obligations.	 	Their	consideration	was	
not	 as	 focused	or	 philosophically	 rigorous	on	 the	 topic	 of	 suffering	 as	 that	of	Buddhists	 (Buddha’s	
uppermost	mantra	was	said	to	be	‘I	teach	only	suffering	and	the	transformation	of	suffering’).1		The	
Buddhist	 Adhidhamma	 Pitaka	 is	 not	 only	 an	 extraordinarily	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	 basic	 natural	
principles	that	govern	mental	and	physical	processes	related	to	our	suffering,	but	it	treats	the	subject	
in	a	philosophically	rigorous	and	systematised	way.	 	This	thesis	 is	attempting	to	bring	together	the	
wealth	 and	 richness	 of	 the	 Buddhist	 approach	 with	 that	 of	 the	 pragmatic,	 less	 rigorous,	 but	
nevertheless	significant,	approach	of	Epictetus	and	his	version	of	Stoicism:	 	each	has	something	to	
offer	the	other,	both	trying	to	address	the	same	human	problem.				












Secondary	 sources	 of	 literature	 dealing	 directly	 with	 the	 general	 teaching	 as	 well	 as	
interpretations	and	analysis	of	Epictetus’	ethics	 include	Long’s	 (2002)	masterful	 study	of	Epictetus,	
which	provides	invaluable	discussion	on	critical	themes	related	to	suffering	including	governance	of	
our	emotions,	automony,	volition,integrity,	actions	and	feeling.		Bonhöffer’s	(1996)	classic	exposition	



















Dyson	 (2009)	 on	 the	 normative	 self;	 work	 on	 the	 psychology	 and	 epistemology	 of	 Epictetus	 by	
Girdwood	(1998).		
In	 order	 to	 explore	 the	 background	 and	 broader	 aspects	 of	 Stoicism	 in	 relation	 to	 Epictetus	
various	secondary	sources	have	been	used	including	Long	and	Sedley	(1987)	and	Sellars	(2006).	Rist	







categories;	 Brennan	 (2005)	 studies	 emotions	 and	 Stoic	 psychology	with	much	 focus	 on	 Epictetus;	




as	 Cognitive	 Behavioural	 Therapy	 (CBT)	 and	 Rational	 Emotive	 Behavioural	 Therapy	 (REBT).	 	 In	
addition,	the	use	of	the	medical	paradigm	for	psychological	and	ethical	health	was	a	recurrent	theme	
in	Greek	and	Roman	times,	as	seen	in	the	works	of	Aristotle,	Plato,	Galen,	Plutarch,	Chrysippus	and	




information	 and	 reference;	 Sorabji’s	 (2002)	 major	 study	 on	 emotion	 and	 its	 therapy	 is	 a	
comprehensive	source	of	 ideas	and	inspiration;	Gill	(1985,	2006)	provides	a	masterly	account	of	the	
philosophical	 foundations;	 Ellis	 (1962,	 2005)	 and	 Beck	 (1979)	 relate	 to	 REBT	 and	 CBT	 respectively	
with	 Epictetus	 as	 a	 forerunner;	 Murguia	 and	 Diaz	 (2015)	 write	 on	 CBT,	 Stoicism	 (in	 particular	
Epictetus),	Buddhism,	Taoism	and	Existentialism;	Zhang	(2009);	and	Robertson	(2010)	write	on	CBT	








the	 earlier	 Stoics,	 Zeno	 and	Chrysippus.
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Like	many	ancient	 thinkers	and	philosophers,	Buddha	taught	 in	 the	oral	 tradition	and	 for	many	
years	his	monks	propagated	his	thoughts	orally.		Later	his	thoughts	were	captured	in	a	set	of	canons	
and	primary	texts.		Over	the	years	many	interpretations	and	commentaries	based	on	the	teachings	of	
the	 Buddha	 have	 developed.	 	 The	world’s	 library	 of	 Buddhist	 teaching	 is	 voluminous	 and	 diverse,	




lesser	 extent	 the	 Adhidhamma	 Pitaka.	 	 We	 have	 also	 used	 several	 modern	 interpretations	 and	
commentaries	 of	 the	 Buddhist	 scriptures	 including	 that	 of	 Tsering	 (2005,	 2006,	 2008,	 2012),	Nhat	
Hanh	(1992,	1998),	Dalai	Lama	(2009,	2013),	Bodhi	 (2005,	2008,	2012,	2016,	2017),	Kelsang	Gyatso	
(1994),	 Kalupahana	 (1992a),	 Brazier	 (2003)	 and	 Frosndal	 (2005).	 	 Tsering,	Nhat	Hanh,	Dalai	 Lama,	
Bodhi,	 Kelsang	 Gyatso	 have	 been	 helpful	 for	 their	 modern	 and	 authoritative	 interpretations	 and	
commentary	 on	 the	 Four	 Noble	 Truths,	 the	Eightfold	 Path	 and	 related	 aspects	 such	 as	 Dependent	
Origination	and	the	five	Aggregates.		In	addition,	references	to	the	English	translations	of	the	Sutta	
Pitaka	 and	 the	Adhidhamma	 Pitaka	 by	 Bodhi	have	 been	 used.	 	Kalupahana	 has	 been	 selected	 for	
more	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 the	 Buddhist	 theory	 of	 knowledge	 and	 understanding,	 human	
personality,	epistemology	and	logic,	and	sankhara	(dispositions).	 	Brazier	has	been	specifically	used	
for	an	overview	of	Buddhist	psychology.		
Regarding	 comparisons	 between	 Buddhism	 and	 Stoicism/Epictetus,	 several	 secondary	 studies	
have	been	consulted	and	reviewed	and	these	include:	Ferraiolo	(2010),	Andrei	(2009),	Goerger	(2017),	
Murguia	 and	 Diaz	 (2015),	 Gowans	 (2010),	 Davis	 and	 Sharpe,	 and	 Yu	 (2004).	 	 None	 of	 the	 studies	
consulted	 provide	 a	 detailed	 comparison	 of	 Buddhism	 with	 Epictetus,	 especially	 in	 regard	 to	 a	
comprehensive	 view	 of	 suffering.	 	 Ferraiolo	 is	 a	 good	 introduction	 into	 the	 way	 the	 West	 might	
appreciate	Buddhism	by	considering	Epictetus’	teaching	and	counsel,	 in	other	words	how	we	might	
fashion	 Epictetus	 in	 the	 likeness	 of	 a	 Roman	 Buddha.	 	 Goerger	 presents	 a	 limited	 and	 useful	






















introduction	 to	 the	medical	 paradigm	 that	 is	 used	 in	 Buddhism	 and	 Stoic	 thinking.	 	 The	 study	 by	
Murguia	 and	 Diaz	 examines	 the	 foundations	 of	 Cognitive	 Behavioural	 Therapy	 and	 its	 roots	 in	
ancient	philosophy,	including	Stoicism	and	Buddhism.		Gowans’	focus	is	on	the	medical	analogies	in	
Buddhist	 and	 Hellenistic	 thought	 and	 how	 this	 is	 related	 to	 discussion	 on	 psychological	 health,	
central	moral	questions	and	modification	of	beliefs	in	response	to	rational	arguments.		The	study	by	
Davis	and	Sharpe	provides	 some	useful	and	well	 contructed	preliminary	notes	and	 ideas	 regarding	
the	notion	of	philosophy	as	an	art	of	living,	comparing	Stoicism	with	Buddhism,	with	examples	from	




used,	 and	 for	Vajrayāna	Buddhism	 the	 language	 is	 Tibetan.	 	 In	 this	 thesis	Pali	 is	 occasionaly	 used	




considering	 the	 Buddhist	 model,	 The	 Four	 Noble	 Truths.	 	 These	 truths	 express	 the	 foundation	 of	
Buddhist	 thinking	 and	 orientation	 regarding	 suffering	 and	 are	 used	 in	 this	 thesis	 to	 show	 a	
correspondence	 between	 Buddhist	 thinking	 and	 that	 of	 Epictetus;	 they	 are	 used	 as	 the	 point	 of	
reference	for	reframing	Epictetus’	thinking	and	approach	as	the	basis	of	a	practical	‘theory	of	human	
suffering’.	 	 In	 addition,	 several	 key	 Buddhist	 concepts	 are	 introduced	 in	 the	 chapter	 that	 are	
referenced	 in	 the	 other	 chapters	 of	 this	 thesis	 for	 comparative	 purposes	 and	 to	 illustrate	 parallel	
thinking	in	Epictetus.		These	include:	sankhara	(disposition),	kamma	(action),	cetanā	(volition),	avijjā	
(ignorance),	 tanhā	 (desire),	 upādāna	 (clinging,	 attachment)	 and	 khandas	 (aggregates	 related	 to	





to	 the	 suffering	of	 a	diseased	 soul.	 	 This	 includes	 discussion	of	 dispositions	 and	habits	 as	 a	 critical	
factor	 in	 the	 conditioning	of	man’s	 suffering.	 	 Various	 examples	 of	 language	are	 cited	 to	 illustrate	
Epictetus’	thinking	on	the	suffering	of	a	diseased	soul.			
Chapter	 3	 (Epictetus	 and	 the	 Second	 Noble	 Truth)	 looks	 in	 detail	 at	 the	 causes	 of	 suffering	
(second	noble	truth)	and	again	this	is	discussed	in	the	context	of	Epictetus.		This	chapter	also	looks	at	
the	 language	 employed	 by	 Epictetus	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 our	 philosophical	 inquiry	 into	 suffering.		







unravel	 the	 secrets	 of	 why	 our	 actions	 (our	 wishes,	 wants,	 desires)	 relate	 to	 our	 experience	 (our	
suffering).	 	 Our	 comparison	 with	 Buddhism	 continues	 with	 a	 discussion	 on	 the	 equivalent	
active/passive	aspects	of	Buddhist	thinking.	
Chapter	4	(Epictetus	and	the	Third	Noble	Truth)	looks	in	detail	at	the	cessation	of	suffering	(third	
noble	 truth)	with	 focus	on	Epictetus’	 approach	 to	 suffering.	 	 This	 chapter	 discusses	 the	 realisation	
that	 suffering	 can	 be	 overcome,	 and	 that	 we	 have	 the	 opportunity	 to	 free	 ourselves	 from	 the	
conditioned	 mind	 that	 keeps	 us	 attached	 to	 a	 cycle	 of	 suffering.	 	 Our	 realisation	 of	 this	 truth	 is	
directed	 through	 contemplation	 and	 a	 reflective	 mind,	 in	 particular,	 that	 volition	 (cetanā)	 drives	
actions	 (kamma),	 develops	 mental	 formations	 (sankhara)	 and	 leads	 to	 wholesome	 (kusala)	 or	
unwholesome	(akusala)	states	of	mind.		In	this	chapter	we	discuss	Epictetus’	response	to	this	through	
his	 teaching	 of	 the	 faculty	 of	 moral	 choice	 (prohairesis)	 and	 how	 through	 the	 application	 of	 this	
faculty	we	can	practise	the	cessation	of	our	unwholesome	acts	and	states	of	mind.		
Chapter	 5	 (Epictetus	 and	 the	 Fourth	 Noble	 Truth)	 looks	 in	 detail	 at	 the	 eightfold	 path	 (fourth	
noble	 truth),	 a	 set	 of	 activities	 to	practise	 and	 train	with	 for	 the	 cessation	of	 suffering.	 	Again	our	
















of	 the	 heroes,	 armies,	 wives	 and	 children,	 all	 suffering	 for	 some	 cause,	 through	 conflict,	 love,	
jealousy	 and	 the	 need	 for	 power.	 (Hall	 (2012)	 provides	 an	 insightful	 response	 to	 this	 view	 in	 the	




















not	 provide	definitive	 answers	 to	 these	 age-old	 questions	but	 gives	 an	 interpretation	of	 Epictetus’	
thinking	 that	 shows	 that	 suffering	 is	 linked	 both	 with	 a	 language	 of	 being	 and	 a	 language	 of	












Suffering	 is	 the	 common	 bond	 that	 all	 humans	 share:	 a	 natural	 and	 human	 experience	 that	
happens	to	all	of	us.		Our	attitude	should	be	neither	negative	nor	pessimistic:	to	think	otherwise	is	to	
show	 a	 lack	 of	 understanding	 of	 what	 suffering	 is	 and	 the	 significant	 role	 it	 plays	 in	 our	 lives;	 to	
engage	 in	 addressing	 our	 suffering	 is	 an	 opportunity	 to	 learn	more	 about	 oneself	 and	 to	 examine	
oneself.	 	 In	 this	 thesis	 I	 consider	 the	 relative	suffering	of	 the	 individual,	not	of	society	or	a	species.		











In	 this	 thesis	 I	make	 the	 claim	 that	what	 Epictetus	 teaches	 can	 be	 closely	 aligned	 to	 	 the	 Four	
Noble	Truths	(1.2)	and	to	a	reasonable	degree15	some	of	the	underlying	scriptures	found	in	the	texts	
of	the	Sutta	Pitaka	and	Adhidhamma	Pitaka.16		 In	carrying	out	this	comparison	I	shall	show	that	the	
methodical,	 systematic	 and	 rigourously	 detailed	 approach	 of	 Buddhism	 is	 beneficial	 to	 the	
understanding	and	application	of	Epictetus’	teaching,	rendering	a	more	systematized	approach	to	his	
































Both	their	 journeys	 adopted	a	philosophical	 ‘way	of	 life’	 (1.3):	a	 ‘living’	philosophy	to	search	 for	
the	 truth	 behind	 inner	 freedom	and	 peace	 of	mind.	 	 Such	 philosophical	 journeys	 brought	 them	 in	
touch	with	their	inner	souls,	to	be	more	aware	of	their	existence	and	to	recognise	suffering,	and	work	













Stoic	 and	 Buddhist	 views	 are	 similar	 in	many	ways	 regarding	 the	 universal	 truth	 behind	man’s	
suffering,	 the	 causes	of	 this	 suffering	and	 the	 idea	 that	man	 is	 capable	of	 freeing	himself	 from	his	





In	 the	 Stoic	 world	 the	 focus	 is	 predominantly	 on	 a	 philosophy	 of	 personal	 ethics	 based	 on	 a	
system	 of	 logic	 and	 an	 understanding	 of	 the	 physical	 world.	 	 They	 teach	 that	 the	 pathway	 to	




In	 the	Buddhist	world	 the	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 notion	 of	dukkha,	 a	 term	 that	 is	 difficult	 to	 translate	





Although	 the	Stoic	and	Buddhist	worlds	might	 seem	to	be	different	 in	 focus	and	 starting	point	
they	offer	 similar	but	alternative	perspectives	of	human	suffering	and	are	actually	 the	same	at	 the	














all	 forms	of	experience	 that	 can	happen	 to	 someone	or	 something,	 to	be	 influenced	or	affected	 in	
some	way,	to	suffer	(in	both	a	general	and	also	specifc	sense).		Epictetus’	use	of	this	term	goes	some	













tried	 and	 tested	 framework	 to	 systematically	 structure	 the	 presentation	 of	 Epictetus’	 thinking	 on	
suffering.		The	Four	Noble	Truths	approach	is	not	found	in	the	works	of	Epictetus	per	se	but	my	claim	
is	 that	 it	 does	 exist,	 albeit	 in	 a	 covert	 way,	 and	 so	 taking	 this	 approach	 is	 a	 valuable	 means	 of	
illuminating	the	depth	of	Epictetus’	thinking	on	suffering.		Overall	it	is	hoped	that	this	approach	will	
provide	a	 richer	understanding	of	Epictetus	and	perhaps	open	 the	door	 to	a	better	appreciation	of	


















































• The	third	truth	 (nirodha) -	the	truth	of	the	cessation	of	suffering	(our	suffering	through	
our	personal	system	of	desires	can	be	brought	 to	an	end	 leading	to	 liberation	and	well	
being	-	discussed	further	in	Chapter	4);	
• The	 fourth	 truth	 (magga)	 -	 the	 truth	of	 the	way	 to	 liberation	 from	suffering	due	 to	our	
attachment	 to	 desires	 (eightfold	 path	 process,	 activities	 and	 exercises	 of	 Right	 View,	
Right	 Intention,	 Right	 Speech,	 Right	 Action,	 Right	 Livelihood,	 Right	 Effort,	 Right	
Mindfulness,	Right	Concentration	–	discussed	further	in	Chapter	5).			
What	these	truths	reflect	is	one	of	the	fundamental	laws	in	Buddhism,	the	Law	of	Kamma.27		The	
essence	of	 this	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	Rice	 Seedling	Sutra	 (Salistamba	Sutra	)28	‘Due	 to	 the	 existence	of	
this,	that	arises.		Due	to	the	production	of	this,	that	is	produced.		It	is	thus:	due	to	ignorance	there	is	

























form	two	sets	of	 relationships:	 the	first	and	second	truths	 (suffering	arises	because	of	some	cause)	
and	the	third	and	fourth	truths	(suffering	can	cease	if	we	follow	the	path	leading	to	cessation).		The	
existence	 of	 something	 (say,	 the	 thought	 of	 death)	 causes	 suffering	 to	 arise	 (in	 terms	 of	 fearful	
thoughts	 of	 death),	 the	 very	 same	message	 found	 in	 the	 language	 of	 Epictetus.
29































































The	 reasons	why	the	Four	Noble	Truths	are	 immune	 from	metaphysical	debate	and	controversy	
can	be	explained	as	 follows.	 	Buddha’s	 teaching	strategy	 revolves	around	asking	 the	 right	 types	of	
question	 in	 the	 right	 context	 and	 at	 the	 right	 time.
33
		 One	 type	 of	 questions	 are	 the	 so-called		


















The	 Four	 Noble	 Truths	 should	 be	 acknowledged	 simply	 for	 what	 they	 are,	 four	 categorical	
teachings	 about	 suffering	 to	 be	 experienced,	 to	 reflect	 upon	 and	 to	 practise,	 as	 part	 of	 the	 path	
leading	to	the	end	of	suffering.		Answering	unnecessary	and	speculative	questions	entangles	us	in	a	
thicket	of	views	and	circular	arguments	that	hampers	our	path	to	freedom	from	suffering.	 	To	treat	






























another	 sense	 how	 this	 concept	 is	 applied	 in	 the	 context	 of	 Buddha’s	 and	 Epictetus’	 approach	 to	
suffering	reveals	not	divisions	but	some	striking	similarities	in	thinking.		This	is	why	the	discussion	of	
the	 Four	 Noble	 Truths	 is	 important,	 as	 well	 as	 related	 Buddhist	 topics	 of	 the	 five	 aggregates	 and	
sankhara,	and	the	commonly	shared	subjects	of	impermanence,	attachments	and	volitional	actions.		
The	notion	of	selfhold	 is	 found	 in	the	words	and	teachings	of	 the	Buddha,	and	takes	on	several	
meanings	and	nuances.
39
		 	For	example,	 in	Buddhim	we	can	find	the	notions	of	 'I	am'-conceit,	 'ego-
conceit'	 (asmimana),40	and	 the	view	of	 self,	 as	 the	 identity	 view	 (sakkayaditthi).41		 There	 is	 also	 the	






we	need	to	consider	 this	 in	 the	context	of	his	 teaching	strategy,	which	provides	the	 framework	 for	
everything	 he	 taught:
44









Buddha	purposely	used	 the	phrase	 ‘There	 is	 suffering’
48
	(see	above)	 rather	 than	 ‘I	 am	suffering’	
and	 this	 strategy	 not	 only	 avoids	 the	 entanglement	 with	 metaphysical	 debate	 of	 issues	 such	 as	





































In	Epictetus	 the	 ‘self’	 reveals	 itself	 in	many	different	ways,	 some	of	which	are	discussed	 in	 this	
thesis,	 in	 particular,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 ourselves,	 and	 what	 we	 say	 to	 ourself	 (1.5,	 5.3.5),	 our	
dispositions	 (2.3),	 our	 volitional	 actions	 and	 the	 prohairesis	 (4.4)	 and	 our	 sensibilities	 to	 passions	













	(5.3.4)	 and	 so	 on.	 	 For	 the	







Before	 leaving	this	question	of	the	 ‘self’,	 it	 is	worth	mentioning	that	Buddhism	has	a	chequered	
history	 of	 disputes	 about	 ‘self’	 and	 ‘not-self’	 doctrines.
56
		 The	 various	 interpretations	 and	
misinterpretation	of	Buddha’s	theories	of	‘self’	and	‘not-self’	has	led	to	many	circular	arguments	and	
use	 of	 his	 theories	 and	 strategies	 that	 are	 out	 of	 context.	 	 One	 of	 the	 controversial	 debates	 is	 in	
regard	 to	 the	 phrase	 ‘all	 phenomena	 are	 not-self’	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 five	 aggregates.	 	 These	
aggregates	 are	 a	 set	 of	 processes	 that	 shape	 the	 empirical	 individual	 and	 so	 the	 totality	 of	 our	
experiences	 can	 be	 explained	 in	 relation	 to	 these	 aggregates.	 	 Consequently	 our	 suffering	 arises	






































or	 unskillful	 kamma	 to	 avoid	metaphysical	 arguments	 of	 self	 and	 non-self,57	that	 distract	 us	 from	
dealing	with	our	suffering	and	our	path	to	enlightenment	and	awakening.		
A	 second	area	of	misunderstanding	 is	 that	of	Dependent	Origination	 (paṭiccasamuppāda),58	and	
conditioned	phenomena/volitional	dispositions	(sankhara),59	which,	as	with	the	five	aggregates,	lead	
to	 questions	 that	 are	 inconsistent	 with	 discussion	 on	 self/non-self,	 and	 should	 be	 classed	 as	
undetermined	 questions.	 	 We	 consider	 Dependent	 Origination,	 sankhara,	 kamma	 and	 the	 five	












• patipatti	 -	 practice	 with	 this	 thesis	 (pursuing	 the	 theory	 to	 gain	 insight	 and	
understanding);		
• pativedha	 -	 finally	 there	 is	 the	 result	 of	 this	 practice	 (realisation	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 the		
thesis).			
For	 example,	with	 the	Second	Noble	 Truth:	we	 have	 the	 thesis	 that	 craving	 and	 attachment	 is	 the	
origin	 of	 suffering;	 then	 there	 is	 practice	 with	 this	 thesis	 to	 exercise	 and	 develop	 our	 mind	 in	 a	
reflective	way	in	our	daily	lives;	and	finally	the	result	of	the	practice	is	succeeding	in	gaining	insight,	
understanding	 and	 knowing,	 which	 means	 we	 are	 not	 just	 reacting	 to	 what	 has	 been	 learnt	 and	





















Hadot,	 Nussbaum	 and	 others.
62
		 This	 concept	 has	 its	 origins	 in	 the	 philosophy	 of	 Socrates.63		 The	







learning	 Stoic	 theory,	 digesting	 it	 and	 applying	 it	 to	 our	 individual	 lives	 and	 experiences	 through	
practice.	 This	 line	 of	 thinking	 pervades	 his	 approach	 to	 philosophy,	 which	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 of	
Buddhism.	 	 Epictetus	 follows	 his	 master	 Musonius	 in	 this	 respect:	 he	 advocates	 learning	 theory,	
doctrines	 and	 principles	 and	 then	 putting	 this	 theory	 into	 practice,	 exercises	 and	 so	 finally	
transforming	 our	 lives.
66
		 Musonius	 argues	 that	 philosophical	 theories	 are	 useless	 unless	 through	
practice	they	can	produce	in	us	a	transformation	of	our	life,	and	this	is	echoed	by	Epictetus.		We	can	
talk	and	recite	 the	rules	but	we	also	need	to	put	 them	 into	practice;
67
	both	theory	and	practice	are	












know	how	to	act	upon	our	daily	cravings	unless	we	practise.	 	Our	actions	are	up	 to	us	 and	how	we	































it	means	 to	have	a	 fever	 in	 the	 right	way,	 and	have	 the	 right	 view;	not	 to	 just	 take	 the	 thesis	 and	
words	 of	 a	 physician	 as	 to	 what	 a	 fever	 is,	 but	 to	 experience	 and	 embrace	 it,	 to	 develop	 an	





















Epictetus’	 thinking,	mastery	of	philosophical	 theory	does	not,	on	 its	own,	constitute	knowledge.	 	 If	
someone	with	 proficiency	 in	 theory	 fails	 to	 act	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 theory	 he	would	 be	 acting	
against	 such	 knowledge.	 	 The	 ancient	Greek	 and	Roman	debate	 on	 theory	 and	practice	 resonates	








their	 own	 way	 of	 life	 and	 their	 daily	 activities.	What	 is	 also	 clear,	 however,	 is	 that	 some	 form	 of	
exercise	 (askēsis)	 for	 a	 philosophical	 way	 of	 life,	 to	 be	 used	 alongside	 philosophical	 theory,	 is	




and	well	 flourishing	 life	 free	 from	dukkha	or	suffering.	 	With	Epictetus	there	 is	also	this	notion	of	a	
spiritual	path	 involving	practice	and	 training	with	 similar	objectives.	 	Epictetus’	 three	disciplines	of	


















what	 is	 sometimes	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 Three	 Spiritual	 Exercises	 or	Disciplines	 of	 the	 Soul	or	 Three	
Fields	 of	 Study.
81
		 These	 spiritual	 exercises,	 psychological	 acts	 of	 the	 soul,	 deal	 with	 everything	
related	to	us	and	in	our	control:	(i)	desires	and	aversions,	(ii)	impulse	to	act	and	(iii)	judgements	and	
assent.		Whatever	is	in	our	control	we	can	desire	or	not	desire,	we	have	the	impulse	to	act	or	not	act,	
we	can	assent	or	not	assent.	 	These	 three	 spiritual	 exercises	 can	be	 viewed	as	different	aspects	of	
reality:	 (i)	wishing	 for	 things	 to	 happen	 as	 they	 do,	 acceptance	 of	 universal	 nature	 and	 living	with	






necessarily	 in	 any	 systematic	 or	 formal	way	 but	 generally	 thematically	 presented	 as	 philosophical	
discourse	and	arguments	depending	on	the	nature	of	the	topic	of	his	teaching	being	discussed.	 	As	
well	 as	 editing	Epictetus’	Discourses	 in	 full,	Arrian	 collected	 together	passages	 from	 the	Discourses	





Handbook	 with	 a	 brief	 discussion	 on	 ‘what	 is	 up	 to	 us’	 (in	 our	 control)	 and	 an	
announcement	of	the	three	disciplines.		
• Three	spiritual	exercises:		
o Desires	and	aversions	 (Sections	2-29)	 -	 that	we	may	never	 fail	 to	get	what	we	
desire	nor	fall	into	what	we	want	to	avoid;	
o Impulse	 to	 act	 (Sections	 30-41)	 -	 that	we	may	 act	 in	 an	 orderly	 fashion,	 upon	
good	reasons,	and	not	carelessly;	
o Judgement	 and	 assent	 (Sections	 42-45)	 -	 that	we	 avoid	 error	 and	 rashness	 in	
judgement,	and	in	general,	about	cases	of	assent.	
• Philosophical	 life	 (Sections	 46-52)	 –	 these	 sections	 present	 the	 theme	 of	 leading	 a	
philosophical	 life;	 they	 particularly	 focus	 on	 the	 various	 stages	 of	 educational	
development	from	layman	to	philosopher,	and	the	training	needed	to	make	progress.	














The	question	has	been	raised	as	 to	whether	 these	 three	 fields	of	study	correspond	to	 the	 three	
parts	 of	 Stoic	 philosophical	 discourse	 of	 physics,	 ethics	 and	 logic.	 	 There	 are	 various	 views	
(Bonhöffer,	 Dobbin,	 Barnes,	 Hadot)
83
	about	 whether	 there	 are	 any	 forms	 of	 correlation	 or	
correspondence.		Sellars	argues	that,	rather	than	look	for	a	correspondence	between	areas	of	study	
and	the	three	parts	of	philosophy,	we	should	agree	to	a	correspondence	between	types	of	exercise	
and	 types	 of	 discourse,	 and	 this	 would	 connect	 the	 two	 together:	 exercise	 theme	 ‘desires	 and	
aversions’	and	the	discourse	on	physics;	exercise	theme	‘impulse	to	act’	and	the	discourse	on	ethics;	









is	 Buddhist	 thinking	 regarding	 the	 three	 mental	 poisons	 or	 defilements	 (klesas)	 associated	 with	
attachments,	 aversions	 and	 ignorance.	 	 The	 klesas	 reflect	 the	 destructive	 and	 disturbing	 states	 of	
mind	that,	as	we	shall	discuss	at	length	in	chapters	2	and	3,	are	the	cause	and	effect	of	our	suffering.		
The	klesas	are	strikingly	similar	to	Epictetus’	discourse	and	teaching	on	desires	and	aversions,	and	on	
ignorance.	 	 Furthermore,	 we	 have	 highlighted	 the	 parallel	 thinking	 behind	 the	 cause	 of	 suffering	
(dukkha)	relating	to	our	mental	conditioning	through	feelings	and	perceptions,	cravings	and	clingings	
(attachments),	 and	 so	 on.	 	 This	 parallel	 thinking	 goes	 even	 further	 to	 embrace	 related	 issues	 of	
impermanence,	 existential	 phenomena	 and	 conditioned	 mental	 existence,	 emotions	 and	
impressions,	 meditative	 and	 therapeutic	 practice,	 to	 name	 but	 a	 few	 areas	 of	 remarkable	
commonality.		This	can	lead	us	to	admit	that	there	is	a	close	correlation	of	ideas	between	Epictetus	
and	 Buddhism,	 as	 the	 discussion	 in	 1.2-5	 explains.	 	 This	 intersection	 of	 ideas	 and	 concepts	 is	
remarkable	despite	there	being	East-West	differences	in	language	and	vocabulary,	culture,	attitudes	
to	 life,	and	so	on.	 	For	example,	the	presentation	of	Epictetus’	teaching	with	 its	focus	on	a	virtuous	
life	and	that	of	Buddhism	with	its	soteriological	emphasis	on	suffering	can	mislead	us	into	seeing	less	













The	discussion	of	a	medical	analogy	between	the	 illness	of	 the	soul	and	that	of	 the	body	 is	not	

































and	 the	 soundness	 of	 the	 body	 and	 the	 soul:
93





































useless	 if	 they	have	no	helpful	 bearing	on	 a	practical	 end:	 ‘our	 aim	 is	 to	be	healthy	 rather	 than	 to	









cure	and	treatment.	 	 In	the	 introduction	to	Gethin’s	work	he	refers	to	the	four	noble	truths	as	 ‘The	
Disease,	 the	 Cause,	 the	 Cure,	 the	 Medicine’.
100
		 Again	 according	 to	 Anderson,
101
	this	 is	 a	 very	
common	metaphor	that	we	find	throughout	contemporary	writings	on	the	four	noble	truths	but	not	a	






directly	 by	 Buddha	 or	 by	 his	 followers	 and	 disciples.	 	 However,	 as	 with	 the	 ancient	 western	
discussion,	 there	 is	 a	 useful	 analogy	 here,	 especially	 as	 an	 approach	 for	 comparing	 Epictetus	with	
Buddhism,	 as	 briefly	 outlined	 in	 the	 paper	 by	 Andrei,
104
	with	 elements	 of	 the	 medical	 analogy	
appearing	 also	 in	 Ferraiolo
105
	on	 catharsis	 and	 desires,	 and	 Goerger
106
	on	 remedial	 practices	 of	
meditation.	 	 Gowans
107
	provides	 an	 interesting	 analysis	 of	 the	 use	 and	 limitations	 of	 the	 medical	
analogy	and	points	 to	 some	 controversial	 aspects	where	one	might	question	 the	utility	of	 such	an	




Epictetus	makes	 several	 references	 to	 physicians	 and	medical	 treatment	 and	 likens	 the	 lecture	




		 We	 also	 have	 in	 many	 instances	
Epictetus	expressing	 the	 therapeutic	 function	of	philosophy	 for	 the	curing	of	 the	soul.	 	 In	addition,	





























(nosos),111	remedies	 (pharmaka),112	weals	 left	 behind	 on	 the	 mind,113	being	 cured	 (therapeuō),114	
purfication	 and	 cleansing	 of	 the	 soul	 (catharsis).115	as	 well	 as	 talking	 of	 the	 uneducated	 as	 being	
invalids	 or	 as	 if	 they	 were	 sick.
116
		 	 We	 can	 observe	 from	 this	 that	 Epictetus	 follows	 the	 general	
essence	of	the	Stoic	medical	analogy.	 In	2.3	we	shall	discuss	further	the	medical	 language	used	by	
Epictetus.		
The	 medical	 analogy	 of	 logos	 as	 treatment	 or	 remedy	 for	 the	 sick	 or	 ill	 mind	 is	 prevalent	
throughout	 Epictetus.	 	 As	 with	 right	 (sound,	 healthy)	 logos	 in	 Plato,	 Aristotle	 and	 Epictetus,	 in	
Buddhism	we	have	Right	View	and	Right	Understanding,	both	of	which	are	necessary	for	the	proper	
medical	 treatment:	 both	 are	 remedies	 prescribed	 in	 the	 Eightfold	 Path.	 	 So	 too	 we	 find	 similar	
prescriptions	 in	 Epictetus,	 for	 example,
117





		 Just	 as	 the	 Eightfold	 Path	 prescribes	 the	 use	 of	 contemplation	 and	 meditation	 to	 be	





and	 5.2.	 	 And	 as	 the	 Stoics,	 Aristotle,	 Plato	 and	 other	Greeks	 and	Romans	will	 argue,	 philosophic	
principles	or	discourse	(logos)	is	insufficient	on	its	own	to	transform	our	sick	and	ill	mind	but	we	need	
also	 to	 train	 and	 practice	 (askēsis),	 reflecting	 the	 sentiments	 of	 the	 Buddhist	 procedure.	 	 Equally	
important,	one	of	the	functions	of	askēsis,	is	the	digestion	of	the	logos	(as	disccused	in	5.2.1)	–	this	is	
important	to	cure	the	illness	of	the	soul	and	to	realise	the	prescribed	remedy.			
So	 in	 Epictetus	we	 have	 use	 of	medical	 language,	 references	 and	 analogies.	 	We	 also	 observe,	
from	our	 discussion	 and	 investigation,	 that	 Epictetus	 closely	 correlates	with	 the	 Four	Noble	 Truths	




































and	disease.	 	 This	 final	 part	of	 the	procedure	 concerns	 the	 treatment	 itself,	whether	 the	 remedies	
and	medicine	prescribed	are	appropriate	and	 fitting,	whether	 they	will	be	effective	at	dealing	with	
our	 disease	 and	 illness.	 	 The	 reference	 point	 for	 these	 are	 the	 prescribed	 remedies	 found	 in	 the	








































Language	 is	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 human	 existence	 enabling	 us	 to	 express	 our	 experiences,	
thoughts,	 feelings	 and	 needs.	 	 The	 link	 between	 language,	 our	 existence	 (our	 being	 and	 our	
becoming,	acting	and	being	acted	upon),	our	perception	and	experience	of	 reality,	our	psychology	
and	state	of	mind	has	been	discussed	and	explored	by	many	ancient	and	contemporary	writers.		For	
example,	 Marcus	 Aurelius	 saying	 ‘everything	 is	 but	 what	 we	 think’
121





and	discourse	with	ourselves)	 can	move	and	 incite	us	 to	act	or	produce	a	passive	effect	on	us:	our	
language	 and	 thought	 can	 modify	 and	 transform	 our	 being	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 realising	 good	 and	





























the	words	 of	 this	 language	 he	 refers	 to	 is	 only	 what	 the	 speaker	 can	 know	 (about	 his	 immediate	
private	 sensations	 and	 experiences),	 –	 another	 person	 cannot	 understand	 this	 language);	 it	 is	 a	
private	language.		We	are	the	subject	matter	of	our	own	experiences;	we	have	the	understanding	and	






the	subject-matter	of	our	 thoughts,	 feelings	and	cognitions,	our	prohairesis.	 	The	Buddhist	 scholar	






What	 we	 say	 to	 ourselves	 and	 what	 is	 said	 to	 us	 by	 others	 can	 persuade	 and	 influence	 our	
thinking,	 feelings	 and	 behaviour,	 and	 conversely	what	we	 feel	 and	 experience	 can	 be	 exhibited	 in	
linguistic	expression.		This	was	known	in	the	Greek	and	Roman	times	as	well	as	in	modern	times:	it	is	
one	 of	 the	 methods	 of	 the	 modern	 treatment	 of	 cognitive	 disorders	 and	 the	 basis	 of	 some	
cognitive
127
	and	 rational	 emotive	 behavioural	 therapies.
128
		 Our	 internal	 communications	 and	
dialogue	 process	 information,	 feelings	 and	 impressions	 and	 these	 are	 monitored,	 examined	 and	
debated	by	us	to	take	action	and	make	decisions.		Plato	in	the	Sophist	said	‘thought	and	speech	are	
the	same;	only	the	former,	which	is	a	silent	inner	conversation	of	the	soul	with	itself,	has	been	given	
the	 special	 name	 of	 thought’.
129
		 In	 Theaetetus,	 	 Plato	 again	 touches	 upon	 thought	 as	 the	 soul’s	






























our	 language	and	speech	mirrors	what	 is	 ‘thought’	and	agrees	with	what	 is	real:	does	our	 language	
and	 thought	 represent	clearly,	 concisely	and	appropriately	 the	content	of	an	 impression	or	not?	 	 If	
our	thoughts	are	muddled,	confused	and	unclear	then	what	we	say	to	ourselves	can	mirror	this	with	
incoherent	and	imprecise	jumble	of	words	and	expressions.			
Epictetus	 says	 there	 is	 ‘no-one	 closer	 to	 myself	 than	 I	 am’
132
	to	 convince	 and	 persuade	me	 of	



















'I	am'	(asmimana),	an	 imperious	sense	of	 ‘I’	 that	 lurks	 in	the	background	of	our	mind,	similar	to	the	




Stoic	 arguments	 clearly	 link	 language	 to	 thoughts	 and	 impressions,
136
	and	 Epictetus	 is	 one	 of	
several	 thinkers	 who	 developed	 their	 philosophical	 teaching	 around	 this	 connection.	 	 There	 is	 no	
shortage	 of	 advice	 from	 Epictetus	 about	 being	 careful	 about	 what	 we	 say	 to	 ourself:	 inner	
conversations	 such	 as	 ‘I	 am	 in	 a	 bad	 way’	 or	 ‘I	 am	 better	 than	 you’
137






















		 Likewise	we	 can	 talk	 to	ourselves	with	an	overly	high	opinion	of	ourselves,	 exhibiting	
pretentious	thoughts	about	ourselves	and	producing	a	feeling	of	having	a	greater	importance	than	is	
actually	possessed.	 	We	can	also	talk	to	ourselves	in	a	way	that	is	 intermediate	between	these	two:	
unaffected	 by	 negative	 thought	 provoking	 feelings	 and	 modest	 about	 any	 positive	 thought	
provoking	feelings.					
We	have	discussed	Epictetus’	 claims	 that	our	examination	of	 impressions	and	sensations	 forms	
the	standard	by	which	the	truth	of	things	is	tested	as	a	presentation	(mental	impression).		Indeed	as	
Epictetus	says,	‘For	presentation	comes	first;	then	thought,	which	is	capable	of	expressing	itself,	puts	
into	 the	 form	 of	 a	 proposition	 that	 which	 the	 subject	 receives	 from	 a	 presentation’.139		 When	 we	
compare	 this	 cause	 and	 effect	 series	 with	 Buddhism	 there	 is	 no	 doubt	 the	 theory	 of	 kamma	 and	
Dependent	 Origination	 (see	 2.2	 and	 4.2.2)	 reflects	 the	 same	 thing	 –	 a	 comprehensive	 technical	
analysis	appears	in	the	Abhidhamma.140			
One	of	the	distinctive	features	of	the	style	of	Epictetus	is	his	use	of	language	in	a	variety	of	ways	
such	as	dialogue	 to	 instruct	 and	 convey	principles:	 to	make	us	 think	and	 learn	and	 to	exercise	our	

























Further,	 Epictetus	 would	 himself	 insist	 that	 language	 affects	 how	 we	 feel,	 our	 emotions	 and	
consequently	our	suffering.		In	3.3	we	draw	on	the	active	and	passive	aspect	of	language	in	Epictetus	
to	provide	supporting	examples	and	instances	of	what	subsists	in	our	thoughts	through	the	use	of	the	





















or	meant	 in	 what	 has	 been	 verbally	 expressed.	 	 Consequently	 what	 is	 said	 through	 language	 and	
what	subsists	accordingly	in	our	thoughts	can	direct	us	towards	what	is	true	or	false,	right	or	wrong,	






of	 our	 evidence	 comes	 from	 cognitive	 pyschologists	 such	 as	 Ellis,	 Horney,	 Beck	 and	 others	 (1.5).		
Language	 is	used	to	give	commands,	make	statements	and	ask	questions	of	both	ourselves	and	of	
others:		‘What	do	I	think	about	the	situation?’	or	‘How	do	I	feel	about	the	situation?’		Our	answers	can	
appeal	 to	our	 intellect,	 logic	and	 sense	of	 reasoning	and	 rational	 thinking,	or	 appeal	 to	our	ethical	




and	 I	 must	 use	 my	 mind	 to	 make	 the	 right	 use	 of	 my	 impressions.
147
		 His	 argument,	 which	 he	














The	 Stoics	 drew	 a	 distinction	 between	 language	 and	 logic.
148
	Language	 includes	 written	 text,	
speech,	utterances,	words	and	so	on,	 is	corporeal,	material	and	sensible	and	hence	part	of	 the	real	









and	 sayables),	 which	 have	 meaning	 but	 do	 not	 have	 full	 being;	 they	 exist	 intra-mentally,	 are	
intellectual.
149









to	 something	 or	 some	 things.
151
		 An	 incomplete	 predicate	 joined	 on	 to	 a	 nominative	 case	 yields	 a	
proposition	 (one	 form	of	 lekton).	 	Some	predicates	are	constructed	with	the	passive	voice,	as	 ‘I	am	
heard’,	‘I	am	seen’.		Neutral	predicates	are	such	as	correspond	to	neither	of	these,	as	‘thinks,’	‘walks.’		




itself	 can	 be	 denied	 or	 affirmed.
	152
		 There	 is	 a	 difference	 between	 proposition,	 interrogation	 and	
inquiry.	 	A	proposition	 is	 that	which,	when	we	 set	 it	 forth	 in	 speech,	becomes	an	assertion,	 and	 is	
either	false	or	true;	an	interrogation	is	a	thing	complete	in	itself	like	a	proposition	but	demanding	an	
answer,	e.g.	 ‘Is	 it	day?’	and	this	 is	 so	 far	neither	 true	nor	 false.	Thus	 ‘It	 is	day’	 is	a	 judgement,	 ‘Is	 it	








we	 shall	be	demonstrating	 the	 technical	agility	of	Epictetus	 in	his	use	of	 the	active	and	passive,	 in	
what	 proves	 to	 be	 evident	 in	 our	 claim	 that	 language,	 and	 what	 we	 say,	 especially	 to	 ourselves,	
affects	our	mental	state	and	our	moral	choices	and	indifference.					
1.6.2	 Lekta		
Turning	 to	 the	 psychological	 aspect	 of	 the	 lekta,	 impressions	 are	 thoughts	 with	 propositional	
content	and	it	is	the	propositional	content	of	these	mental	impressions	and	images	that	we	assent	to.		


















































This	 discussion	 leads	 us	 on	 to	 the	 Stoic	 categories,
162




this,	 Long	 remarks,	 we	 have	 some	 interpretations	 that	 link	 the	 categories	 to	 Stoic	 grammar	
(substrate	 to	 pronouns,	 qualified	 to	 nouns	 and	 the	 dispositions	 to	 verbs).	 	 Graeser
164
	relates	 the	
syntactic	 parts	 of	 language	 to	 semantic	 counterparts	 using	 the	 terms	 subject,	 qualification,	
disposition	 and	 relation,	 which	 serve	 as	 basic	 types	 of	 meaning	 signified	 by	 linguistic	 expression.		
Hence,	 ‘Socrates	 is	 feeling	happy’	 is	a	 reference	to	 the	subject’s	soul	being	 in	a	certain	disposition.		







or	 proposition.	 	 Furthermore	 from	 Diogenes	 Laertius
167
	we	 understand	 that	 an	 impression	 is	 a	
modification	of	our	 rational	 capacity	 and	 that	 this	 is	 related	 to	a	proposition	 the	 content	of	which	
describes	what	affects	this	capacity.		We	argue	that	this	is	consistent	with	Epictetus’	use	of	language.		
Epictetus	 resolutely	 reminds	us	 that	our	 impressions	and	thoughts	must	 face	a	 reality	 test,	and	we	


































In	 this	 thesis	 our	 focus	 is	 restricted	 to	 language	 and	 thinking	 in	 terms	of	 how	we	perceive	 and	
experience	 suffering:	 in	 the	passive	 state,	how	our	mind	 is	 conditioned	by	mental	 impressions	and	
dispositions,	and	in	the	active	state,	the	conditions	that	lead	to	this	conditioned	mind	–	here	we	see	













	and	epistemology	 (pramana).	 	 In	Dignaga’s	view	perception	and	 inference	are	 the	
means	 to	 access	 correct	 knowledge.	 	 There	 are	 many	 good	 references	 to	 the	 works	 of	 Dignaga	
including	 Hayes	 (1982),	 Chu	 (2006)	 and	 Hattori	 (1968).	 	 Kalupahana	 also	 provides	 a	 useful	








we	 are	 to	 be	 free	 of	 suffering.	 	 The	 attainment	 of	 ‘vision,	 discernment,	 wisdom,	 knowledge	 and	
illumination’	 is	 through	 theory,	 practice	 and	 realisation	 (pariyatti,	 patipatti	 and	pativedha)	 and	 the	
equivalences	in	Epictetus	as	discussed	in	1.3.	
1.7.2	Aggregates	and	Sankhara	
In	 unlocking	 the	 truth	 and	 psychology	 behind	 the	 Dukkha	we	 need	 to	 consider	 the	 Buddhist	
concept	of	 five	aggregates	 (khandhas),	which	 is	discussed	 in	1.2.3	and	2.2.3.4,	and	sankhara,	which	






























personality	 and	 belong	 to	 the	 causally	 conditioned	 mental	 dispositions:	 these	 dispositions	 shape	
individuality	 out	 of	 the	 sense	 and	 sensibilities	 of	 conditioned	 phenomena	 and	 experiences;	 they	





aggregates	 constructs	 a	 sense	 of	 personal	 identity	 and	 our	 clinging	 to	 these	 aggregates	 can	 be	
thought	 of	 as	 a	 cognitive	 process	 of	 identification	 and	 appropriation.	 	 This	 leads	 towards	 what	
Buddha	calls	 ‘I-making’	or	 ‘mine-making’	and	 the	conceited	 self	 (see	1.2.3)	and	so	 to	 linguistic	and	
cognitive	formations	like	‘this	is	mine’,	‘this	I	am’,	‘this	is	myself’.	 	Subsequently	we	are	in	danger	of	
associating	or	relating	everything	that	is	a	product	of	sankhara	and	the	five	aggregates	with	‘I	am’	in	








cannot	provide	stablility	 from	disturbing	 thoughts	and	 feelings,	or	provide	 the	security	of	a	 serene	
life.		Our	ignorance	conditions	our	thoughts,	feelings,	mental	formations	and	consciousness	that	we	
























of	 our	 suffering.	 	 Our	 ignorance	 causes	 us	 to	 identify	 ourselves	 with	 the	 five	 aggregates	 and	 we	
continue	to	crave,	to	identify	and	be	attached	to	them,	we	continue	to	build	up	a	conditioned	reality	
from	which	 we	 continue	 to	 experience	 suffering.	 	 Another	 way	 of	 expressing	 the	 sankhara	 is	 the	
collection	of	all	volitional,	emotional	and	intellectual	elements	of	our	mental	life	and	existence,	and	
our	consciousness	is	our	awareness	that	is	indispensable	to	all	our	cognitive	activity.		
The	 Four	Noble	 Truths	 (1.2)	 pivot	 around	 the	 notion	 of	dukkha	 (suffering)	 and	 the	First	 Truth	 is	
underpinned	by	the	five	aggregates	as	these	are	affected	by	conditioned	clinging	and	so	are	suffering	






upon	 (through	volitional	and	kammic	 actions)	produces	 the	passive	sankharas180	and	 these	create	a	






‘self’	 (1.2.2-1.2.3).	 	 We	 therefore	 have	 a	 linguistic	 relationship	 and	 parallel	 psychological	 thinking	
between	 sankhara,	 the	 active	 (kammic	 and	 volitional	 actions)	 and	 passive	 (dispositions),	 and	 the	
language	of	Epictetus	poiein	 (to	act)	and	paschein	 (to	be	acted	upon)	and	the	dispositions	 (2.3)	and	
the	prohairesis	(Chapter	4):	both	go	hand	in	hand	with	our	everyday	experience	of	suffering	and	are	
connected	 through	 the	Four	Noble	 Truths	 (1.2).	 	 This	 can	 be	 translated	 as	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 active	
constructs	 the	 feelings,	perceptions,	volitional	 formations	and	consciousness.	 	The	active	can	be	 in	
the	form	of	bodily,	verbal	or	mental	actions,	which	as	discussed	in	5.2.2,	can	be	performed	skilfully	
(kusala-kamma)	or	unskilfully	(akusala-kamma).181		Hence	the	clear	importance	of	language	in	the	life	
of	 human	 suffering,	 and	 the	 role	 of	 the	 active	 and	 the	 passive	 common	 to	 both	 in	 Buddhism	 and	
Epictetus.	 	Our	 inner	conversations	(1.5.3,	4.5,	5.3.5),	and	what	we	say	to	ourself,	and	the	volitional	
language	we	use	(4.5),	conditions	and	shapes	our	mental	formations.				















Epictetus’	 thinking	 on	 suffering	 of	 the	mind.	 	 Each	 of	 these	 truths	will	 be	 used	 in	 the	 subsequent	
chapters	to	compare	the	thinking	between	the	two	schools	of	thought	and	to	show	both	schools	of	
thought	 have	 the	 same	mission,	 to	 free	men	 from	 sickness	 of	 the	mind	 and	 that	 they	 arrive	 at	 a	
common	 understanding	 regarding	 the	 prime	 factors	 causing	 suffering.	 	 They	 also	 arrive	 at	 similar	
regimes	of	exercise	and	practice	that	work	towards	the	cessation	of	suffering.		I	claim	that	recasting		
Epictetus	using	the	Buddhist	Four	Noble	Truths	enhances	our	appreciation	and	understanding	of	his	
teaching	and	presents	his	 thinking	 in	a	more	 systematic	way,	using	a	 similar	but	different	method	
and	approach.	
This	chapter	has	also	introduced	the	role	that	language	plays	in	the	psychology	of	suffering.		Our	
impressions	 and	 thoughts,	 feelings	 and	 emotions,	 of	 what	 we	 experience	 are	 expressed	 in	
language.
182
		 As	 such	 language	 can	 reveal	 our	 psychological	 state	 of	 mind,	 reflect	 how	 we	 are	
disposed	towards	particular	circumstances	in	life	and	hold	the	key	to	our	experiential	existence.		This	
aspect	will	continue	to	feature	in	the	subsequent	chapters	as	we	investigate	in	detail	the	Four	Truths.			
Chapter	 2	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 truth	 of	 suffering,	 that	 is,	 there	 is	 suffering	 in	 the	 world,	 which	




or	 possess	a	 certain	 state	or	 condition	of	 the	body	or	mind’.	 	 Chapter	 3	will	 focus	 on	 the	 cause	of	
suffering,	 that	 is,	 dissatisfaction	 in	 life	 originating	 from	 desires	 and	 aversions,	 attachments	 and	
repulsions,	cravings	and	clingings.		Section	3.3	discusses	the	language	of	cause	and	effect,	the	active	
and	 passive	 (poein	 and	 paschein).	 	 Chapter	 4	 will	 focus	 on	 the	 cessation	 of	 suffering,	 that	 is,	 it	 is	
possible	to	cease	the	dissatisfaction	in	life,	opening	the	way	to	a	sense	of	well-being	and	happiness.		






























































of	 it	with	definitions	and	 semantics.	 	 Suffering,	 in	 the	Buddhist	 view	of	 the	 concept,	 reveals	many	
hidden	 dimensions,	 depths	 and	 senses,	 making	 it	 a	 very	 profound	 human	 experience.	 	 	 In	
comparison,	 suffering	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 traditional	 Stoic	 passions	 (pathē)	 is	 a	 subset	 of	 those	
experiences	one	might	come	across	in	one’s	journey	through	life	–	a	notion	that	should	become	clear	
as	we	investigate	the	language	of	Epictetus	later	in	this	thesis.	
The	First	 Noble	 Truth183	points	 to	 the	 need	 for	 understanding,	 insight,	 knowing	 about	 suffering	
(dukkha)	and	its	nature:	it	is	based	on	three	insights	–	firstly	there	is	dukkha,	secondly	dukkha	needs	
to	be	understood,	and	thirdly	dukkha	has	been	understood.	
Investigation	 into	 the	 first	 insight	 should	aim	 to	gain	a	 realisation	 that	 suffering	does	exist	and	
acknowledge	 that	 it	 is	 part	 of	 all	 life	 to	 nobly	 accept	 our	 suffering,	 and	 have	 the	 insight	 that	 we	
experience	 it	 through	being	 incapable	of	satisfying	 (dukkha)	our	desires	or	aversions,	 the	feeling	of	
dissatisfaction,	of	something	happening	or	not	happening	in	our	lives	that	we	deem	to	be	pleasant	or	

























Given	 the	 subtlety	of	 some	human	experiences	 it	 is	 not	 always	an	easy	 task	 to	understand	 the	
nature	 of	 our	 suffering.	 	 Dukkha	 can	 be	 deep-rooted	 in	 our	 subconscious,	 be	 difficult	 to	 detect,	







To	fail	 to	respond	to	dukkha	 is	 to	neglect	what	 it	means	to	be	a	human	being	and	this	means	a	




To	 reiterate,	 the	First	Noble	Truth	 is	about	understanding,	knowing,	giving	 insight,	wisdom	and	
seeing	the	light	regarding	dukkha:	it	is	not	concerned	with	finding	the	cause	of	dukkha	or	solutions		to	
help	the	cessation	of	dukkha.	This	First	Truth	requires	us	to	look	deeply	with	a	reflective	mind	to	fully	



















such	 states	of	mind,	 about	good	and	evil,	moral	purpose	and	duties,	 indifference,	use	of	 externals	
and	what	is	and	is	not	in	our	control,	use	of	impressions	and	many	other	topics,	all	of	which	relate	to	
dukkha.		His	Discourses	provide	a	large	quantity	of	teaching	material	on	these	issues	and	to	support	a	
better	 understanding	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 dukkha.	 	 His	 teachings,	 we	 claim,	 reflect	 man’s	 actual	
experience	of	dukkha,	and	it	 is	evident	that	this	 is	not	some	theoretical,	abstract	set	of	notions	and	
issues.	 	 To	 this	 extent	 his	 teachings	 put	more	 emphasis	 on	 a	 practical	 stance	of	 understanding	by	
putting	 ourselves	 in	 the	 position	 to	 understand	 the	 nature	 of,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 problems	 associated	





well	 argued	 in	 Long.
186
		 Even	more	 so,	 his	 emphasis	 is	 on	moral	 practice	 and	 exercise	 rather	 than	
theory	or	 academic	 learning.
187
		 This	 approach	particularly	 aligns	well	with	 the	 insights	 of	 the	First	
Noble	 Truth	of	 understanding,	 knowing	 and	 embracing	 the	 reality	 of	dukkha	 –	 to	 understand	 that	
suffering	 is	a	part	of	us,	not	as	an	academic	exercise,	but	an	exercise	 in	our	own	 ‘art	of	 living’.	 	He	
warns	of	being	 ‘uneducated	in	life’188	–	to	have	a	beginner’s	mind	or	to	have	a	mind	where	we	have	
gained	 insight	 into	dukkha,	 and,	 as	 Long	 points	 out,189	philosophy	 is	 not	 a	 question	 of	 choosing	 a	
profession	but	of	selecting	a	certain	lifestyle.			









	comes	 through	 education,	 which	 ultimately	 concerns	 understanding	 the	 truth	 of	 dukkha.		
Here	is	a	sample	from	Epictetus,	he	says	‘the	free	man	who	has	seriously	examined	the	matter,	and,	
as	you	might	expect,	had	discovered	the	truth	about	it.		But	if	you	look	for	it	where	it	does	not	exist,	
why	be	 surprised	 if	 you	never	 find	 it?’






















wisdom	 through	 being	 educated	 in	 the	 matters	 of	 life.	 	 The	 same	message	 of	 learning	 from	 the	
lessons	of	life	already	appears	in	Aeschylus:	 ‘suffering	that	leads	to	the	understanding	of	one’s	fault’,	
or	put	another	way	‘wisdom	comes	through	suffering’.193	
The	 theme	 of	 knowledge	 and	 ignorance	 appears	 as	 dualities	 in	many	ways	 in	 other	 schools	 of	
thought:	the	Hindu	Bhagavad	Gita194	talks	of	‘light	and	darkness’	in	the	sense	of	light	as	the	lamp	of	
wisdom	and	knowledge	and	darkness	as	ignorance:	that	is,	to	understand	and	appreciate	the	‘light’,	



















dukkha	 is	a	process	of	knowing	and	assimilating	an	understanding	of	the	problem:	 if	we	 	do	not	do	




We	 should	 not	 be	 too	 optimistic	 about	 this	 task	 of	 recognition;	 it	 is	 not	 necessarily	 a	 simple	
matter	 to	 recognise	one’s	 suffering,	 since	by	 its	very	nature	suffering	can	be	deep-rooted	either	 in	
the	subconscious	(it	can	be	so	habitual	and	normalised	we	fail	to	recognise	it)	or	hidden	behind	many	
masks	 and	 layers	of	 a	 conditioned	mind	and	protected	by	our	 ego.	 	Both	Epictetus	 and	Buddhism	
staunchly	 share	 the	 same	 view	 that	 in	 order	 to	 deal	 with	 our	 suffering	 we	 must	 first	 recognise,	
acknowledge	 and	 accept	 our	 suffering	 for	 what	 it	 is,	 a	 part	 of	 life,	 unavoidable,	 inevitable	 -	 to	
Buddhists	this	means	having	understanding,	 insight	and	knowing	what	is	behind	our	suffering,	that	
is,	 the	essence	of	 the	First	Noble	Truth.	 	Epictetus’	 teaching	 responds	with	a	similar	notion	that	we	





















with	 life	 because	 of	 his	 difficulties	 and	 asks	 Epictetus	 for	 advice.
201 Epictetus	 is	 very	 direct:	 	 ‘It	 is	
difficulties	 that	 show	 what	 men	 are’
202  and	 our	 struggle	 means	 we	 must	 contend	 with	 our	
circumstances	as	men.		His	response	is	one	of	uncompromising	realism	but	also	trying	to	awaken	us.		
Epictetus	argues	time	and	time	again	that	we	must	master	the	art	of	living: ‘living	an	examined	life	
and	not	 to	 accept	 any	 impression	unexamined’;203	‘know	 thyself	 by	 reflecting	within	 and	 turn	 your	
thoughts	upon	yourselves,	find	out	what	preconceived	ideas	you	have’;204	‘look	towards	yourself	for	




in	 touch	 with	 what	 he	 has	 difficulties	 with	 and	 why	 he	 is	 dissatisfied.	 	 In	 dealing	 with	 these	
requirements Epictetus’	strategy	and	purpose	is	a	practical	one,	to	discipline	one’s	mind	towards	the	
practical	 goal	 of	 applying	 our	 understanding,	 knowing	 and	 insight	 regarding	 the	 truth	 of	 suffering	
(dukkha)	 into	 practice	 in	 our	 own	 life,	 in	 order	 to	 deal	 with	 those	 experiences	 and	 situations	 that	












• The	clinging	 five	aggregates	 (one	of	material	 form,	and	 four	 related	 to	 the	mind	 -	 feelings,	


















• Ordinary	 suffering	 (dukkha	 dukkha	 –	 ‘suffering	 of	 suffering’)	 concerned	 with	 the	 cycle	 of	
human	life	(from	birth,	illness,	old	age	through	to	death,	and	all	that	happens	in	between);	






























212 is	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 why	 we	 suffer.	 	 So	 death	 is	 neither	 terrible	 nor	 the	 cause	 of	 our	
suffering,	 it	 is	 our	 own	 judgement	 and	 opinion	 about	 death	 that	 disturbs	 us.	 	 This	 statement	 of	
Epictetus	holds	for	all	circumstances	and	for	all	three	of	the	categories	of	suffering.		
In	 an	 interesting	 passage	 Epictetus	 discusses	 the	 body	 and	mind	 heritage	we	 have	 been	 given	
from	our	birth.
213 	 	 In	 choosing	between	 the	 two	elements,	man	 for	 the	most	part	 tends	 to	 incline	
towards	 an	 attachment	 to	 the	 former	 element	 rather	 than	 the	 latter	 element	 and	 through	 this	























attention	 to	 its	 unimportance.  He	 further	 labours	 the	 point	 by	 his	 statement	 about	 the	






that	manacles	one’s	freedom’.220    
Some	of	the	evident	points	being	made	here	by	Epictetus	are:	(i)	we	need	to	understand	what	is	
not	under	our	control	and	in	particular	‘our	body’,221 (ii)	we	should	live	in	accord	with	nature;	obedient	
to	 it	also	 is	our	body,	both	 in	sickness	and	health,	and	through	stages	of	our	growth,	development	
and	 ageing
222






can	do	 is	 to	 accept	 the	 truth	of	 death,	 it	 is	 certain	 to	 come	and	 it	 is	 not	 evil,	 and	we	 should	 think	
rationally	about	our	fear	of	it.		In	the	Buddhist	canon	the	following	is	a	remark	about	human	life: ‘It	is	
short,	 limited	and	brief;	 it	 is	 full	of	suffering,	full	of	tribulation.	 	This	one	should	wisely	understand.		






















	‘…	but	 if	 you	 try	 to	 avoid	 disease	 or	 death	 or	 poverty,	 you	will	 experience	misfortune	…	




228  asks	 What	 is	 death?	 Death	 is	 the	 passing	 away,	 disappearance,	
completion	of	time,	casting	off	the	body,	and	interruption	in	the	life	faculty.		What	is	ageing?		Ageing	
is	 whatever	 decrepitude,	 brokenness,	 greying,	 wrinkling,	 decline	 of	 life-force,	 weakening	 of	 the	
faculties	we	may	experience	in	old	age.		What	is	illness	and	pain?	Whatever	pain,	discomfort,	ailment,	
infection,	disease		may	afflict	our	body	or	bodily	functions.		
No	 one	 who	 is	 born	 is	 free	 from	 ageing	 and	 death,	 irrespective	 of	 wealth,	 status,	 beauty,	
possessions	 and	 property: ‘The	 beautiful	 chariots	 of	 kings	 wear	 out,	 this	 body	 too	 undergoes	
decay.’






nature.	 	 Epictetus	 asks
230 ‘How	 treat	 your	 paltry	 body,	 then?	 	 As	 its	 nature	 is’,	 but	 we	 should	 not	
interpret	 this	 as	meaning	we	 should	 neglect	 our	 body;	 rather,	 it	 is	 in	 the	 charge	 of	 someone	 else	
[God]	 and,	 as	 Long	 remarks,
231





‘For	 if	he	avoids	anything	 that	 is	not	a	matter	of	 choice,	he	knows	 that	 some	 time	he	will	
encounter	something	in	spite	of	his	aversion	to	it,	and	will	come	to	grief’
232 



















Death	is	not	up	to	us;	it	is	according	to	nature.     
2.2.3.3	Suffering	Regarding	Change		
Suffering	due	to	change	(vipariṇāma-dukkhataa)	is	based	on	the	lesson	of	impermanence	(anicca	
–	 ‘a’	 nothing,	 ‘nicca’	 meaning	 constant,	 continuous,	 permanent),	 which	 is	 the	 notion	 that	 all	 of	
conditioned	 existence,	 with	 no	 exceptions,	 is	 transient,	 subject	 to	 change.	 	 Buddha	 taught	 that	
because	 all	 things	 are	 impermanent,	 our	 attachments	 to	 things,	 whether	 physical	 or	 mental	
formations,	will	ultimately	lead	to	suffering. This	type	of	suffering	thus	arises	when	we	are	enjoying	
what	we	desire	and	 the	pleasurable	experiences	 in	 life	and	we	want	 this	experience	 to	continue	as	
long	as	possible	if	not	forever:	we	become	attached	to	this	experience,	we	personally	identify	with	it	
(1.2.3).	 	When	change	happens	and	we	become	separated	from	what	pleases	us,	what	we	crave	for,	
what	 we	 are	 attached	 to,	 this	 separation	 causes	 us	 to	 suffer.	 	What	 is	 it	 that	 is	 attached?	 	 Is	 it	 a	
physical	or	psychological	attachment?		We	say	‘I	am	suffering’	or	‘I	suffer’.		Who	or	what	is	this	‘I’	that	






lead	 to	a	 state	of	 suffering:	we	attach	ourself	 to	 this	 stream	and	 identify	 an	enigmatic	 ‘I’	with	 this	
attachment	and	consequently	with	this	suffering.		As	argued	and	explained	in	1.2.3,	despite	different	
views	about	the	self/non-self	in	Buddhism	and	Stoicism,	such	metaphysical	issues	are	not	relevant	to	
our	pursuit	 of	 using	 the	Four	Noble	Truths	or	 the	 five	aggregates.	 	Discussing	 the	 ‘I’	 or	 ‘me’	 that	 is	
suffering	only	distracts	from	any	comparison	between	Buddhism	and	Epictetus	and	the	problem	of	
suffering	due	to	change	and	 impermanence.	 	The	same	arguments	as	discussed	here	 (and	 in	1.2.2)	
about	 self/non-self
236
	also	 apply	 to	 the	 suffering	 considered	 in	 2.2.3.4	 and	 elsewhere	 in	 this	 thesis	
where	we	compare	Buddhism	and	Epictetus.		

















these	 changes	 can	 make	 us	 dissatisfied.	 	 The	 more	 we	 crave,	 grasp	 at	 and	 attach	 ourselves	 to	
pleasant	things,	the	more	likely	we	are	to	increase	the	suffering	in	our	life.		
We	always	feel	comforted	by	what	we	know,	what	we	are	familiar	with	and	what	we	have,	 love	
and	own.	 	Even	the	thought	and	uncertainty	about	 things	changing	and	being	taken	away	 from	us	
causes	 us	 anxiety	 and	 suffering.	 	We	 feel	 at	 ease	 and	more	 secure	 if	we	 know	 that	 things	will	 not	
change.	 	Many	things	that	change	are	simply	out	of	our	control	and	our	clinging	to	such	things	will	
cause	us	suffering.	 	So	the	truth	behind	this	suffering	 is	man’s	 inability	to	accept	the	 impermanent	
nature	 of	 life	 (things	 and	 experiences)	 and	 our	 attachment	 to	 them	 becomes	 the	 cause	 of	 our	
suffering	–	in	other	words	man	needs	to	acknowledge	and	accept	he	has	no	control	over	things	that	
are	 inconstant,	 unsteady	 and	 impermanent.	 	 Teachings	 on	 the	 perpetual	 state	 of	 change,	 or	
impermanence,	are	 found	 in	many	philosophies	and	belief	 systems	 including	Buddhism,	Hinduism,	








things	 that	 cannot	 be	 taken	 away	…	 In	 such	 fashion	 do	 you	 too	 remind	 yourself	 that	 the	
object	of	your	love	is	mortal;	it	is	not	one	of	your	own	possession;	it	has	been	given	you	for	
the	present,	not	inseparably	nor	for	ever’.239  
Presenting	 these	 views	Epictetus	wants	 us	 to	 recognise	 the	 inevitable	 truth	 of	 impermanence	 and	
attachment.		He	is	unequivocal	in	this	and	wants	us	to	be	in	no	doubt	that	this	applies	to	everything	
in	 life	and	our	 suffering;	 the	object	of	our	 love	or	attachment	may	not	be	a	person,	but	a	material	
possession.		
Those	 things	 that	 are	 subject	 to	 hindrance,	 deprivation	 and	 compulsion	 are	 not	 our	 own,	 but	
those	that cannot	be	hindered	are	our	own, says	Epictetus,240	following	the	principle	of	what	is	and	is	
not	 in	 our	 control.	 	 Epictetus’	 account	 emphasises	 that	 to	 think	 that	 possession	 and	 ownership	 is	
eternal	 is	 a	 serious	 flaw	 in	 our	 thinking;	 it	 is	 a	 temporal	 possession	 that	 can	 be	 taken	 away	 or	
removed	 at	 any	 time.	 	 Such	 an	 error	 in	 thinking	 causes	 us	 to	 suffer	 badly,	 especially	 as	 we	 get	
emotionally	and	personally	attached	and	we	identify	our	self	with	these	attachments.			
Epictetus,	 like	 the	Buddhists	 and	others,	 says	 that	 all	 that	 comes	 into	 existence	will	 eventually	
change	 into	 something	 else,	 as	 life	 turns	 into	 death:	 all	will	 follow	 this	 natural	 law	 of	 change	 and	



















Trying	 to	 control	 what	 happens	 and	 wish	 for	 things	 not	 to	 change	 is	 a	 recipe	 for	 discontent.	 	 As	
Epictetus	 insists:	 ‘For	 the	 origin	 of	 sorrow	 is	 this	 –	 to	 wish	 for	 something	 that	 does	 not	 come	 to	
pass.’
242




	and	 ‘I	want	 something,	 and	 it	 does	not	happen;	 and	what	 creature	 is	more	wretched	
than	I?	I	do	not	want	something,	and	it	does	happen;	and	what	creature	is	more	wretched	than	I?’244		













































• Mental	 formations	(sankhāra)251	–	passive	sense:	 in	general	conditioned	phenomena	and	 in	
particular	 all	 mental	 dispositions,	 conditioned	 things,	 fabrications	 or	 volitional	
formations;active	sense:		kamma	that	leads	to	Dependent	Origination;	
• Consciousness (viññāṇa)252 –		consciousness,	mental	life	force,	mind,	or	discernment.		
The	Nidance	 Samyutta253	presents	 a	 sequence	 of	 twelve	 conditioned	 and	 conditioning	 links	 of	
Dependent	Origination.	 	These	twelve	 links	are	cause-effect	 links;	each	element	conditions	the	next	
link	in	the	chain:		from	ignorance	arise	volitional	formations;	then	arises	consciousness;	and	so	on	to	
the	arising	of	sensory	stimulation;	then	arise	feelings;	then	arises	consciousness;	then	arise	cravings;	
then	 arises	 grasping;	 and	 so	 on	 to	 suffering	 (sankhāra-dukkhataa).	 	 In	 a	 similar	 way	 we	 can	 trace	
backwards	 from	 the	 question	 ‘What	 is	 the	 origin	 of	 sankhāra-dukkhataa?’	 to	 the	 answer	 ‘spiritual	
ignorance’.		The	following	is	an	example	of	some	of	these	conditioned	links:	
• The	senses	(salayatana)	are	a	condition	for	contact	(to	experience	external	impressions);	










known	 by	 this	 name	 by	 Epictetus.	 	 However,	 we	 can	 argue	 that	 it	 is	 a	 concept	 embedded	 in	 his	
teaching	 and	 is	 clearly	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 it:	 to	 see	 this	 we	 only	 need	 to	 consider	 many	
interrelated	areas	of	discourse	such	as	the	role	of	the	use	of	the	suffering	in	the	context	of	active	and	
passive	 language	 and	Stoic	 categories	 (3.3),	 the	 pathological	 states	 of	mind
254
	(Chapter	 3)	 and	 the	
psychology	 of	moral	 choice	 (4.4).	 	We	 can	 immediately	 see	 this	 concept	 in	 his	 teaching
255
	on	 the	
proper	use	of	our	 impressions,	our	 judgements,	 impulses	and	actions,	 and	attachments	 to	desires:		
the	cause	of	our	doing	or	not	doing	something,	saying	or	not	saying	something,	being	elated	or	cast	
down,	avoiding	or	pursuing	something	is	due	to	conditioning,	conditioning	of	our	mind.		As	Epictetus	


















feelings,	 desires	 and	 attachments	 involves	 a	 determining	 cause.	 	 Supporting	 this	 argument	 is	 the	
following	 from	 Epictetus:	 ‘Things	 seen	 by	 the	 mind	 (which	 the	 philosophers	 call	 φαντασίας),	
whereby	 the	 intellect	 of	man	 is	 struck	 at	 the	 very	 first	 sight	 of	 anything,	which	 penetrates	 to	 the	
mind,	are	not	subject	to	his	will,	nor	to	his	control,	but	by	virtue	of	a	certain	force	of	their	own	thrust	
themselves	 upon	 the	 attention	of	men;	 but	 the	 assents	 (which	 they	 call	 συγκαταθέσεις),	whereby	
these	 same	 things	 seen	 by	 the	mind	 are	 recognised,	 are	 subject	 to	man’s	 will,	 and	 fall	 under	 his	
control’.256	
This,	 albeit	 in	 Epictetus’	 words,	 captures	 the	 Buddhist	 notion	 of	 Dependent	Origination’	 (2.2.3.4).		
We	 can,	when	 confronted	with	 ‘things	 seen	 by	 the	mind’,	 assent	 to	 them	 or	we	 can	 dissent	 from	










































again	sound	very	similar	 to	 the	Buddhist	principle	of	Dependent	Origination:	 this	arises	because	of	
that.		As	Epictetus	remarks,264 we	all	have	views	of:		
‘what	ought	to	be	done	and	what	ought	not,	good	and	evil,	 fair	and	foul,	and	on	these	grounds	
assign	praise	and	blame,	censure	and	 reprehension,	passing	 judgements	on	 fair	and	 foul	practices,	
and	discriminating	between	them.’			






















The	 following	 table	 summarises	 the	 types	 of	 suffering	 and	 associated	 feelings	 discussed	 in	
2.2.3.2-2.2.3.4,	showing	how	the	Buddhist	scheme	can	also	be	found	in	the	discourses	of	Epictetus.	
Suffering	 Aspects	 Feelings	and	Emotions	 Discourses	
















































































































































































to	understand	 for	 knowing	 the	existence	of	 suffering	 in	our	 lives.	 	Understanding	dispositions,	 the	
conditioned	mind,	provides	insight	into	suffering	and	its	existence	in	our	lives.		What	we	do,	think	and	




disorder.	 	 Subsequently,	 Epictetus	 leaves	 us	 in	 no	 doubt	 that	 when	 we	 are	 in	 such	 a	 state	 our	
prohairesis	 is	dysfunctional	leaving	us	morally	harmed	or	injured	in	some	way	(4.6.2).	 	Our	evidence	
for	 this	 in	Epictetus	 is	well	attested	by	his	 repeated	and	characteristic	challenges	to	prove	that	the	
prohairesis	 is	 the	 key	 to	our	moral	 existence	 (4.4),	 and	 the	 force	of	 this	 claim	 can	be	 linked	 to	 the	
dynamic	 interaction	 between	 the	 active	 and	 the	 passive	 (3.3),	 thus	 rendering	 us	 acting	 upon	
ourselves,	our	dispositional	choice	compelling	us	 to	be	morally	 right	or	wrong.	 	Epictetus	disclaims	
any	notion	that	the	soul	could	ever	be	healthy	if	the	prohairesis275	is	not	healthy,	that	is,	functioning	in	
accord	with	nature	and	our	own	reasoning	faculty	as	our	true	nature.			
The	 term	nosos	 can	variously	mean	sickness,	 illness	and	disease.	 	Sometimes	 the	word	nosos	 is	
specifically	 used	 to	 denote	 illness,	 which	 in	 common	 modern	 day	 usage	 is	 often	 applied	
interchangeably	with	‘disease’,	although	one	is	able	to	argue	that	they	can	be	distinguished:	illness	is	
more	a	subjective	feeling	(e.g.	 feeling	of	anxiety	without	any	reason,	a	 feeling	about	some	present	







in	 reporting	 the	Stoic	view.	 	Galen	applies	 the	 term	nosos	only	 to	 the	condition	 that	 is	opposite	 to	
































ruins	 the	 soul	 itself	 and	 annihilates	 the	whole	 of	 its	 power’.	282		 Disease	 is	 portrayed	 in	 both	 these	
cases	as	a	lack	of	common	sense,	having	no	discernible	meaning	or	purpose	for	the	state	of	madness,	
and	 destroying	 the	 power	 of	 the	mind	 to	 function	 properly	 and	 as	 a	 consequence	 damaging	 and	
injuring	the	soul.			
We	have	Epictetus	asking	us	‘What	is	injury?’		We	need	to	move	away	from	the	notion	of	an	injury	
being	 damage	 or	 harm	 to	 the	 body	 or	 possessions	 and	 view	 injury	 as	 follows:	 ‘So-and-so	 injured	












Epictetus	considers	 injustice	to	be	a	nosos	as	 it	 reflects	the	soul	of	a	non-virtuous	person:	 it	 is	a	























the	 good	 and	 the	 evil.	 	 The	 language	 of	 disease	 is	 very	 commonly	 used	 by	Greek	 philosophers	 to	
express	a	multitude	of	problems.	In	the	Platonic	Epistles,	we	find	‘the	nosos	of	insanity’287	as	the	mind	
is	 deranged	 and	 not	 functioning	 as	 it	 should	 and	 in	 Plato’s	Gorgias	 ‘the	 nosēma	of	 his	 injustice’288	
reflecting	man’s	wrongdoing	to	himself	and	possibly	others,	needing	attention	before	 it	becomes	a	











to	 his	 question	 ‘What	 will	 you	make	 of	 disease?’
292
		 The	 sort	 of	 person	 a	 man	 is	 depends	 on	 the	
condition	 of	 his	 soul	 and	 whether	 this	 condition	 is	 contrary	 to	 nature,	 in	 which	 case	 his	 soul	 is	
disordered	and	damaged,	in	other	words	it	 is	 in	a	state	of	disease.	 	 If	man	gets	the	right	idea	about	








As	 discussed	 (1.3.3,	 1.7.2,	 2.2)	 disease	 (nosos)	 is	 caused	 by	 our	 ignorance:	 wrong	 impressions,	
perceptions,	 judgements,	actions	and	the	like.	 	Epictetus,	 in	a	Discourse	on	struggling	with	external	
impressions,	 gives	 us	 the	 notion	 of	 nosos and	 infirmity	 (arrostēma)	 of	 the	 soul	 in	 relation	 to	 the	
psychology	 of	 being	 confronted	 with	 external	 impressions:
293
	this	 relates	 to	 how	 we	 might	 be	
disposed	 towards	 such	 impressions,	 that	 is,	 those	 inherent	 qualities	 and	 characteristics	 of	 ourself	
that	 pull	 us	 towards	 or	 push	 us	 away	 form	 these	 impressions.	 	 He	 plays	 out	 the	 significance	 of	
impressions	and	our	processing	of	them,	in	particular,	the	pathology	of	the	language	we	might	use,	




































arrostēma,	both	of	which	are	generally	defined	as	 illness	or	sickness.	 	 	Stobaeus297	defined	 infirmity	
(arrostēma)	as	a	disease	accompanied	by	a	‘weakness’	(astheneia).		The	Stoics	preferred	to	think	of	a	
person’s	weakness	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 lacking	 the	 ability	 to	 act	 and	 control	 one's	 own	 impulses,	 one’s	
desires,	passions	or	vices.		According	to	Diogenes	Laertius,	Zeno	referred	to	arrostēma	as	‘a	disease	

















soul	 	 being	of	 a	 certain	 quality	 in	 terms	of	 ‘lack	of	 tone’	 (atonia)	 and	 ‘weakness’	 (arrostēma)	when	
because	 of	 the	 judgement	made	 the	 soul	 either	 yields	 or	 persists	 intolerant	 to	 the	 commands	 of	
correct	 reas0ning.	 	We	may	 be	 excited	 and	 aroused	 by	 certain	 external	 impressions	 in	 a	way	 that	
makes	us	envious	and	jealous.	 	Such	an	arousal	 is	caused	by	a	faulty	 judgement,	a	failure	to	realise	
the	 evil	 behind	 our	 envy	 together	 with	 an	 underlying	 moral	 weakness	 of	 the	 soul	 towards	 being	




































Epictetus’	 text	distinguishes	between	 impediment	as	 a	moral	obstruction	and	 impediment	as	a	
physical	hindrance:	an	impediment	in	the	sense	of	the	body	is	a	hindrance	by	external	physical	forces	





Epictetus	builds	on	 this	view	 to	 further	 clarify	 this	notion	of	 self-determination	and	 freedom	of	










impediments	 or	 hindrances	 (pañca	 nīvaraṇāni)	 that	 hinder	 the	 development	 of	 the	 mind	 towards	
insight	and	freedom	from	suffering.305  These	Buddhist five	impediments	function	in	a	similar	way	



































becomes	 disturbed	 and	 if	 this	 disposition	 becomes	 ingrained	 and	 habitual,	 the	 more	 lasting	 the	
disease	becomes,	more	hardened	and	fixed.			
Epictetus,	 time	 and	 time	 again,	 puts	 forward	 the	 imperative	 of	 the	 good,	 relating	 to	 living	 in	




right	 life-style	choices	 in	 regard	to	 things	 that	are	up	to	us	and	those	not	up	to	us	and	accordingly	
whether	 these	 choices	 will	 dispose	 us	 to	 being	 morally	 strong	 or	 infirm,	 healthy	 or	 diseased.	 	 In	
Aristotle’s	 view,	 virtue	 and	 vice	 are	 states	 that	 are	 concerned	 with	 choices,	 good	 or	 bad,	 thus	
resulting	 in	 the	 moral	 constitution	 or	 disposition	 of	 the	 soul.
310
		 As	 Long	 comments,	 Epictetus	
emphasises	our	natural	autonomy	to	choose	and	act,	and	to	assign	values	to	things;	and	the	proper	
condition	of	the	prohairesis	is	complete	autonomy.311				



























hexis,	 a	 state,	 disposition	 or	 habit	 of	 the	 body	 or	 mind,	 which	 is	 interpreted	 as	 being	 a	 more	
permanent	state	of	mind.	
Buddhism	and	Dispositions	
Buddhists	 refer	 to	 sankhara	 (1.2	 and	 1.7.2-3)	 in	 the	 passive	 sense	 (dispositions	 or	 mental	
formations)	 and	 in	 the	 active	 sense	 to	 kamma	 and	 volitional	 actions	 (see	 1.2.1,	 2.2.3.4,	 1.7.2).			
Buddhists	talk	of	the	individuation	of	a	person	in	the	sense	of	discovering	the	psychic	or	pathological	
person	we	 are	 and	 our	 human	personality,
314








• Dispositions,	 although	 causally	 conditioned	 and	 processing	 the	 other	 factors	 of	
personality,	are	significant	to	individuation;	









Taking	 account	 of	 our	 discussion	 in	 1.2,	 this	 Buddhist	 view	 resonates	 with	 the	 thinking	 and	
language	of	Epictetus,	regarding	the	conditioned	mind:	our	power	of	volition	(moral	choice)	and	that	
how	we	feel,	think	and	act	reflects	how	we	mould	our	personality.		The	nature	of	the	subject	(the	self	
or	 the	 human	 person),	 who	 experiences	 suffering,	 is	 a	 discussion	 involving	 many	 metaphysical	
differences	and	controversial	views	as	revealed	by	modern	scholarship.	 	This	is	why,	as	explained	in	
1.2.2-1.2.3,	we	have	avoided	a	comparative	discussion	on	the	metaphysical	aspects,	and	why	we	have	
remained	 with	 the	 Four	 Noble	 Truths	 (1.2),	 which	 provide	 a	 neutral	 ground	 for	 comparison.	 	 In	
particular,	in	1.2.3	we	also	restricted	our	discussion	of	‘self’	and	‘non-self’	in	the	context	of	Buddha’s	
teaching	strategies	to	avoid	being	distracted	from	the	pragmatic	goal	of	dealing	with	our	suffering.			





























The	 Stoics	 defined	 four	 categories	 of	 being	 or	 becoming:	 substance (hypokeimenon),	 quality	
(poion),	 disposition	 (pos	 echon),	 and	 relative	 disposition	 (pros	 ti	 pos	 echon).	 	 De	 Lacy,	 Menn	 and	




general	 and	 not	 particularly	 aimed	 towards	 suffering;	 nevertheless	 it	 offers	 an	 insightful	
interpretation	for	the	arguments	that	follow.		As	we	see,	two	of	these	relate	to	disposition:	to	possess	









nature	 and	 if	 he	 is	 disposed	 in	 the	 opposite	 way	 then	 he	 will	 enjoy	 a	 disturbed,	 disconnented,	
dissatisfied	 life	discordant	with	nature.	 	So	we	can	be	disposed	 in	a	way	 that	makes	us	 feel	bad	or	




state	 of	 our	mind.	 	 Epictetus,	 in	 accordance	with	 ancient	 tradition,	 conforms	 to	 the	 view	 that	 the	
disposition	of	our	soul	 in	regard	to	virtue	and	vice	refers	 in	a	 less	normative	sense	to	our	happiness	
and	suffering	and	various	other	qualities	related	to	us,	such	as	health	and	disease.		The	healthy	soul	is	













suffering	 and	 perturbed	 by	 pathē.	 	 Hence	 health,	 disease	 and	 infirmity	 are	 themselves	 types	 of	
disposition.			















in	 a	 bad	way	 (κακῶς	 ἔχειν)’.325		Man’s	 disposition	may	be	 such	 as	 to	 leave	 him	worse	 than	 a	 dead	










despair’	 to	 contrast	 the	 effects	 of	 an	 unsound	 or	 deranged	 mind	 with	 those	 of	 a	 rational	 one.
327
		


























destroys	 his	modest	 disposition	 and	 character.
331





















may	 possess	 sound	 judgements	 (ὀρθὰ	 δόγματα	 ἔχεις)	 or	 unsound	 (φαῦλα)	 judgements;335	our	































that	we	are	self-sufficient:	 I	am	able	 to	get	greatness	of	soul	and	nobility	of	character	 from	myself	
(ἐγὼ	 οὖν	 ἔχων	 ἐξ	 ἐμαυτοῦ	 λαβεῖν	 τὸ	 μεγαλόψυχον	 καὶ	 γενναῖον).347		 	 This	 powerful	 resource	 we	


















Following	 on	 from	 this,	 Epictetus	 raises	 the	 question	 of	 the	 ethical	 basis	 of	 man’s	 actions	 and	
whether	they	are	rightly	performed,	that	is,	in	accord	with	nature	‘for	our	losses	and	our	pains	have	
to	do	only	with	 the	 things,	which	we	possess’.355		He	 remarks	we	 should	be	possessed	of	 the	 right	
provisions	 for	 the	 journey	 of	 life.
356
























we	 decide	what	 is	 best	 for	 us.	 	 So	what	 appears	 to	 be	 better,	 to	 be	 ‘in	 a	 disgraceful	 state’
357	and	







all	 can	agree,	but	applying	 this	 to	particular	 circumstances	does	not	always	meet	with	agreement.		




Reason	 is	 the	most	 important	 thing	 we	 have,	 the	most	 superior	 of	 all	 man’s	 features	 and	 we	
should	be	disposed	towards	making	it	beautiful,	being	disposed	in	such	a	way	as	not	to	be	possessed	
of	 wretched	 judgements	 (πονη	 ρὰ	ἔχεις	 δόγματα)361	but	 possessed	 of	 sound	 judgements	 (ὀρθὰ	
δόγματα	 ἔχεις).362		 Of	 all	 the	 possessions	 man	 has	 his	 reason	 and	 judgement	 is	 uniquely	 his	 to	
control.
363












troubles’	 (πᾶσά	σοι	ἀσφάλεια,	πᾶσά	σοι	εὐμάρεια,	πρᾶγμα	οὐκ	ἔχεις)367 as	 long	as	you	maintain	a	
will	 to	guard	 those	 things	under	your	control	and	make	 them	conformable	 to	 	nature.	 	Man’s	 soul,	
however,	may	be	petrified,	his	disposition	so	hardened	as	to	make	his	opinions	trapped,	immovable	
and	 rigid	 to	 change;	 he	 is	 regarded	 as	 ‘being	 in	 a	 bad	 way	 (κακῶς	 ἔχειν)’368	and	 he	 is	 in	 such	 a	
wretched	and	miserable	way	 ...	 ‘His	 self-respect	 and	 sense	of	 shame	have	been	destroyed	and	his	




























from	 these,	 including	 our	 use	 of	 judgements,	 impressions	 and	 preconceptions	 and	 so	 on
371
	and	
whether	we	 have	 had	 enough	 time	 to	 prepare	 and	 train	 ourselves	 for	 the	 future	 (ἔσχες	 εἰς	 τοῦτο	
ἱκανὸν	χρόνον)	and	whether	we	will	win	the	contest	of	life,	putting	into	practice	what	we	have	learnt	
and	 testing	 how	well	 we	 have	 trained	 ourselves.














What	 should	 the	 future	 target	 of	 our	 training	 be?	 	 The	 target	 should	 be	 towards	 our	 moral	
purpose,	 and	 not	 turned	 outwards,	 towards	 things	 that	 are	 not	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 moral	 purpose;	
otherwise	‘you	will	have	neither	your	desire	successful	 in	attaining	what	it	would,	nor	your	aversion	
successful	 in	 avoiding	 what	 it	 would’;
376









380	and	 you	 shall	 apply	 that	 criterion.381		Our	 lessons	 should	 teach	 us	 how	we	
should	 live	 in	 the	 future,	 what	 our	 focus	 should	 be,	 and	 what	 we	 should	 let	 go.	 	 ‘You	 cannot	 be	
continually	giving	attention	to	both	externals	and	your	own	governing	principle.		But	if	you	want	the	























we	 consider	 is	 the	 verb	 prosechō	 (προσ+έχω)	 to	 be	 disposed	 towards	 something	 in	 the	 sense	 of	
turning	 one’s	mind,	 thoughts	 or	 attention	 to	 something.	 	We	 shall	 in	 5.3	 consider	 the	 therapeutic	
aspect	of	turning	one’s	mind	and	thoughts	towards	curing	our	suffering	and	where	we	use	the	related	
noun	prosochē,	which	simply	means	attention.		
In	 the	 case	 of	 Epictetus,	 prosechō	 relates	 to	 focusing	 our	 mind	 or	 thoughts	 to	 whatever	 is	
important	 regarding	our	moral	purpose.	 	 ‘At	 the	 instant	 I	am	being	called	 to	do	something;	at	 this	
instant	I	shall	go	home	with	the	purpose	of	observing	(προσέξων)	the	due	measure	which	I	ought	to	













are	 being	 careless	 about	 the	 good	 and	 evil,	 and	 about	 that	 which	 is	 indifferent.
386
		 	 Turning	 our	
thoughts	to	the	things	that	are	important	to	ensure	a	virtuous	life	such	as	keeping	our	moral	purpose	
in	a	good	state	is	to	pay	attention	and	attach	ourself	to	these	things;	we	ought	to	attach	ourselves	to	
the	 general	 principles	 and	 have	 them	 at	 our	 command	 at	 all	 times.
387








of	 submitting	 or	 giving	 myself	 up;
390







































and	 application.	 	 Gill,	 Sachs,	 Rorty,	 Polansky,	 Ross,	 Hutchinson	 and	 Russell	 provide	 some	
commentary	on	the	use	of	hexis	in	Aristotle	(with	some	informative	comparison	with	diathesis).395		It	




on	possessing	 virtue	or	on	displaying	 it	 –	on	hexis	 or	 on	 the	manifestation	of	 a	hexis	 in	 action’397	–	
hence	 moral	 virtue	 is	 made	 up	 of	 hexis.	 	Aristotle	 points	 out,	 to	 which	 the	 Stoics	 agree,	 ‘Habits	
(hexeis)	are	also	dispositions;	but	dispositions	are	not	always	habits’.398		However,	Aristotle	and	the	
Stoics	do	have	different	views	about	hexis	and	diathesis.	 	Aristotle	makes	the	distinction	the	degree	













likewise	 of	 bad	 things	 some	 are	 hexeis	 and	 some	 are	 diatheseis,	 and	 some	 neither;	 all	 vices	 are	
diatheseis	 whereas	 proclivities,	 sickness	 and	 infirmities	 are	 hexeis.	 	 Graver	 contends	 that	 the	































Aristotle	 argued	 ‘Moral	 goodness	 …	 is	 the	 result	 of	 habit	 …	 none	 of	 the	 moral	 virtues	 is	
engendered	 in	 us	 by	 nature,	 since	 nothing	 that	 is	 what	 it	 is	 by	 nature	 can	 be	 made	 to	 behave	
differently	 by	 habituation	…	moral	 virtues,	 then,	 are	 engendered	 in	 us	 neither	 by	 nor	 contrary	 to	









and	 accustom	 yourself	 to	 something	 else	 instead’.
405
		 In	 other	 words	 we	 do	 things	 out	 of	 habit:	
continuous	practice	of	 these	 things	we	do	will	 sustain	 them;	 they	become	fluent	and	 they	become	






profitable	 habits	 we	 should	 nurture	 and	 the	 unprofitable	 ones	 we	 should	 extirpate.
407
		 The	
Dhammapada	 reflects	 the	 same	 thoughts:	 ‘having	 done	 evil,	 don’t	 repeat	 it,	 don’t	wish	 for	 it,	 evil	































the	 case	 ‘I	 must	 act	 as	 a	 man’
410
	then	 we	 must	 acquire	 the	 skill	 of	 being	 a	 man	 which	 Epictetus	
reminds	 us	we	must	 practise	 at,	making	our	moral	 purpose	good	 and	making	 right	 judgements	 in	
accord	 with	 nature.	 	 Whatever	 we	 regularly	 practise	 regarding	 the	 affairs	 of	 life	 can	 become	 an	
acquired	 experience	 or	 habit,	 and	 depending	 on	 the	 judgements	 we	 make	 and	 the	 actions	 we	
perform,	 tend	 us	 towards	 being	 disposed	 with	 a	 virtuous	 or	 vicious	 state	 of	 mind.	 	 As	 Simplicius	
notes,	 the	 soul,	 through	 its	 good	 or	 bad	 education	 of	 its	 better	 or	 worse	 hexis,	 is	 to	 be	 held	
responsible	 for	 the	 actions	 arising	 from	 this	 hexis,	 as	 it	 follows	 its	 own	 self-motion	 (the	 prudent	
towards	 the	 prudent,	 licentious	 towards	 the	 licentious);
411
	by	 diagnosing	 the	 actions	 of	 people	we	
understand	their	hexis.		
In	 reviewing	 the	 Skeptical	 position	 found	 in	 Sextus	 Empiricus	 PH	 1.23-24	 Nussbaum	 provides	




		Our	 fixed	and	 ingrained	habits	 can	mean	we	neither	assent	 to	nor	 refuse	 the	
impressions	presented,	without	using	our	reasoning	power,	having	no	reasons	for	taking	action,	that	





































to	 whether	 we	 feed	 our	 angry	 temperament.	 	 This	 example	 from	 Epictetus	 on	 anger	 makes	 his	
point:–	‘If,	therefore,	you	wish	not	to	be	hot-tempered,	do	not	feed	your	habit,	set	before	it	nothing	
on	which	 it	can	grow.	As	the	first	step,	keep	quiet	and	count	the	days	on	which	you	have	not	been	










to	 the	 situation.	 	Our	 disposition	 towards	 the	man	 reviling	 us
419
	is	 based	 on	 our	 judgement	 of	 the	
situation,	 as	 Dobbin	 remarks,
420






If	we	discipline	ourselves	 to	 adopt	 this	point	of	 view	and	exercise	 accordingly	we	 shall	 acquire	 the	




external	 impression	and	this	occurs	time	and	time	again	then	the	wretched	state	we	are	 left	 in	will	
continue	 to	 haunt	 us.	 	 It	 leaves	 us	 with	 a	 bad	 habit	 (hexis)	 of	 mind	 and	 our	 wrong	 opinions	 and	
judgements	and	provides	us	with	arguments	to	justify	our	conduct	in	how	we	respond.	 	 In	this	case	
we	have	made	a	practice	of	doing	what	we	do	not	want	to	do,	and	at	 last	we	will	be	 in	a	wretched	








of	knowledge	and	 instruction	 in	matters,	which	are	 indispensable	 to	 leading	such	a	 life,	 in	keeping	







































vedana	 (painful	 feelings).	 	 In	 Buddhism,	 the	 kilesa428 are	 the	 mental	 states	 that	 manifest	 in	








Epictetus	remarks	there	 is	a	 failure	 in	our	thinking	that	results	 from	not	considering	what	 is	the	
nature	of	your	good	and	evil	and	that	‘The	nature	of	the	good	as	well	as	of	the	evil	lies	in	the	use	of	



























aspects	 of	 our	 lives;	 it	 is	 not	 always	 present	 but	 our	 ignorance	 and	 our	 insistence	 on	 things	 being	
permanent	makes	it	present.		Buddhists	think	of	the	life	of	a	person	in	bondage	as	that	of	someone	




present	 and	 future	 evils.	 	 Of	 course	 this	 view	 is	 not	 universal	 as	 some	 might	 argue	 that	 being	
emotional	makes	us	human,	whereas	Epictetus	argues	that	suffering	makes	us	human,	and	these	are	









of	 life	 and	 the	 loss	 of	 or	 separation	 from	 these	 things:
437










The	 Stoics	 defined	 a	 subclass	 of	 the	 general	 form	 of	 suffering	 (paschō),	 the	 so-called	 passions	
(pathē)	 and	 their	 subspecies:	 lust	 (epithumia),	 pleasure	 (hēdonē),	 fear	 (phobos)	 and	distress	 (lupēe).		


































our	passions	 is	 to	achieve	a	 sense	of	moral	 freedom	from	disturbing	passions	 leading	 to	a	 state	of	
tranquillity	 (apatheia).446		 This	 subclass	 of	 suffering	 highlighted	 by	 the	 Stoics	 relates	 to	 how	 we	
perceive	or	 think	of	 things,	 in	 terms	of	how	we	perceive	 their	 apparent	present	good	or	 evil	 or	 an	
apparent	future	good	or	evil,	or	a	prospective	good	 in	the	future,	or	equally	a	prospective	evil.	 	We	
shall	 throughout	this	 thesis	consider	different	aspects	of	good	and	evil,	 in	 relation	to	our	suffering:	
the	 prospects	 of	 pursuit	 and	 avoidance	 and	 equally	 important	 how	 we	 pursue	 and	 avoid.	 	 This	
involves	the	question	of	what	we	mean	by	good	and	evil,	and	in	the	case	of	Epictetus,	this	relates	to	
the	moral	condition	of	our	soul	 (see	Chapter	4	on	the	prohairesis)	–	whether	 it	be	 in	a	good	or	bad	
condition	now	and	the	prospect	of	a	continuation	or	worsening	of	this	condition.		
We	might	say	we	are	moved	by	 ‘passion	and	emotion’.	 	This	phrase	 is	a	 loose	 interpretation	of	
what	underpins	the	Stoic	theory	of	 the	soul	 that	 it	 is	 in	motion	 (kinēsis)	and	 is	 in	a	state	of	 tension	
(tonos).	 	The	analogy	 is	used	 to	describe	 the	 traditional	 four	Stoic	emotions.447		Chrysippus	viewed	
the	passion	of	lust	(epithumia)	as	the	irrational	stretching	(desire)	or	pursuit	of	an	expected	good,	and	
pleasure	(hēdonē)	as	an	irrational	swelling,	or	fresh	opinion	that	something	good	is	present,	at	which	
people	 think	 it	 right	 to	 be	 swollen	 (elated).




the	 dictates	 of	 reason,	 or	 a	 movement	 of	 the	 soul,	 which	 is	 irrational	 and	 contrary	 to	 nature.449 	
Equally,	 the	Stoic	description	of	 fear	 (phobos)	 is	an	 irrational	 shrinking/aversion	or	avoidance	of	an 
expected	danger,	and	distress	(lupē)	is	an	irrational	contraction	or	fresh	opinion	that	something	bad	is	
present,	 at	which	 people	 think	 it	 right	 to	 be	 contracted/depressed.	 	 The	 passions	 of	 pleasure	 and	
distress	follow	from	the	passions	of	lust	and	fear.		Whenever	we	fail	to	avoid	the	objects	of	our	fear	or	

























purpose,	 let	him	envy,	yearn,	 flatter,	 feel	disturbed;	whoever	shall	 regard	anything	else	as	
evil,	let	him	sorrow,	grieve,	lament,	be	unhappy’.450			
2.4.3	Content-Free	Passions	
One	of	the	recurrent	 ideas	of	Epictetus	about	the	passions	 is	 that	they	are	experiences	through	
which	suffering	is	born,	developed,	dissipated	and	dies	or	ceases.		Epictetus	reminds	us	that	without	
thought	mental	pain	or	suffering	is	not	experienced	as	pain	or	suffering	but	just	as	an	experience,	it	is	
thought	 that	 makes	 our	 suffering	 so,	 through	 a	 fabrication	 of	 our	 own	 notion	 of	 reality	 (cf.	 the	
Buddhist	theory	of	aggregates	and	sankhara	–	1.2.3,	1.7.2-3,	2.3.2.1).	
Suffering	 is	 an	 affliction	 of	 the	 mind	 because	 of	 thought	 and	 judgement:	 this	 cornerstone	 of	
Epictetus	 is	shared	with	the	Buddhists.	 	This	 is	embodied	 in	Epictetus’	 famous	aphorism:	Ταράσσει	
τοὺς	 ἀνθρώπους	 οὐ	 τὰ	 πράγματα,	 ἀλλὰ	 τὰ	 περὶ	 τῶν	 πραγμάτων	 δόγματα:‘It	 is	 not	 things	 that	
disturb	us,	but	our	judgements	about	these	things.’	451			
So	 do	 our	 emotions	 contain	 anything	 of	 value	 or	 do	 they	 just	 tell	 us	 about	 our	 ignorance	 and	
misunderstanding	of	good	and	evil?		The	main	thrust	of	the	Four	Noble	Truths	is	exactly	this,	to	look	











emotive	 content	 and	 this	 can	 be	 pleasant,	 unpleasant	 or	 neutral	 but	 all	 are	 impermanent,	
unsatisfactory	(in	the	long	term)	and	subject	to	change;	hence	suffering	is	a	feeling;	and	so	feelings	
have	no	intrinsic	value	beyond	pointing	to	our	ignorance	about	the	good	and	evil,	and	consequently	
they	 make	 us	 realise	 our	 errors	 in	 belief	 and	 judgement;	 as	 soon	 as	 we	 remove	 the	 distinction	
between	‘self’	and	‘other’,	then	negative	feelings	and	their	emotive	content	regarding	things	such	as	
good	and	bad,	pleasant	and	unpleasant	become	meaningless.		Although	Epictetus	does	not	use	the	
same	 language	 as	 the	 Buddhists,	 we	 have,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 1	 and	 in	 this	 chapter,	 parallel	
thinking	 regarding	 emotions	 being	 empty	 of	 any	 permanent	 existence.	 	 The	 pathē	 are	 essentially	
irrational,	 and	 their	 content	 might	 be	 an	 assemblage	 of	 errors,	 mistaken	 beliefs	 and	 wrong	 or	
deluded	views,	or	the	voice	saying	'I	am	this	or	that'	that	lurks	in	the	background	of	our	mind	(cf.	1.5),	















We	 now	 revisit	 the	 medical	 model	 (1.4),	 which	 is	 a	 strategy
454
	for	 diagnosis	 and	 remedial	
treatment	 and	 therapy	 for	 the	problem	of	 our	 suffering,	 in	 order	 to	 continue	 comparing	Epictetus	
with	the	Buddhist	approach:	




• Prognosis	 (4.6)	 –	 there	 is	 a	 cure	 for	 our	 disease	 and	 suffering	 	 (reflecting	 the	 Truth	
discussed	in	4.2);	
• Treatment	 (5.3)	–	 the	cure	 is	 the	Eightfold	Path	 (Buddhism)	and	the	Three	Exercises	of	
the	Soul	(Epictetus)	(reflecting	the	Truth	discussed	in	5.2);	
Diagnosing	the	nature	of	our	dissatisfaction	and	our	suffering	soul	is	coming	face	to	face	with	the	





elements	 (2.3)	 and	 the	 behaviour	 that	 reflects	 the	 disease	 before	 we	 can	 pass	 judgement	 on	 the	
therapy	 required	 to	 treat	 the	disease.	 	 	Of	 course	 the	diagnosis	must	 also	 relate	 to	an	aetiological	







to	understand	why	our	 ignorance	and	 inexperience	 in	doing	this	 leads	to	our	suffering.	 	Supporting	
this	strategy	Simplicius	remarks	upon	the	disposition	of	the	uneducated	‘Knowledge	of	the	good	and	





in	 life	 provides	 another	 part	 of	 the	 truth.	 	 Further	 to	 this,	 making	 evaluative	 judgements	 and	
















fore	 the	 truth	 behind	 suffering	with	 appropriate	 discernment	 and	 natural	 distinction	 between	 the	
healthy	and	unhealthy	 soul.	 	 Epictetus,	paraphrasing	a	passage	 from	Plato’s	Sophist	 (228c),458	says	
‘for	 every	 soul	 is	 unwillingly	 deprived	 of	 the	 truth’.
459









symptoms	of	 our	 disease.	 	 ‘I	 have	 the	 faculty,	which	 the	man	must	 have	who	 is	 going	 to	 appraise	
those	who	handle	syllogisms	properly.	But	 in	everyday	 life	what	do	 I	do?	 	Sometimes	 I	 call	a	 thing	















signs	 expressed	 in	 language,	 speech,	 words,	 and	 sayables	 and	 presented	 as	 having	 propositional	
content.	 	 The	 word	 symptōma	 has	 several	 meanings	 including	 ‘anything	 that	 happens,	 a	 chance	
occurrence,	mishap’	and	so	on,	and	derives	 from	the	word	sympipto,	which	means	 ‘to	 fall	upon,	 to	
















Epictetus	 has	 specific	 examples	 of	 symptoms	 throughout	 his	 discources	 reflecting	 the	
cause/effect,	active/passive	nature	of	suffering.		Clearly	jealousy	(zēlotypia)	and	envy	(phthonos)	are	
symptōmata	 of	 a	man	who	 is	 suffering,	 the	 causes	 of	which	may	be	many	 and	 varied.	 	As	 already	






suffering	or	diseased	 soul	 is	 as	diverse	as	 it	 is	profound,	and	both	gross	and	 subtle.	 	Psychological	
symptoms	 of	 fear,	 for	 example,	 include	 various	 forms	 of	 worry,	 being	 anxious,	 feeling	 troubled,	
feeling	 unsafe	 and	 insecure,
463





	we	worry	 about	getting	old	because	we	 lose	our	 friends	and	
then	eventually	we	face	death.		When	we	become	attached	to	something	we	love	we	get	anxious	and	











Man	may	be	quick	 to	defend	himself	when	he	hears	 someone	 is	 speaking	 ill	 of	him,
469
	and	 this	
may	 be	 an	 indicator	 of	 his	 irascibility	 or	 a	 feeling	 of	 inferiority	 or	 being	 carried	 away	 by	 irritation.		
Epictetus	points	to	the	feeling	of	inferiority	as	a	potential	indicator	of	disease,	depending	on	how	the	
person	deals	or	copes	with	this	feeling.		Being	better	or	worse	off	than	someone	else	can	be	a	mere	






am	 not	 subject	 to	 restraint,	 or	 to	 compulsion’,
471
	reflecting	 that	 our	 making	 our	 prohairesis	 pure	
makes	 us	 better	 off	 than	 the	 inferior.	 	 Feelings	 of	 inferiority,	 being	 of	 lower	 status,	 rank,	 second-
class,	 subservient,
472

































We	 shall	 discuss	 in	 Section	 5.2.1	 the	 Buddhist	 practice	 of	 Right	 Mindfulness	 and	 Right	
Concentration,	 the	object	of	which	 is	 the	practice	of	mental	perception.	 	This	practice	 can	provide	
signs	 (lakshana	–	 indications,	 symptoms).	 	 In	 the	Diamond	Sutra	 four	 signs	are	enumerated	–	 self,	
person,	 living	being	and	 life	 span
477
	-	hence	 signs	 tell	us	much	about	 the	perceiver	as	 the	object	of	




or	 despair	 (that	 is,	 depression).	 	 These	 indicators,	 signs,	 messages	 are	 possible	 warnings	 of	 an	
underlying	problem.		Given	these	signs,	indicators,	symptōmata,	we	can	carry	out	a	diagnosis	to	find	
out	what	the	issue	is,	what	its	nature	is	and	then	its	possible	causes.			



































































or	 is	 acted	 upon	 (paschō).	 	 Our	 analysis	 of	 the	 active/passive	 linguistic	 relationships	 helps	 us	 to	
understand	 the	 semantics	 behind	 suffering:	 giving	 sense	 to	 the	 series	 of	 cognitive	 cause/effect	
relationships	 that	 can	exist	 (cf.	kamma	 –	 1.2.1);	 as	well	 as	 insight	 into	our	 ignorance	and	volitional	
actions	 (cf.	 aggregates	 and	 sankhara	 –	 1.2.3,	 1.7.2).	 	 The	 active/passive	 relationship	 between	
language	 and	what	 subsists	 in	 our	 thoughts	 as	 expressed	 in	 language
481
	and	 the	 relationship	with	
‘thing	said’,	 ‘the	 thing	 thought’	and	 ‘the	meant	 (lekta)’	 (1.6.2)	adds	context	 to	 the	causal	nature	of	
suffering.	 	 This	 linguistic	 aspect	 is	 similar	 to	 that	 found	 in	 the	 language	 and	 logic	 of	 Buddhist	
philosophy	(see	1.7)	and	aligns	with	the	Buddhist	notion	of	sankhara,	and	the	principle	of	Dependent	
Origination,
482	and	 the	 ‘act	 of	 forming’	 or	 ‘having	 been	 formed’,	 reflecting	 both	 the	 active	 and	
passive	sense	of	our	conditioned	existence.	




















































Simplicius,	 in	 his	 intepretation	 of	 Epictetus,	 points	 to	 the	 soul	 having	 three	 relations	 that	 are	
expressed	in	three	kinds	of	life	and	three	kinds	of	desire:	these	relations	of	the	soul	are	towards	the	












recognise	 this	ambiguity	 in	 the	notion	of	 ‘desiring	 things’,	especially	 strong	 feelings	of	wanting,	or	
not	wanting,	that	are	not	properly	directed	to	a	virtuous	life	and	our	confusion	between	things	out	of	
our	 control	 and	 things	 in	 our	 control.	 	 Both	Epictetus	 and	Buddhism	argue	 that	 feelings	 of	 desire,	





The	 Buddhist	 Dharma	 talks	 about	 upādāna,	 the	 clinging,	 grasping	 and	 attaching	 ourselves	 to	
sense	pleasures,	self-doctrine,	wrong	views,	irrational	thoughts	and	feelings,	and	the	like.		As	already	
discussed	 (2.2.3.3),	 clinging	 is	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 result	 of taṇhā	 (craving),	 and	 is	 part	 of	 the	
sequence	of	conditioned	links	that	 lead	us	to	dukkha.	 	Likewise	bhāva	(emotion,	sentiment,	state	of	









		Epictetus	 remarks,	 ‘it	 is	his	 judgement	about	each	of	 these	things	which	 is	
the	 thing	 that	 hurts	 him,	 that	 overturns	 him’.
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and	 his	 sorrow,	 grief,	 fear	 and	 anxiety	 is	 again	 that	 it	 is	 caused	 by	 his	 conditioned	mind:
488
	those	
conditioned	 links	of	 craving	of	desire	 (or	 aversion),	 clinging	 to	his	opinions,	 views	and	 judgements	























views	 and	 opinions	 can	 be	 very	 persuasive	 and	 have	 the	 ability	 to	 attract	 and	 overpower	 us,	 and	





The	consequence	of	our	clinging	 is	bhava,	 the	coming	to	be:	 the	production	of	a	state	of	being	
resulting	 from	 our	 ignorance	 and	 all	 the	 subsequent	 causes	 and	 effects	 in	 the	 sequence	 of	
conditioned	 links.	 	Man’s	habitual	or	emotional	 tendencies,	mental	dispositions	and	 the	 like	are	all	
rooted	 in	 this	 coming	 to	 be.	 	 Ignorance	 is	 present	 in	 this	 coming	 to	 be,	 in	 the	 same	way	 that	 our	
ignorance	is	present	in	our	feelings,	cravings	and	clingings.		If	there	were	no	ignorance,	we	would	not	
cling	to	the	things	we	crave,	and	subsequently	without	ignorance	our	dukkha	would	not	be	present.		
Craving	 is	 rooted	 in	 volitional	 actions,	 feelings	 and	 coming	 to	 be.	 	 Consequently	 every	 link	 in	 the	
















	Our	prohairesis.	 	As	Long	 says	 ‘we	doom	ourselves	 to	 frustration,	 lack	of	 freedom,	
unhappiness	 and	moral	 imperfection,	 all	 of	which	 are	misuses	of	 our	 rationality’	
496
	by	 consistently	














	we	 can	 ascribe	 our	 actions	 to	 the	 decisions.
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anxiety	 is	 again	 that	 it	 is	 caused	 by	 his	 conditioned	mind:
503
	those	 conditioned	 links	 of	 craving	 of	
desire	(or	aversion),	clinging	to	his	opinions,	views	and	judgements	regarding	his	desire	(or	aversion),	





Buddhists	 view ignorance	 as	 the	 greatest	 corruption	 of	 the	 mind	 and	 the	 main	 cause	 of	 our	
suffering.
505
		 Buddhism	 uses	 the	 term	 avidya	 (Pali	 avijjā),	 which	 is	 commonly	 translated	 as	
‘ignorance’,	but	this	 literally	means	‘lack	of	 light,	darkness’,	or	 ‘not	to	see’	or	 ‘not	to	know’:	derived	
from	 vidya	 which	 means	 ‘to	 see’	 or	 ‘to	 know’	 (like	 the	 Latin	 videre,	 ‘to	 see’).	 	 Different	 Buddhist	










the	 other;	 and	 will	 manifest	 neither	 desire,	 nor	 aversion,	 nor	 choice,	 nor	 purpose	 in	
accordance	with	nature;	will	not	assent,	will	not	dissent,	will	not	withhold	judgement	–	such	
a	man,	 to	 sum	 it	up,	will	go	about	deaf	and	blind,	 thinking	 that	he	 is	 somebody,	when	he	




has	 a	 bearing	 on	 our	 suffering.	 	 Do	 we	 understand	 what	 is	 and	 is	 not	 in	 our	 control?	 	 Do	 we	
understand	the	impermanence	of	life	and	mortality?	Do	we	know	where	good	and	evil	reside?	Do	we	
know	how	to	use	our	 impressions	correctly?	 	And	so	on.	These	all	have	something	 in	common:	our	
not	knowing	or	not	understanding,	our	misunderstanding	or	misjudging	of	our	impressions	(and	their	














like:	 these	all	 can	 situate	 ignorance	 to	be	present	 in	our	 feelings,	 cravings,	 clingings,	 and	all	 those	
other	conditioned	things	that	arise	through	ignorance.		Man’s	anger,	fear	and	anxiety	are	the	host	to	
some	 form	 of	 ignorance.	 	 ‘Death’	 says	 Epictetus	 ‘is	 nothing	 dreadful	 –	 but	 our	 judgement	 about	
death’:
507
	our	 fear	 of	 death	 is	 related	 to	 ignorance	 that	 is	 present	 in	 our	 feelings	 about	 death,	 our	




cause	 the	 arising	of	 suffering.	 	 	 	 Ignorance	deprives	 us	 of	 our	 freedom	 to	 live	with	 an	undisturbed	






here	 is	 not	 an	 intrinsic	 or	 innate	 feature	 of	 our	 nature	 but	 is	 a	 ‘learned’	 ignorance,	 created	 and	
developed	through	the	beliefs,	opinions	and	views	we	choose	to	adopt.		
	Stobaeus	 says	 of	 ignorance	 that	 it	 is	 changeable	 and	 weak	 assent,
510




opinion	 (doxa)	and	cognition	 (katalēpis),	with	 the	 latter	 stationed	between	 the	other	 two.512		Given	
these	 claims	 we	 can	 note	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 knowledge,	 opinion	 and	 ignorance	 has	
implications	 for	 our	 cognitions	 and	 cognitive	 impressions,
513
	and	 so	 to	 the	 chain	 of	 Dependent	
Originations.		We	assent	to	an	impression,	depending	on	how	the	impression	appears	to	us	and	how	
it	makes	us	feel,	which	may	or	may	not	turn	out	to	be	correct.		As	Annas	points	out,	the	exact	relation	
between	 ignorance	 and	 doxa	 (opinion)	 is	 tricky:514	she	 holds	 them	 distinct	 but	 says	 the	 Stoics	
sometimes	 blurred	 the	 line	 between	 them.	 Vogt
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as	 saying	 we	 should	 be	 indifferent	 to	 them
517








	remarks	 we	 may	 interpret	 as	 insulting,	 fault	 finding,	 demeaning	 and	 so	 on;	 but	 our	
ignorance,	 our	 lack	 of	 knowing	 the	 true	 nature	 of	 these	 remarks	 means	 we	 go	 astray	 with	 our	
subsequent	 actions.	 	 Has	 it	 not	 been	 true	 that	 from	 time	 immemorial,	 every	 mistake	 and	 every	
misfortune	 has	 been	 due	 to	 this	 kind	 of	 ignorance?	As	 Epictetus	 says:	 ‘Why	 did	 Agamemnon	 and	



































beliefs	or	preconceived	 ideas	or	past	experiences.	 	We	become	conditioned	by	 ‘things	 seen	by	 the	











is	not	so.	 	As	Epictetus	 insists	 ‘But	 if	their	eyes	are	not	opened,	they	have	nothing	superior	to	their	
mere	opinion’.526  But	to	grasp	‘things	seen	by	the	mind’	as	secure	and	unchangeable	by	reason	is	to	
grasp	 things	 as	 they	 really	 are.	 	 Given	 these	 truths,	 what	 is	 lacking	 from	 Epictetus’	 perspective	 is	




use	 that	we	 fail,	which	 leads	 to	a	 lack	of	knowing,	misunderstandings,	deluded	 thinking	 leaving	us	
open	 to	beliefs,	 feelings	 that	 ‘carry	us	away’
528	into	a	 state	of	dukkha:	we	are	unable	 to	distinguish	





























a	 progression	 from	 ‘something	 that	 was’	 to	 ‘something	 else’,
533
	an	 impression	 gives	 rise	 to	 such	
movement.	 	Present	 in	 this	 impression	 (opinion,	belief,	 judgement)	 is	 its	 cause:	 	Epictetus	and	 the	
Buddhist	 Dharma	 have	 broad	 agreement	 about	 such	movements,	 believing	 that	 the	 cause,	 in	 the	








the	Discourses.	 	 Our	 ignorance	 of	 what	 is	 in	 our	 control	will	 lead	 us	 to	 become	 naturally	 slavish,	
subordinate	and	emotionally	attached	to	externals,‘tossed	to	and	fro	with	them’.536			
As	 argued	 by	 Epictetus,	 we	 desire	 things	 we	 cannot	 control	 and	 we	 want	 situations	 to	 be,	 to	
happen,	to	develop	according	to	what	we	crave	or	shun.			We	want	things	to	happen	our	way;	this	is	a	
failure	and	error	in	our	thinking	and	is	due	to	our	ignorance,	lack	of	understanding	of	reality	and	the	




	even	more	so	Epictetus’	prime	concern	 lies	 in	our	prohairesis,538	which	 is	naturally	 free.	 	A	
life	of	freedom	or	slavery	 is	distinguished	by	knowing	what	 is	truly	our	own	and	 in	our	control,	and	
what	is	not	in	our	control.		As	Thich	Nhat	Hanh	says	‘Ignorance	has	been	the	jailkeeper.		Because	of	
ignorance	 the	 mind	 has	 been	 obscured,	 just	 like	 the	 moon	 and	 stars	 hidden	 by	 storm	 clouds.		
Clouded	 by	 endless	 waves	 of	 deluded	 thoughts,	 the	 mind	 falsely	 divided	 reality	 into	 subject	 and	









happen	 in	 life,	 the	 process	 of	 change	 and	 transformation,	 difficulties	 and	 situations	 that	 man	
struggles	with.	 	Therefore	‘if	a	man	endeavours	to	incline	his	mind	to	these	things,	and	to	persuade	
















	‘Whenever	 you	 	 grow	 attached	 to	 something,	 do	 not	 act	 as	 though	 it	 were	 one	 of	 those	
things	 that	 cannot	 be	 taken	 away,	 but	 as	 though	 it	were	 something	 like	 a	 jar	 or	 a	 crystal	
goblet,	so	that	when	it	breaks	you	will	remember	what	it	was	like,	and	not	be	troubled’ 
541	




542 	 Chilling	 must	 be	 one’s	 first	 response	 to	 this	 passage,	 says	 Long.543		 One	 of	 the	
important	 points	 here	 is	 being	 emotionally	 prepared	 for	 the	 inevitable,	 which	 brings	 us	 back	 to	
impermanence.	 	 	 It	 is	 a	 stark	 reminder	 of	 the	 reality	 of	 life	 that	 brings	 home	 the	 truth	 about	 the	
nature	of	things.		If	our	thinking	is	possessive	and	expresses	a	desire	that	we	possess	those	that	we	









such	 as	 not	wanting	 things	 to	 happen	 that	 are	 out	 of	 our	 control;	 this	will	 inevitably	 result	 in	 our	
distress	 and	 dukkha,	 desiring	 and	 clinging	 to	 things	 we	 want	 to	 be	 permanent	 whilst	 ignoring	 or	
denying	that	we	live	in	a	world	that	involves	constant	change.		Epictetus	frequently	states	the	phrase	











and	 what	 is	 true	 and	 what	 is	 false.549		 Likewise	 Epictetus	 argues	 that	 wisdom	 enables	 us	 to	





















found	 in	 intelligence,	 knowledge	 and	 reason	 and	 nowhere	 else	 can	 the	 good	 be	 found.
553	 
Furthermore	 our	wisdom	 should	 provide	 us	with	 the	 right	 ideas	 about	 good	 and	 evil.554  We	need	


















we	are	 interested	 in	 the	active	and	the	passive	 in	 terms	of	 the	 language	of	cause	and	effect	which	
provides	 insight	 into	the	the	parallel	thinking	with	the	Buddhist	notions	of	karma	and	the	sankhara	
(1.7.2,	1.7.3).			
The	 subject	 of	 suffering,	 in	 the	 ancient	 Greek	 world,	 employs	 a	 multitude	 of	 terms,	 some	 of	
general	 significance,	 others	 more	 specific.	 	 The	 principal	 term	 for	 suffering	 is	 the	 verb	 paschō,558	
which	means	‘to	have	something	done	to	one,	to	be	acted	upon,	to	have	an	effect	on	someone’,	or	in	
absolute	terms,	’	to	experience	suffering,	to	experience	a	feeling	or	sensation’.		
Over	 time	 the	word	 came	 to	 be	 associated	with	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘experience	 emotionally’	 and	 its	
derivative	pathos	generally	came	to	mean	 ‘emotion’	or	‘passion’.	 	The	word	‘emotion’,	however,	did	
not	 actually	 enter	 into	 the	 English	 language	 until	 the	 17
th
















world	 tends	 to	 use	 this	 word	 and	 associate	 it	 synonymously	 with	 the	 word	 pathos.	 	 The	 literal	
meaning	 of	 pathos	 is	 more	 inclusive	 and	 more	 profound	 than	 that	 of	 the	 common	 meaning	 of	
emotion.	 	 This	 said,	 the	 notions	 of	 ‘being	 acted	 upon’	 (pathos)	 and	 ‘being	moved’	 (émotion)	have	





of	 defying	definition	 and	meaning,	 but	 existing	merely	 as	 an	 experience,	 a	 feeling,	 an	 impression.		
Consequently	this	tallies	with	the	general	notion	of	suffering	in	the	Buddhist	sense	that	can	be	very	
blatant	 and	 gross,	 to	 the	 very	 subtle,	 sometimes	 consciously	 overwhelming	 or	 subconsiously	
consuming	us	(2.2).			
The	 Stoics	 and	 Epictetus	 used	 paschō	 in	 the	 sense	 ‘to	 suffer’	 to	 include	 a	 range	 of	 different	
affections	such	as	emotions,	 feelings,	mental	 formations	and	spiritual	dispositions.	 	 In	addition,	we	
find	Epictetus	using	paschō	 in	a	broad	way	and	in	different	contexts,	not	all	of	which	are	associated	
with	 suffering	 in	 the	 narrow	 sense	of	 ‘passion’	 or	 ‘emotion’,	 but	which	 are	 applicable	 to	 our	wider	
sense	of	 suffering:	 for	example,	 some	of	his	uses	 relate	 to	 the	activity	of	being	appealed	 to,	being	






sense	 of	 passivity	 means	 that	 inherent	 in	 the	 word	 paschō	we	 can	 attribute	 a	 deeper	 and	 more	
profound	 level	of	 interpretation	to	 the	notion	of	suffering.	 	 In	 this	sense	suffering	may	manifest	as	
very	subtle	effects	acting	upon	the	mind,	a	concept	 that	 is	well	known	 in	Buddhist	philosophy	and	




The	 suffering	 (mind)	 is	 something	 we	 experience	 due	 to	 something	 we	 do	 to	 ourselves,	 all	 of	





oneself’	nature	 of	paschō	 appears	 in	 Epictetus,	 for	 example,	 in	 the	 sense	of	 imagining	or	 having	 a	
feeling	about	something.		In	the	Long	translation	we	have	pathē	used	in	the	sense	of	‘persuasion’	as	in	








yourself	 or	 take	 away	 your	 persuasion	 that	 the	 stars	 are	 even	 in	 number’.560		 In	 the	 Oldfather	
translation	of	the	same	passages	pathē	is	translated	as	‘feel’.			
Equally	 we	 may	 act	 upon	 (peithō)	 our	 self	 by	 convincing	 or	 compelling	 our	 self	 in	 a	 way	 that	
causes	us	suffering.		From	a	linguistic	point	of	view	we	can	be	both	the	agent	of	action	(we	act	upon,	
peithō)	 as	 well	 as	 the	 patient	 (we	 are	 acted	 upon,	 paschō)	 –	we	 convince	 ourselves	 that	 there	 is	
something	 in	 regard	 to	 an	 external	 impression	we	 should	 be	 fearful	 or	 anxious	 about,	 which	 re-
iterates	the	point	we	started	with	-	our	suffering	is	something	we	do	to	ourselves.			
3.3.2	Pascho	and	Its	Uses	in	Epictetus		
We	now	come	to	the	crux	of	our	examination	of	paschō	and	 its	derivatives.	 	What	 follows	are	a	
number	of	examples	from	Epictetus	to	illustrate	his	broad	appreciation	of	paschō	related	to	suffering;	
we	shall	also	consider	some	of	the	compounds.	 	 In	3.3.3	we	shall	consider	how	 	 	poieō	 (‘to	act’)	and	
paschō	 (‘to	 be	 acted	 upon’)	 complement	 each	 other	 and	 correlate	with	 the	 active/passive	 relation	
behind	our	suffering	–	this	 is	done	(action)	and	that	happens	(something	receives	the	results	of	the	







As	 a	 general	 rule	 we	 often	 talk	 of	 suffering	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 negative	 affections	 (aversiveness)	
whereas	 Epictetus	 clearly	 shows	 recognition	 that	 suffering	 can	 be	 also	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 positive	
affections	 (attractiveness).	 Sometimes	 Epictetus	 uses	 paschō	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 being	 moved	 by	 a	
situation	or	circumstance,	which	 lures	us	 towards	something	we	desire.	 	He	cites	 the	example	of	a	
thief	admiring	the	property	of	others:’	I	reflected	that	the	man	who	stole	it	was	moved	(epathen)	by	
no	 unreasonable	motive’;562 or	 in	 the	 case	 ‘How	 did	 you	 feel	 (epathes)?	 	Didn’t	 you	 have	 a	 fever?		
Didn’t	 your	 head	 ache?
’563
		 As	 one	would	 expect	 from	 the	 notion	 of	 experiencing	 being	moved	 by	
pathos,	 Epictetus	 presents	 the	 case	 of	 not	 being	 moved	 as	 a	 state	 of	 apatheia,	 a	 state	 of	 mind	
undisturbed	 by	 passion,
564
	freedom	 from	 disturbance,	 be	 it	 from	 sorrow,	 anger,	 compulsion,	
hindrance	 or	 the	 like,
565
	being	 calm	 and	 tranquil(for	 example,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 not	 being	moved	 by	
desire).
566





























		 In	addition	we	have	the	notion	of	eupatheia	and	it	 is	 likely	that	
Epictetus,	 following	 Chrysippus,	 had	 in	mind	 eupatheia	 as	 being	 ‘right	 sensibility	 towards	 rational	





















imprints	 we	 bring	 with	 us	 in	 our	 mind.
575




experiences	 and	 kammic	 imprints,577	and	 future	 volitions	 and	 actions	 subsequently	 create	 further	
experiences	and	imprints	(1.2.1	on	kamma	and	2.3.2	on	dispositions).		In	3.3.3-3.3.5	this	kammic	effect	
will	be	illustrated	by	examples	from	Epictetus’	use	of	active/passive.		
































ἐλάφων	 πάσχομεν)582 and	 run	 away	 from	 the	 event.	 	 In	 these	 examples,	 we	 can	 understand	
Epictetus
583
	as	 saying	we	 lack	 confidence	 in	 regard	 to	 things	 indifferent,	 a	 discussion	 taken	 up	 by	
Graver.		
Of	course	experiences	may	not	be	seen	or	felt	as	suffering	when	they	arise,	remain	or	cease	but	




In	 the	 following	extract	Epictetus	 illustrates	 the	use	of	paschō	 in	 the	sense	of	being	persuaded,	
and	having	a	feeling	about	something:		
‘…	assent	from	a	persuasion	(the	feeling)	(παθεῖν)	that	a	thing	is	so	…	dissent	from	a	persuasion	
(the	 feeling)	 (παθεῖν)	 that	 it	 is	 not	 so	…	 suspended	 judgement	 from	 a	 persuasion	 (the	 feeling)	
(παθεῖν)	that	it	is	uncertain	…’584	







of	mental	change	 in	us.	 	As	with	Buddhist	theory	on	Dependent	Origination,	 impressions	condition	
feeling	 and	 feeling	 in	 turn	 conditions	 craving	 and	 desires.
586
		 Similarly,	 Graver	 talks	 about	 our	
capacity	 to	undergo	a	wide	 range	of	 feelings.
587




































When	we	 are	 persuaded	 (acted	upon),	we	have	 suffered	 and	 experienced	 some	action	 and	our	
very	nature	reveals	itself	through	this	suffering:	how	we	are	disposed	(ēthos)	towards	an	impresssion	
reveals	 itself,	 how	we	 emotionally	 react	 (pathos)	 towards	 the	 impression	 reveals	 itself,	 or	 how	we	
reason	 (logos)	 towards	the	 impression	 is	 revealed.	 	These	things	about	us	are	 revealed	whether	we	
are	persuaded	 (acted	upon)	by	what	others	 say	 to	us,	 through	 their	 rhetoric,	or	by	what	we	say	 to	
ourselves	through	the	words	and	language	we	use	and	the	thoughts	and	propositions	behind	these	
things	 we	 say	 to	 ourselves.	 	 It	 is	 our	 reasoning	 that	 contemplates	 these	 things	 and	 determines	
whether	we	assent	or	dissent	or	suspend	judgement.			
Epictetus	 uses	 several	 words	 related	 to	 persuasion:	 pathein	 (‘to	 be	 acted	 upon’),593	peithō	 (‘to	
prevail	 on,	 win	 over,	 persuade,	 convince’)
594
	and	 pithanos	 (‘persuasive,	 plausible,	 convincing’).595		
Being	 persuaded	 (pathein),	 that	 is,	 experiencing	 that	 a	 thing	 is	 so	 is	 not	 exactly	 the	 same	 as	
convincing/persuading	 (peithō) oneself	 that	 the	 thing	 is	 so.	 	 	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	we	 are	 persuading	









guards,	 the	 sound	 of	 the	 tyrant’s	 voice	 or	 by	 things	 seen	 and	 heard	 by	 the	 mind	 regarding	 our	
perception	of	 the	tyrant.	 	We	also	have	the	case	where	Epictetus	 is	arguing	against	the	Epicureans	

















‘I	 greatly	 fear	 that	 a	 noble-spirited	 young	man	may	 hear	 these	 statements	 and	 be	 influenced	
(pathēi)	by	them,	or,	having	been	influenced	(pathōn)	already,	may	lose	all	the	germs	of	nobility,	





‘if	you	are	persuaded	(pathōn)	 it	 is	night,	do	not	change	your	opinion,	 if	that	seems	best	to	you,	
but	abide	by	it	and	say	that	you	ought	to	abide	by	your	decisions’.600 
c)	To	be	influenced,	devoted	or	attached	to	something		
As	 discussed	 in	 3.2,	 our	 craving	 and	 then	 clinging	 to	 things	 –	 people,	 possessions,	 feelings,	
judgements,	mental	formations	–	can	cause	us	to	suffer	(cf.	1.2.3	attachment	to	the	five	aggregates).		
Epictetus’	advice	is,	‘whenever	you	grow	attached	(prospaschēis)	to	something,	do	not	act	as	though	
it	 were	 one	 of	 those	 things	 that	 cannot	 be	 taken	 away’
601	(cf.2.2.3.3	 on	 impermanence).	 	 This	
illustrates	another	 important	aspect,	 the	dynamic	nature	of	 paschō,	 to	be	moved	 towards	or	away	
from	 something	 (as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 active/passive	 union	 or	 pairing	 of	 paschō/poieō	 (attraction	 or	
repulsion:	see	our	discussion	in	3.3.3	for	more	details	of	this	relationship).	
What	we	experience	 through	external	 events	 and	 circumstances	 can	have	 a	 powerful	 influence	
over	us,	which	can	attract	or	repulse	us.		We	can	be	influenced	(pathēi)	by	what	others	say	or	having	
been	 influenced	 (pathōn)	by	what	 they	have	 said	 can	 cause	us	 to	be	moved	and	act	 in	 a	wrong	or	
improper	 way,	 we	 are	 affected	 (paschomen).	 	 Epictetus	 argues	 that	 we	 should	 not	 be	 devoted	 or	
addicted	 (prospaschein)	 to	 things	 that	 are	 not	 our	 own,	 but	 we	 should	 be	 influenced	 by	 true	
judgements	(πάσχειν	ἀξιῶ,	ἀλλ᾿	ὑπὸ	δογμάτων	ὀρθῶν),602	as	Long	reminds	us	we	are	returning	to	the	
distinction	between	what	is	‘ours’	and	‘what	is	not	ours’,	and	material	well-being	is	‘not	ours’,	and	so	
mistaking	 this	 difference	 means	 we	 misidentify	 our	 happiness.
603
		 Being	 devoted	 to	 or	 yearning	

























be	 aroused	 by	 these	 impressions	 every	 time	 they	 appear	 then	 our	 affections	 (psuchēs	 pathōn)	
become	habitual,	 this	condition	 is	hardened	and	our	weakness	 for	 this	will	be	strengthened	and	so	








is	 worthy	 of	 and	 deserves.
610
		 The	 key	 argument	 is	 that	 the	 externals	 he	 submits	 to	 become	 his	
masters;	 they	 have	 control	 over	 what	 he	 desires,	 and	 he	 also	 has	 masters	 in	 the	 form	 of	




































The	 above	 examples	 (a	 –	 e)	 provide	 a	 sample	 of	 evidence	 towards	 our	 claim	 that	paschō	 in	 its	
deployment	in	Epictetus	is	diverse:	it	is	as	broad	as	it	is	narrow.		In	this	sense,	the	resulting	suffering	
is	a	subjective	passive	experience	that	could	be	a	gross,	strong	and	painful	disease	or	a	subtle	disease	





our	 argument	 and	 claim	 that	 language	 is	 a	 key	 factor	 in	 our	 suffering	mind.	 	 The	 concepts	 of	 the	
active	 and	passive	 appear	 in	Epictetus	 at	 times	 as	 inseparable	 items	and	at	other	 times	 as	 related	




In	 using	 poieō	 Epictetus	 explores	 a	 full	 range	 of	meanings	 and	 effects	 from	 ‘doing	 and	 acting’	
through	 to	 ‘making,	 producing,	 creating,	 causing’,	 all	 of	 which	 can	 result	 in	 a	 range	 of	
effects/affections.		We	can	of	course	create	an	action	of	body,	speech	or	mind:	what	is	done,	said	or	
thought	 can	 result	 in	 a	 pleasant	 or	 unpleasant	 feeling	 or	 reaction	 in	 us.	 	 The	 two	 verbs	 poieō	 and	
paschō	 represent	 a	 causal	 relationship	 between	 that	 which	 acts/does	 something	 (agent)	 and	 that	
which	 is	 acted	 upon/affected	 (patient)	 –	 (cf.	 1.2.1	 cause	 (kamma	 -	 action)	 and	 effect	 (vipaka	 -	
consequences)).			We	have	noted	that	the	two	verbs	are	thus	correlated	and	dynamically	dependent	
on	 each	 other	 in	 that	 they	 share	 a	 causal	 relationship	 with	 each	 other.	 	 One	 concerns	 natural	
activities	of	various	kinds	(do,	make,	create,	produce,	cause,	act)	while	the	other	concerns	the	states	






As	 discussed	 in	 1.4.5	 ignorance	 leads	 to	 volition	 and	 to	 afflicting	 emotions	 and	 negative	 states	 of	
mind,	such	as	jealousy,	anger	or	fear.	 	According	to	Diogenes	Laertius’	summary	of	Stoic	doctrines,	
‘reflexive	 predicates	 are	 those	 among	 the	 passive,	which,	 although	 in	 form	passive,	 are	 yet	 active	











As	 a	 comparison	 the	 sankhara	 (1.7.2)	 that	 leads	 to	 our	 dispositional	 tendencies	 and	 our	






his	 dialectical	 style	of	 teaching.	 	 ‘What,	 then,	 should	 I	 do?’	 (τί	 οὖν	μοι	 καθήκει	ποιεῖν):618 accept	 a	
feeling	that	something	is	wrong,	false; ‘What	do	you	wish	me	to	do?’	(τί	με	θέλετε	ποιεῖν)619 to	avoid	
the	fear	of	death:	what	 I	should	do	 is	not	wish	for	something	that	does	not	come	to	pass;	or	 in	the	
case	of	adapting	our	preconceptions	 to	 individual	 instances,	who	knows	 ‘what	we	ought	 to	do	and	
what	 we	 ought	 not	 to	 do.’620  As	 part	 of	 a	 dialectical	 discussion	man’s	 goal	 is	 said	 to	 be	 	 ‘To	 live	
securely,	to	be	happy,	to	do	everything	as	he	wishes	to	do,	not	to	be	hindered,	not	to	be	subject	to	
compulsion’.621   
We	 can	 identify	 from	 this	 sample	 of	 uses	 in	 Epictetus	 that	 the	 potential	 development	 of	 the	
causal	 effect	 of	 this	 suffering	 is	 due	 to	 that	 situation	 happening;	 this	 suffering	 is	 due	 to	 man	
doing/not	doing	something;	this	suffering	comes	about	because	of	that	being	produced.		As	already	
discussed	 in	 1.5	 and	 1.6,	 the	 language-thought-feeling-action	 relationship	 through	 the	 use	 of	 the	
active/passive	pair	(poieō	and	paschō),	what	we	say	(legō)	and	the	meaning	of	what	we	say	(lekton)	is,	





























happened	 (been	affected).	 	 ‘Why	man	what	are	 you	about/doing?’
623





arises.	 	 Due	 to	 the	 production	 of	 this,	 that	 is	 produced.	 	 It	 is	 thus:	 due	 to	 ignorance	 there	 is	
volition.’
624  Due	to	the	attractiveness	of	external	things,	positive	affections	(desires)	arise	in	us	and	
due	 to	 the	 unattractiveness	 of	 external	 things,	 negative	 affections	 (aversions)	 arise	 in	 us.	 	 This	
Buddhist	 thesis	on	 the	 formation	of	 conditional	 arising	 is	 in	broad	agreement	with	Epictetus’	 view	
and	we	argue	that	desires	and	aversions	are	produced	in	the	mind	due	to	our	being	acted	upon	by	the	
impression	 we	 have	 that	 something	 appears	 pleasurable	 or	 agreeable	 to	 us,	 or	 that	 something	
appears	disagreeable	or	unpleasant	to	us.		Someone’s	distasteful	behaviour	towards	us	can	produce	a	
dislike	and	hate	 for	 that	person.	 	Making	good	 remarks	about	you	or	making	 rude	 remarks	affects	
your	feelings;	making	you	elated,	happy	or	cheerful	and	miserable,	sad	or	depressed.	
  The	use	of	poieō	 to	describe	 the	production	of	a	good	or	bad	state	of	mind	 is	commonly	seen	
throughout	Epictetus.  On	one	occasion	he	 leads	his	 reader	 through	a	 line	of	 reasoning	 illustrating	





Epictetus:	 ‘judgements	 producing	 love	 in	 the	 household’;626	‘Can	 you,	 then	 show	 anything	 higher	







the	question	Epictetus	wants	us	 to	consider	 is	what	needs	 to	be	done	to	produce	this	 freedom.	 	 In	
reinforcing	 his	 point,	 Epictetus	 talks	 about	 the	 musician	 being	 anxious	 in	 anticipation	 of	 the	















tremble’).	 	 Epictetus	 is	 ceaseless	 in	 his	 dialogues	 in	 involving	 the	 active	 voice	 to	 argue	 and	 to	
illustrate	 that	 man’s	 actions	 can	 hinder	 him,	 lead	 him	 astray	 in	 the	 use	 of	 impressions	 and	 the	
formation	of	irrational	and	unwholesome	thoughts.			
What	Am	I	Doing?		
Doing	 things	makes	 things	happen:	 things	 that	can	affect	not	only	us,	but	also	others.	 	Making	
moral	choices	(prohairesis)	about	what	we	do,	make,	produce,	create	can	cause	things	to	happen	that	
will	bear	 fruit	 (cf.	 the	Buddhist	notion	of	 an	effect	 (vipaka)	 -	 1.2.1,	 5.2.1)	at	 some	point	 in	 time	 (cf.	
kamma	in	1.5	and	sankhara	in	1.7).		Doing	things	with	a	certain	intention	bears	with	it	a	certain	moral	
character	and	attitude,	be	it	good,	bad	or	neutral.		
Epictetus	 exploits	 the	 moral	 intent	 and	 result	 of	 doing	 things	 (poieō):	 ‘making	 men	 witness,	
reflect,	 examine	 and	 question	 what	 they	 are	 doing’









do	 (say,	 think	 and	 act)	 and	why	 this	 can	make	 us	 elated	 in	 one	 instance,	 or	 cast	 down	 in	 another	
instance:	 ‘to	 consider	 the	 cause	 of	 our	 doing,	 or	 of	 our	 not	 doing,’
632
to	 examine	 our	 judgements,	
opinions	and	decision,	to	practise	and	realise	the	truths	of	our	suffering	(1.3).		One	of	the	key	reasons	
we	 should	 self-question	 and	 self-examine	 is	 for	 self-discovery:
633
	why	 do	 I	 have	 the	 desires,	
judgements,	 beliefs	 and	 thoughts	 I	 have?	 	 Epictetus	 asks	 ‘Man	what	 are	 you	 about	 (what	 are	you	
doing?’ 
634
		Am	 I	making	 rational	or	 irrational	decisions	about	 things?	 	 If	my	 judgement	 is	 irrational	
then	why	 do	 I	 not	 change	 it?	 	My	 judgement	 can	 cause	 suffering,	 so	 if	 I	 know	 this	 then	why	 not	
change	this	judgement?		But	if	I	have	persuaded	myself	that	I	am	right	and	I	cling	obstinately	to	this	
decision,	despite	it	being	false,	then	I	will	act	‘like	a	sick	man’.635	 We	should	ask	‘What	am	I	about?’,	





















strengthened	 by	 the	 corresponding	 actions	 ‘πᾶσα	 ἕξις	 καὶ	 δύναμις	 ὑπὸ	 τῶν	 καταλλήλων	 ἔργων	
συνέχεται	καὶ	αὔξεται’.639 Hence	a	cycle	of	habit	and	suffering	goes	hand	in	hand,	as	does	habit	and	
well-being:	‘In	general,	therefore,	if	you	want	to	do	something	make	a	habit	of	it;	if	you	want	not	to	
do	 something,	 refrain	 from	 doing	 it,	 and	 accustom	 yourself	 to	 something	 else	 instead’.640 As	
Epictetus	argues,	affairs	of	 the	mind	are	determined	by	what	we	do	and	what	we	do	acts	upon	us,	
affects	us,	creates	feelings,	thoughts	and	suffering	in	us.	 	The	continuous	habit	of	doing	something	





will	 be	 contradictory	 to	 us	 and	 we	 can	 stop	 doing	 what	 is	 contradictory.	 	 If	 we	 do	 not	 see	 this	












impressions,	and	to	take	our	philosophy	of	 life	seriously.	 	He	says:	 ‘”My	desire	 is	not	different	from	
what	it	used	to	be,	nor	my	choice,	nor	my	assent,	nor,	in	a	word,	have	I	changed	at	all,	in	my	use	of	
external	 impressions,	 from	my	 former	 state.”	Think	 this	and	say	 this	about	yourself,	 if	 you	wish	 to	




















result	 of	mental	 formations	 (sankhara).	 	 For	Epictetus,	whatever	 you	want	 to	become	depends	on	
what	you	do:	craving	and	clinging	will	make	you	suffer	(2.2,	3.2.2-3),	so	if	you	wish	to	suffer	then	keep	
on	 craving	and	 clinging	 to	 your	desires,	 choices,	 assents	 and	use	of	 external	 impressions	 and	your	
views.		As	Epictetus	points	out,	‘Tell	yourself,	first	of	all,	what	kind	of	man	you	want	to	be;	and	then	
go	ahead	with	what	you	are	doing’.647		A	man	wants	to	be	an	athlete	so	he	acts	and	practises	his	skills	





One	 of	 the	 reasons	 for	 Epictetus’	 insistence	 on	 our	 acting	 in	 the	 right	way	 (cf.	 Buddhist	 Right	
Action	in	5.2.)	is	the	importance	of	making	the	right	moral	choices	(4.4).		Acting	with	right	choice	in	











a	carpenter	means	he	needs	 to	act	as	a	carpenter;	 that	 is	his	purpose.	 	Whatever	we	are	doing	we	
need	to	do	according	to	the	right	purpose	and	our	standard	of	judgement	needs	to	be	the	right	one.		
What	 I	am	is	shaped	by	what	 I	do	and	what	 I	do	affects	how	I	 feel	and	suffer	and	how	I	experience	
things.		 
Things	Done	with	a	Certain	Quality	
Another	 aspect	 supporting	 Epictetus’	 call	 to	 do	 things	 in	 the	 right	way	 is	 to	 act	 and	 do	 things	
where	there	 is	a	certain	quality	behind	what	we	produce	or	create	and	 it	 is	endowed	with	a	certain	
quality,	 that	 is,	 the	 results	 are	 afforded	with	 certain	 attributes,	 value	 or	 aspects	 of	 quality	 –	 to	 do	
good	or	to	fare	badly.
651		What	 I	do	can	make	me	ugly	or	beautiful,	not	 in	appearance	but	 in	moral	
character,	 the	excellence	 that	 characterises	man,	or	 as	Epictetus	would	 say	what	 it	means	 to	be	a	
man.	 	 Epictetus	 questions	 us:	 ‘Observe	who	 they	 are	 whom	 you	 yourself	 praise,	 when	 you	 praise	
people	 dispassionately;	 is	 it	 the	 just	 or	 the	 unjust	 …	 the	 temperate	 or	 the	 dissolute	 …	 the	 self-
controlled	 or	 the	 uncontrolled?’
652















beautiful	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 appearance	 only	 then	 we	 shall	 suffer,	 as	 this	 type	 of	 beauty	 is	
impermanent,	and	we	are	making	ourselves	slaves	to	something	that	is	not	entirely	under	our	control	
and	which	can	be	taken	away	from	us.	 	 ‘Make	your	prohairesis	beautiful’:654 our	action	should	be	to	
eradicate	 our	 worthless	 opinions	 and	 secure	 ourselves	 against	 disease,	 freeing	 ourselves	 from	
hindrance	and	being	compelled		‘to	do	everything	as	he	wishes	to	do’.655	
Epictetus	 frequently	 puts	 emphasis	 on	 the	 quality	 of	 what	 is	 being	 done	 to	 stress	 the	 causal	





in	 the	 right	way	 to	 achieve	wholesome	 (kusala)	moral	 quality	 rather	 than	 unwholesome	 (akusala):	
Right	View	(5.2.2.1),	Right	Action	(5.2.2.2),	Right	Effort	(5.2.2.3)	all	are	aimed	at	affecting	us	in	a	way	
that	produces	peace	of	mind	and	a	flourishing	life	and	frees	us	from	our	suffering:	wrong	view	clouds	
our	 perception,	 can	 generate	 excessively	 subjective	 views	 and	 unbridled	 attachment	 to	 things	
(upādāna	–	2.2.3.4),	right	views	are	inclined	towards	opposite	objectives	and	outcomes;	right	view	of	
the	five	aggregates	and	sankhara	avoids	the	problems	of	‘This	I	am’,	‘This	is	mine’	and	so	on.657  
This	notion	of	quality	and	 judgement	 is	a	prime	 instance	 in	Epictetus	of	why	we	go	wrong	-	 ‘	 “I	
shall	cause	those	women	sorrow?”		You	cause	them	sorrow?	Not	at	all,	but	it	will	be	the	same	thing	







call	 a	 thing	 good	 and	 sometimes	 bad.’	659		 It	 is	 for	 this	 very	 reason	 that	 disappointment	 and	
dissatisfaction	 arise	 because	 we	 assign	 quality	 values	 to	 external	 things	 through	 ignorance	 and	
inexperience. 		We	should	ask	ourselves	what	is	our	standard	of	measurement	for	judging	the	value	or	




















and	 responses	 to	 things	 done	 to	 us.	 	We	 are	 affected	 (acted	 upon)	with	 a	 sense	 of	 fear,	 but	what	
action	 caused	 this?	 	 	 The	 tyrant’s	 presence	 creates	 a	 certain	 impression,	 the	 citizen	 receiving	 this	
impression	is	affected	by	fear.		Here	in	Epictetus	poiei	is	being	used	of	the	creation	of	an	impression:		
‘What	makes	(poiei)	the	tyrant	an	object	of	fear?’	 	The	response	is:	 	 ‘His	guards,	someone	says,	and	
their	 swords,	and	 the	chamberlain,	and	 those	who	exclude	persons	who	would	enter.’ 
661
		 Is	 it	 their	
physical	 presence	 that	 affects	us?	 	 Is	 it	 their	behaviour,	 their	 voice	or	 the	mere	 sight	of	 them	 that	
affects	us?		We	are	acted	upon	by	our	thoughts	creating	a	sense	of	fear.	
Epictetus’	 teaching	clearly	stresses	the	 importance	of	understanding	the	causal	effectiveness	of	
poieō	 and	 paschō	 and	 how	 by	 investigating	 this	 relationship	 between	 the	 two	 we	 should	 see	 the	
underlying	 problems	 of	 our	 suffering:	 the	 one	 acts	 relative	 to	 the	 other,	 and	 one	 is	 acted	 upon	
relative	 to	 the	other.	 	The	cause	and	effect	 relationship	between	 the	 active	and	passive	 signifies	a	
certain	 movement	 or	 change:	 the	 one	 causes	 the	 movement	 or	 change	 in	 the	 other.	 	 Epictetus	
stresses	the	effects	of	‘things	seen	by	the	mind’,	662	things	that	penetrate	the	mind	–	some	are	subject	
to	man’s	will	 and	 under	 his	 control	 and	 others	 not:	 some	 terrifying	 sound	 comes	 from	 the	 sky,	 or	
from	the	collapse	of	a	building,	or	sudden	word	comes	of	some	peril	or	other,	and	so	man	cannot	help	












(cf.	 4.2.2)	we	have	 the	 situation	of	 things	 that	we	produce	or	 create	 in	 the	mind	 (empoiei),	maybe	



















abuse	towards	us.   
Keeping	Desires	and	Aversions	Under	Control	
A	 repeated	 concern	 for	 Epictetus	 is	 those	 impressions	 that	 can	 affect	 us,	 with	 pleasure	 and	
delight,	or	sadness	and	fear,	and	importantly	our	actions,	reactions	and	responses	as	a	result	of	this	
affective	experience.		The	extent	to	which	we	are	affected	by	what	is	done	to	us	is	up	to	us	and	is	a	








makes	me	 unfortunate	 and	 unhappy.	 	 If	 the	 desire	 is	 accomplished,	 then	 I	 become	 vain,	 as	 I	 am	
elated	 about	 things	 about	 which	 I	 should	 not	 be	 elated;	 and	 if	 I	 am	 impeded	 or	 hindered	 in	 my		
desires	 then	consequently	 this	makes	me	 	wretched	because	 I	 fall	 into	 that	which	 I	 	would	not	 fall	
into.






active	 form.  Epictetus’	 usage	 takes	 two	 forms:672	firstly	 in	 the	 sense	of	 laying	 claim	 to	 something	
that	 does	 not	 belong	 to	 you,	 and	 in	 the	 second	 sense	making	 a	 claim	 about	 something,	 exerting	
oneself	 about	 a	 thing,	 seeking	 after	 it	 or	 contending	 with	 some	 one	 for	 a	 thing.	 	 Epictetuspoints	
again	to	the	fact	that	laying	claim	to	anything	that	is	not	your	own	is	likely	to	end	in	disappointment	
and	 be	 the	 cause	 of	 suffering:	 not	 wanting	 to	 let	 go	 of	 things	 or	 to	 lose	 things,	 be	 it	 people	 or	
possessions,	but	also	clinging	to	thoughts,	opinions	and	judgements.     



















the	 time	 in	 which	 you	 had	 the	 use	 of	 it’ 
674	–	 this	 advice	we	 need	 to	 practise	 as	 part	 of	 our	 daily	
exercises	(see	1.3). 
The	 action	 of	 attaching	 ourselves	 to	 something	 acts	 upon	 us	 and	 affects	 us	 with	 feelings	 of	
pleasure,	desire,	greed	or	delight.	 	If	that	thing	is	taken	away	from	us	or	we	get	detached	from	it	in	
some	way	then	we	are	affected	with	a	sense	of	displeasure,	unhappiness	and	loss.  Epictetus	adds	to	
his	 arguments	 that	 things	 outside	 of	 ourselves	 make	 us	 act	 as	 if	 we	 were	 like	 slaves:	 ‘but	 <he>	
immediately	gives	up	what	is	not	his	own;	he	makes	no	claim	to	what	is	slavish.’675	,	 ‘Slavish’	here	is	
used	in	the	sense	of	our	being	slaves	to	our	attachments	(see	2.3.3.4,	3.2.3	clinging	to	desires).	 







against	our	brother	any	of	the	things	that	 lie	outside	the	realm	of	our	 free	moral	choice	 (μηδέποτ᾽	





678	    
We	hit	at	 the	heart	of	 the	theme	of	Epictetus’	 life,	 freedom	and	slavery,	when	we	talk	of	being	
attached	 to	 people	 and	 things.	 	 We	 experience	 suffering	 through	 our	 attachments.	 	 Does	 a	 man	
attach	himself	 to	people	and	 things	 to	give	him	comfort	 and	 security?
679
		 Things	not	 in	his	 control	







an	attachment,	addiction,	affection	(προσπάσχω)	 to	or	for	something	as	 if	 it	cannot	be	taken	away	
can	 only	 preempt	 and	 be	 a	 possible	 precursor	 for	 future	 suffering
682





















The	 action	 word	 peripoiein	means	 ‘to	 procure,	 acquire	 or	 secure’	 things,	 ‘cause	 to	 keep	 safe,	
preserve’	things.		Epictetus	uses	this	word	in	several	contexts	such	as	in	the	case	of	others	that	have	
the	power	 to	 secure	 for	us	what	we	desire	or	prevent	us	 from	getting	what	we	desire	 ‘τοῖς	ἐκεῖνα	
περιποιεῖν	ἢ	 κωλύειν	δυναμένοις’.684  This	means	we	are	made	subject	 to	 the	whims	of	another’s	
control:	 acted	 upon	 to	 change	 according	 to	 their	 inclinations	 and	 desires,	 and	 tossed	 to	 and	 fro	
accordingly.	 	 However,	 in	 matters	 regarding	 our	 moral	 purpose,	 which	 are	 in	 our	 control	 (τὰ	
προαιρετικὰ	 δὲ	 πάντα	 ἐφ᾽	ἡμῖν),	 we	 have	 security	 and	 no	man	 can	 claim	 things	 under	 our	moral	
control,	 they	 cannot	 act	 upon	 us	 either	 to	 take	 away	 things	 from	 us	 ‘that	 are	 under	 our	 moral	
control’,	or	make	us	do	things	‘under	our	moral	control’	(καὶ	οὔτ᾽	ἀφελέσθαι	τις	ἡμῶν	αὐτὰ	δύναται	
οὔτε	περιποιῆσαι	ἃ	οὐ	θέλομεν	αὐτῶν),	so	there	is	no	room	left	for	anxiety.685  The	sight	and	sound	







a	 receiver	 receiving	 (patient);	an	agent	acting	and	a	patient	being	acted	upon;	 the	basic	 semantics	
behind	this	causal	experience	and	the	linguistical	mechanics	behind	the	fact	that	our	suffering	is	our	
own	affair,	acts	and	deeds	(pragmata)	are	in	our	control.688		If	I	want	(thelō)	to	suffer	I	can	will	myself	
to	 suffer	 so	 turning	 around	 the	 words	 of	 Epictetus	 ‘If	 I	 wish	 (thelō)	 anything,	 I	 will	 speak	 to	 your	
master’689	–	okay	I	can	speak	to	my	prohairesis.		
3.3.4.1	Revealing	Something	About	The	Doer	and	the	Done		
If	a	man	does	anything,	 then	 this	 implies	 there	must	be	something	which	 is	acted	upon	by	 this	
doer	 of	 the	 action	 –	 in	Gorgias	 Socrates	 asks, ‘If	 a	man	 does	 anything,	must	 there	 be	 something	
which	is	also	acted	upon	by	this	doer	of	the	thing?’690	to	which	Polus	responds	in	the	affirmative.			The	
nature	of	action	reveals	something	about	the	nature	of	 the	thing	performing	the	action,	and	 it	can	
also	 reveal	 something	 about	 the	 thing	 being	 acted	 upon.	 	 Another	 question	 Socrates	 raises	 with	
Polus	 is	 this:	 ‘Do	 people	wish	merely	 that	which	 they	do	each	 time,	or	 that	which	 is	 the	object	of	
















does	something	 for	an	object,	he	does	not	wish	the	thing	that	he	does,	but	 the	thing	 for	which	he	
does	 it’.692		This	dialogue	attempts	 to	 illustrate	 several	messages,	 including	 that	 if	 a	man	does	not	
want	 to	have	a	diseased	 soul,	he	needs	 to	 realise	 that	he	has	done	 something	wrong	 to	cause	 the	









		When	we	 are	 acted	 upon,	we	 are	 affected	 in	 some	way,	 have	 an	 experience,	
which	in	the	general	sense	and	in	different	degrees	should	be	classed	as	suffering.			
In	 the	case	of	people,	 if	 the	action	 is	evil	 then	 this	 says	 something	about	 the	nature	and	moral	
character	 of	 the	 doer,	 likewise	 with	 a	 good	 action.	 	What	 is	 done	 is	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 doer,	 and	
sometimes	 directly	 reflects	 what	 the	 doer	 wants	 to	 achieve,	 the	 effect	 they	 wish	 to	 produce	 or	
create.	 	The	tyrant	wants	to	create	fear	 in	his	subjects.
696		This	tells	us	something	about	the	tyrant:	
his	 intention	 is	 to	 create	 fear	 to	 gain	 power,	 to	 control	 others,	 to	 demonstrate	 his	 authority.	 	 His	
motives	 and	 intentions	 come	 across	 through	 his	 voice,	 which	 is	 terrifying,	 or	 his	 aggressive	





same	 way	 and	 some	 people	 listening	 to	 the	 tyrant’s	 voice	 are	 not	 affected	 by	 a	 feeling	 of	 fear;	
nevertheless	there	is	an	effect:	it	might	be	consciously	drawing	our	attention	to	the	tyrant’s	physical	
presence,	 or	 that	 the	 tyrant	 is	 impatiently	 craving	 attention	 or	 needing	 someone	 to	 take	 action.  




























related	 in	 terms	of	action	and	suffering,	 feeling	and	affection	and	also	 they	 reveal	 the	presence	of	
contraries	 and	 differences.	 	 	 An	 action	 may	 result	 in	 a	 man	 being	 acted	 upon	 with	 a	 feeling	 of	
pleasure	or	of	pain	and	sorrow.		A	good	action	could	be	received	with	the	sense	of	a	good	feeling	as	it	
is	our	human	nature	to	be	drawn	towards	the	good	and	repulsed	from	the	evil.	 	Of	course	the	doer	
may	 believe	 their	 action	 is	 good	 and	 just	 but	 in	 fact	 it	 is	 not.	 	 The	 person	 acted	 upon	 may,	 by	
persuasion,	have	a	feeling	(pathein),	see	that	this	 is	so	or	 it	 is	not	so699	(that	the	action	 is	good	and	
just,	or	 it	 is	bad	and	wrong);	they	suffer	either	way.	 	Similarly	 in	the	Buddhist	theory	of	Dependent	
Origination
700
	craving	 is	 conditioned	 by	 feeling,	 and	 feeling	 is	 conditioned	 by	 an	 impression	 (1.2.1,	
1.7.2,	2.2.3.4).		The	action	of	the	doer	reflects	whether	they	are	a	wrongdoer	or	have	lost	their	way	in	
their	 perception	 of	 right	 and	 wrong.  The	 tyrant	 acts	 in	 ways	 that	 reveal	 his	 character,	 wanting	
power,	 control,	 fame	 and	 egotistical	 self-interest,	 and	 the	 effects	 on	 those	 acted	 upon	 are	 fears,	
anxieties,	distress	and	abuse.								
In	the	examples	given	by	Epictetus	in	the	Discourses,	it	is	clear	that	his	intention	is	to	educate	on	













of	 our	 aversion	 to	 avoid	what	we	 do	 not	want.	 	 But	 our	 ignorance,	 bad	 judgement,	wrong	 use	 of	
impressions	can	sometimes	end	up	with	our	doing	or	not	doing	something	or	getting	or	not	what	we	
don’t	want:	all	distinctive	characterisitics	of	error.		This	happens	when	we	want	something	not	in	our	
control;	we	have	not	 regulated	and	maintained	our	wants	within	 the	 sphere	of	 those	 things	 in	our	
control	 (what	 has	 not	 been	given	me	outright).
702





















applause),	 which	 is	 not	 in	 his	 power.	 	 ‘For	 if	 he	 did	 not	 want	 something	 that	 was	 outside	 of	 his	
control,	how	could	he	still	remain	in	anxiety?’706		There	are	many	things	we	may	wish	for:	‘success	in	a	
meeting,	 whilst	 being	 in	 control	 and	 maintaining	 our	 calm’;
707


















		So	our	wants,	desires,	needs,	wishes	 (thelō	 )	underpin	and	 influence	what	we	do,	how	we	








we	 do	 not	 know	 what	 we	 ought	 to	 be	 doing,	 and	 also	 through	 our	 ignorance	 and	 irrational	
judgements	we	are	convinced	that	our	decisions	to	act	in	a	certain	way	are	correct.	
Epictetus’	famously	apt	maxim	for	living	a	serene	life	is	a	recipe	for	a	life	free	of	suffering:	‘Do	not	
seek	 to	have	everything	that	happens	happen	as	you	wish,	but	wish	 for	everything	to	happen	as	 it	
actually	 does	 happen	 and	 your	 life	 will	 be	 serene.’
715
		 Sellars	 offers	 a	 good	 discussion	 of	 this,	 in	
particular	regarding	simple-fated	and	conjoined-fated	things,	and	that	Epictetus	explicitly	reminds	us	
that	we	 cannot	 control	 the	 outcome	of	 the	 latter.
716
		We	 also	 have	 the	 following	 line	 of	 argument	

























Are	 you	 not	 at	 this	 moment	 trying	 to	 escape	 what	 is	 inevitable?	 	 If	 so,	 why	 do	 you	 fall	 into	 any	
trouble,	 why	 are	 you	 unfortunate?‘	 Then	 ask	 yourself,‘	Why	 is	 it	 that	 when	 you	 want	 (thelontosς)	





–	 that	we	cannot	get	 this	 from	outside	ourselves,	nor	by	disturbing	and	deranging	 things,	











‘Will	you	 (thelei)	not	act	 (poiei)	 like	a	sick	man	and	summon	a	physician?’721	Should	Medea	have	
consulted	her	physician	on	how	to	relieve	her	disease?	The	sick	man	should	consider	‘what	I	ought	to	
do	(poiein)’	and	‘	what	I	ought	to	be	doing	(poiein)?’722		So	what	we	wish	or	want	(thelō),	what	we	do	or	
ought	 to	be	doing	 (poieō)	and	how	 this	 affects	us	 (paschōo)	 are	all	mutually	 related,	 as	part	of	 the	
chain	of	 cause	 and	effect,	which	moves	us	 into	our	 suffering	but	 can	 also	move	us	 away	 from	our	
suffering.			
Epictetus’	 use	 of	 this	 language	 of	 wishing/wanting,	 doing/acting/creating	 and	 of	 acted	
upon/affection/suffering	is	extensive,	revealing	and	illustrative	of	different	nuances	of	meaning	and	
principles	inherent	in	his	teaching.		His	approach	is,	as	always,	practical	and	not	analytic;	this	is	not	a	
problem	 as	 it	 more	 than	 serves	 its	 purpose	 of	 unlocking	 the	 cause-effect	 basis	 of	 suffering.	 The	




an	 individual	 (the	cause)	 influence	the	experience	of	 that	 individual	 (the	effect).	 	 In	Buddhist	 terms	
this	is	kamma,	the	experience	of	the	result	of	cause	and	effect	(1.2.1,	1.7.2,	1.7.3,	2.2.3.4)	and	relates	
to	the	Buddhist	notion	of	conditioned	things	as	developed	through	an	active	and	passive	existence,	











language	 as	 explored	 in	 this	 section	 through	 consideration	 of	 Epictetus’	 use	 of	 poieō	 and	 paschō:	
although	 it	 is	 outside	 the	 scope	of	 this	 thesis,	 active	 and	passive	 language	 is	 used	 in	Buddhism	 to	
express	the	principle	of	kamma	and	the	sankharas.			
In	 this	 section	we	have	addressed	 the	use	of	active	and	passive	 language	 to	analyse	and	 reveal		
the	nature,	sense,	quality	and	experience	of	suffering:	how	someone	acts	that	causes	the	experience	
to	take	place	and	how	they	react	when	the	experience	has	taken	place.		




(paschō)	 and	by	 the	Buddhist	 notion	of	dukkha.	 	 This	 exploration	 into	active	 and	passive	 language	
supports	 this	 claim	 and	 provides	 further	 evidence	 of	 the	 parallel	 thinking	 between	 Epictetus	 and	
Buddhism:	 between	 the	 active	 and	 passive,	 and	 cause	 and	 effect,	 all	 of	 which	 are	 relevant	 to	
understanding	the	Second	Noble	Truth.  
Epictetus	announces	 ‘What,	 then,	 is	 the	cause	of	my	going	astray?	 	 Ignorance’.723		As	Buddhists	
argue,	the	existence	of	 ignorance,	the	active	element	of	our	past	existence	(cf.	1.4.5),	produces	the	
volition	 (cetanā)	 to	 act,	 and	 this	 produces	 mental	 formations	 (sankhara)	 and	 through	 Dependent	
Origination	 we	 have	 craving	 and	 then	 clinging	 to	 the	 five	 aggregates	 and	 the	 becoming	 of	 our	
suffering	existence.		Our	ignorance	can	be	gross	and	superficial,	but	there	are	levels	below	this	down	
to	 the	 subconscious.
724 		 Likewise	 Epictetus	 unravels	 the	 problematic	 of	 suffering	 through	 the	
active/passive	 state	 of	 our	 conditioned	 existence:	 we	 expose,	 through	 the	 language	 of	 the	
active/passive,	our	ignorance:	the	cause	must	be	similar	to	the	effect	in	the	sense	that	an	ignorant	or	
deluded	mind	 will	 produce	 the	 volition	 to	 act	 badly.	 	 The	 Buddhist	 analogy	 of	 ignorance	 is	 often	
represented	by	the	blind	person	walking.	 	We	have	a	similar	analogy	used	in	Epictetus:	a	blind	man	
looking	 in	 the	 wrong	 place.
725
		 Through	 the	 natural	 process	 of	 kamma	 and	 volition,	 happiness	 or	
suffering	happens	since	volition	and	kamma	are	part	of	the	process:726	it	is	part	of	the	active/passive	
sense	 of	 our	 existence.	 	 Similarly	 we	 have	 volition	 (prohairesis)	 in	 Epictetus.727		 Our	 blindness	
(ignorance)	can	hinder	our	vision	and	consequently	can	lead	us	to	suffer	(cf.	sankhara	 in	1.7.2,	2.2.3,	



















So	 it	 is	 through	 the	 active/passive	 process	 of	 existence	 starting	 with	 ignorance,	 through	 our	
volitional	 actions,
730	use	 of	 impressions,731	judgements,732	not	 knowing	 what	 is	 and	 is	 not	 in	 our	
power,
733
	not	 understanding	 good	 and	 evil,
734


























lead	 to	 disappointment,	 dissatisfaction	 and	 disease.
738
		 Epictetus	 argues	 that	 it	 is	 our	 ignorance,	
judgements	and	the	decisions	of	our	will	that	result	in	our	suffering:	


































	 and	 de	 Ruyter	 consider	 that	 Chrysippus’	 view	 was	 that	 emotions	
were	 evaluative	 judgements.
	743
		 Nussbaum,	 Sorabji,	 Graver	 amongst	 others,	 have	 discussed	 this	
claim.
744
		 	Also	of	particular	 interest	 is	Nussbaum’s	 remark	that	 the	Stoic	view	 is	 ‘overly	 focused	on	
linguistically	 formulable	 propositional	 content’:
745
	as	 Epictetus	 makes	 reference	 to	 the	 language	


















particular.	 	One	Buddhist	way	of	expressing	this	 is	 that	emotions	are	states	of	a	deluded	mind
751
		–	
such	 states	 of	 mind	 when	 they	 arise	 leave	 us	 disturbed,	 confused	 and	 unhappy.	 	 The	 feeling	
aggregate	 is	 a	 state	 of	 mind,	 which	 labels	 mental	 experiences	 as	 pleasant	 (sukhaa	 vedanaa),	
unpleasant	(dukkhaa	vedanaa),	and	neutral;	these	give	rise	to	actions	such	as	attachments	(upādāna	
–	See	 1.3.3.4),	 aversions	 or	 doing	 nothing,	 being	 indifferent.	 	 Our	 experience	 forms	 or	 creates	 an	
opinion	or	judgement	and	an	impression	in	the	mind	of	the	object	of	our	experience.		A	deluded	mind	
is	 having	 a	 wrong	 understanding	 or	 wrong	 views	 of	 reality;	 our	 deluded	 mind	 forms	 a	 mental	
impression,	which	creates	a	subjective	reality	that	is	contrary	to	rational	argument.		Epictetus	claims	
we	go	astray	and	become	dissatisfied	when	we	make	judgements,	having	the	wrong	view	of	‘what	is	
up	 to	 us’,	 wrong	 understanding	 of	 things	 as	 they	 really	 are,	 and	 making	 the	 wrong	 use	 of	
impressions.	 	 We	 also	 have	 Epictetus,	 like	 Buddhist	 psychology,	 claiming	 that	 we	 assent	 to	 the	





























According	 to	 the	 theory	 of	 dispositions	 presented	 in	 Cicero,	 there	 are	 two	 related	 forms	 of	
judgement:	 occurrent	 judgements	 and	 dispositional	 judgements.	 	 Pathē	 are	 qualified	 as	 ‘recent’,	
‘fresh’,	 ‘occurrent’	 judgements
754
	made	 momentarily	 in	 time	 about	 whether	 something	 is	 worth	
regarding	as	good	or	bad;	they	are	movements	or	impulses	of	the	soul	towards	a	perceived	good	or	
bad.	 	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 disease	 is	 something	 more	 persistent	 and	 longer-lasting	 based	 on	 the	
individual’s	disposition;	inherent	qualities	of	mind	and	character	incline	us	one	way	or	the	other	and	
hence	 we	 have	 the	 notion	 of	 dispositional	 judgements.	 	 Again	 we	 use	 the	 example,	 avarice	 is	 a	
disease	 following	 a	 dispositional	 judgement	 which	 has	 been	 bred	 through	 man’s	 desire	 for,	 and	




A	disease	of	 the	 soul	 is	 thus	 a	 disorder	 of	 the	 soul,	 a	 certain	disposition	 towards	 something	or	
someone	 that	 adversely	 affects	 us,	 from	 which	 we	 consequently	 suffer.	 	 Again,	 Cicero	 offers	 a	
summary	of	the	Stoic	view:	‘they	define	sickness	of	the	soul	as	an	intense	strong	opinion,	persistent	









Judgements	 (dogmata)	 about	 things	 that	are	good	and	evil	 (2.4),	 are	 subject	 to	our	prohairesis:	
this	 is	 the	nub	of	Epictetus’	argument	 throughout	 the	Discourses.	 	 It	 is	man’s	 failure	 to	understand	
wherein	good	and	evil	are	to	be	found	that	causes	disease	and	illness	of	the	mind	and	results	in	our	
suffering.		In	looking	for	the	good	and	evil	we	look	outside	of	ourselves.			The	anxious	man	seeks	his	
peace	 in	externals	but	does	not	know	what	anxiety	 is.	 	We	admire	and	are	earnest	about	externals	















































imperfectly	 the	wisdom	of	 the	Stoic	discourses	and	precepts.	 	 Epictetus	 is	making	 reference	 to	an	
illness,	a	mind	 in	disease	and	a	pathological	 impairment	or	 infirmity	to	the	person’s	moral	purpose	
(2.3).			
Some	 men	 are	 so	 determined	 in	 what	 they	 believe	 in	 that	 they	 cling	 vehemently	 to	 their	




a	 disposition	 to	 act	 properly,	 morally,	 in	 all	 circumstances.
763
		 	 Diogenes	 Laertius	 states,	 ‘All	 the	




Epictetus	 wants	 to	 emphasise	 that	 this	 ‘madness’	 is	 a	 pathological	 condition	 whereby	 man	 is	
showing	 a	 dogged	 determination	 not	 to	 change	 his	 attitude	 or	 position	 on	 something,	 in	 spite	 of	
hearing	good	 reasons	 to	 do	 so.	 	 	 As	Graver	 points	 out,
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so	 the	 fool	 is	 not	 amenable	 either	 to	 reason	 or	 force.	 	 There	 is	 nothing	 harder	 to	 handle	 or	more	
obstinate	and	immovable	than	the	fool	and	the	mad	man:	‘“I	have	decided,”	he	says!		Why	yes,	and	




Men	get	caught	up	 in	their	 ideas	and	views	and	preconceptions;	 they	become	attached	to	their	
decisions	based	on	their	views.	The	very	tone	of	determination	behind	the	phrase,	 ‘I	have	decided’,	
sets	the	scene	for	being	too	rigid	in	seeking	and	not	being	respectful	of	the	truth,	not	accepting	that	
they	 may	 need	 to	 change	 false	 views	 and	 impressions.	 	 Again	 senseless	 ignorance	 and	 dogged	
decisions	dispose	man	to	act	 in	 the	wrong	way:	 	 ‘“I	have	decided”,	precisely	as	 in	a	diseased	body,	
suffering	 from	a	 flux,	 the	 flux	 inclines	 now	 in	 this	 direction	 and	now	 in	 that.	 	 Such	 is	 also	 the	 sick	











that	 is	 characterised	 by	 episodes	 of	 suffering	 from	diseases	 of	 a	mind	 disposed	 towards	 irrational	
behaviour,	a	mind	in	flux,	of	fluttery	ignorance,	inclining	this	way	and	that:	hence	the	Stoic-held	view	
































way	of	 referencing	the	passive	and	active	sankharas	and	the	chain	of	 kamma	 (actions).	 	These	 two	
types	of	sankhara	function	in	a	similar	way	to	the	active	(poieō)	and	passive	(paschō)	 in	Epictetus	in	
relation	 to	 what	 we	 do,	 say	 and	 think	 about	 something,	 and	 the	 suffering	 that	 can	 develop	 as	 a	
consequence.		The	active	sankhara	is	the	kammic	action	(or	doer)	that	acts	upon	and	produces	mental	
formations.	
In	 the	 next	 chapter	 we	 shall	 address	 the	 notion	 that	 suffering	 can	 be	 overcome	 and	 that	
satisfaction	and	contentment	in	life	can	be	attained.		When	we	give	up	our	relentless	desire	for	things	











































































(cetanā	 –	 1.2.1)777	and	 volitional	 formations	 (sankhara	 –	 1.7.2-3),	 and	 right	 views,	 intentions	 and	
actions	 (5.2.1)	 in	 the	 use	 of	 impressions.	 	 Cetanā,	 kamma,	 sankhara	 and	 prohairesis	 are	 linked	 to	
man’s	 sphere	 of	moral	 purpose	and	 so	 to	 the	moral	 quality	 of	 his	 actions.	 	 The	 results	 of	 kammic	
action,	 be	 it	 bodily,	 verbal	 or	 mental,	 are	 consequently	 either	 of	 wholesome/good	 (kusala)	 or	
unwholesome/bad	(akusala)	quality	(5.2.1-2	and	1.7.3):	through	attachment,	aversion	and	ignorance	
unwholesome	 thoughts	 can	 arise,	 and	 corresponding	 actions	 arise.	 	 Hence	 from	 the	 Book	 of	







the	cessation	and	 letting	go	of	 	 'my	wants’	and	 'my	views’	and	 in	adopting	the	right	view	and	right	
intention.		It	is	through	the	language	of	the	active	and	passive	relationship	that	we	form	what	we	do,	
think	and	say,	and	this	feeds	into	and	drives	our	decision-making,	what	depends	on	us,	our	choice,	in	





choices	 are	 made,	 the	 prohairesis	 becomes	 morally	 dysfunctional.	 	 This	 is	 analogous	 to	 an	 inner	
tyrant	dominating	and	taking	over	our	language	of	moral	choice	and	our	ruling	faculty.		Getting	our	
prohairesis	morally	functional,	making	the	right	choices	to	free	us	from	the	cravings	and	attachments	
















The	 Third	 Noble	 Truth779	is	 a	 lesson	 in	 the	 cessation	 of	 suffering	 (nirodha	 saccã)	 and	 it	 is	 a	
realisation	that	our	suffering	can	be	overcome.		This	truth	concerns	the	fading	away	and	cessation	of	




The	Buddhist	 scriptures	say	 ‘all	 that	 is	 subject	 to	arising	 is	 subject	 to	ceasing’;780	in	other	words	
everything	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 impermanence,	 nothing	 has	 a	 permanent	 existence.	 	 The	 Third	 Truth	
wants	us	 to	apply	a	 reflective	mind	 to	our	suffering	and	 the	nature	of	attachment	 to	desire	and	 to	
realise	that	attachment	to	desire	is	suffering.		With	a	reflective	mind	we	see	that	there	is	a	beginning	





We	 argue	 in	 this	 section	 that	 Epictetus’	 teaching	 addresses	 philosophical	 exercises	 for	 the	
cessation	 of	 suffering	 similar	 to	 those	 found	 in	 the	 Buddhist	 teaching.	 Also	 we	 can	 find	 parallels	
between	his	views	and	Buddhist	views	as	 regards	the	 insight	 that	 is	gained	through	contemplation	
and	 opening	 up	 the	 mind	 to	 the	 power	 of	 indifference	 and	 its	 importance	 to	 the	 ceasing	 of	
attachment	to	desires.	
The	cycle	of	suffering	can	never	be	broken	whilst	we	want	to	satisfy	our	desires	for	things	that	are	
impermanent	 and	not	 in	our	 control	 (2.2.1-2,	 3.2).	 	 Epictetus’	 language	explains	 cessation	 in	 these	
ways:	 ‘freedom	 from	 suffering	 is	 not	 acquired	 by	 satisfying	 yourself	 with	 what	 you	 desire	 but	 by	
destroying	 your	 desire’;
781
	by	 ‘overcoming	 our	 desires’;
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	things	not	 in	our	 control:	 this	 is	 ignorance	 (3.2.5).		









of	 the	 Socratic	 orgins	 of	 the	 art	 of	 living,	 it	 is	 more	 than	 just	 merely	 explaining	 what	 human	











The	Buddhist	discourse	on	conditioned	things	 (Pratītyasamutpāda)	 (2.2,	3.2)	states	 that	 ‘This	 is,	
because	that	is.	 	This	is	not,	because	that	is	not.		This	comes	to	be,	because	that	comes	to	be.		This	
ceases	 to	be,	because	 that	 ceases	 to	be’.
789
		Conditioned	 things	 include	physical,	physiological	 and	
psychological	phenomena	and	all	are	subject	to	birth	and	death;
790	the	arising	of	craving	has	feeling	





arising	 is	 subject	 to	 ceasing,	 reflect	 a	 cycle	 of	 birth	 and	 death;	what	we	 attach	 and	 cling	 to,	what	





conditioned	 phenomena	 are	 mortal	 and	 will	 cease	 at	 some	 point	 in	 time:	 all	 our	 passions	 and	
emotions	 are	 mortal;	 they	 are	 all	 conditioned	 phenomena,	 subject	 to	 birth	 and	 death.	 	 So	 why	





















Epictetus	 is	 equally	 vocal	 about	 man’s	 obsession	 with	 death	 and	 the	 desire	 to	 cling	 to	 life.		
Discourse	 on	 conditioned	 phenomena	 is	 evident	 in	 many	 places	 in	 Epictetus:
792
	we	 cling	 to	 our	
judgements	 and	 yearn	 for	 things	 outside	 our	 contr0l	 and	 our	 separation	 from	 things	 not	 in	 our	
control.		He	says	‘all	these	things	are	changes	of	a	preliminary	state	into	something	else’:793	here	he	is	
saying	 that	 when	 the	 current	 state	 ceases	 to	 exist,	 it	 turns	 into	 something	 else	 that	 does	 not	







it	 is	 not	 the	 death	 or	 hardship	 that	 we	 should	 fear.
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to	 ceasing:	 everything	 has	 an	 evolving,	 decaying	 and	 dying	 nature.
800
		 The	 Buddhist	 teaching	 of	
‘When	 this	 is,	 that	 is;	 This	 arising,	 that	 arises;	 When	 this	 is	 not,	 that	 is	 not;	 This	 ceasing,	 that	
ceases’
801
	can	 be	 expressed	 as	 whatever	 is	 subject	 to	 arising	 is	 subject	 to	 ceasing.	 This	 Buddhist	
teaching	is	not	some	metaphysical	discourse	but	a	point	of	reflection	on	what	actually	happens	and	
to	 be	 applied	 to	 life	 and	 to	 our	 experience.	 	 Recalling	 our	 early	 discussion	 (1.2.2	 and	 2.2),	 there	 is	
nothing	abstract	or	esoteric	about	suffering	and	the	Four	Noble	Truths.		There	is	suffering,	it	arises	in	





































are	 dispositions	 of	 the	 prohairesis.	 	 The	 natural	 or	 proper	 working	 condition	 of	 the	 prohairesis	 is	
complete	 autonomy.
804
		 Epictetus	 entertains	 the	 view	 of	 prohairesis	 acting	 as	 an	 inner	 voice	 that	


























































life	worth	 living.	 	There	 is	nothing	aprohairetic	that	can	stop	us	achieving	a	quality	of	 life	based	on	
moral	excellence;	only	 the	prohairetic	can	stop	us	achieving	this	quality	of	 life.	 	The	wise	man	 (the	
sage)	 is	given	as	the	prescriptive	 ideal,	the	man	that	has	achieved	this	eudaimonistic	goal.	 	He	sets	
the	pedagogical	standard	to	be	measured	against,	for	men	to	strive	towards,	but	of	course	very	few	
can	reach	this	ideal.	 	Nevertheless	all	men	have	the	necessary	reasoning	faculties	to	make	progress	
towards	 a	 certain	 quality	 of	 life	 that	might	 not	 bring	 them	 the	 full	 measure	 of	 the	 ideal	 state	 of	
human	flourishing,	but	which	can	certainly	provide	degrees	of	relief	from	their	suffering.		The	desire	
for	apatheia	 is	 for	a	quality	of	 life	we	all	 set	our	hearts	upon	but	 the	 full	measure	of	 such	a	quality	
depends	on	us	and	how	well	we	prepare	ourselves	 in	our	own	act	of	 living,	our	own	way	of	dealing	
with	 life,	 how	 we	 think	 about	 things,	 what	 thoughts	 we	 discuss	 with	 ourselves.	 	 All	 these	 are	











life,	 encompassed	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 eudaimonic	 life,	 to	 lead	 a	 life	 in	 accordance	 with	 man’s	
experience	of	what	happens	by	nature.	
The	meaning	of	quality,	 in	 the	 sense	of	 a	quality	of	 life	worth	 living,	 is	 a	moral	 judgement	and	












Epictetus	 frequently	 demonstrates	 through	 his	 arguments.
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we	 are	 and	 what	 type	 we	 want	 to	 be,	 what	 qualities	 of	 character	 we	 have,	 whether	 we	 neglect	
ourselves	so	we	are	a	person	of	poor	quality	and	bad	standards,	whether	we	want	to	be	beautiful	or	
ugly.	 	Am	I	 that	kind	of	person?	 	The	kind	of	person	that	seeks	to	be	characterised	as	having	good	
quality,	 the	quality	of	excellence	 that	characterises	a	man.
818
		But	 this,	argues	Epictetus,	 is	 to	have	























Such	 discussion	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Bobzien	 (freedom	 and	 determinism),	 Bonhöffer,	 Braicovich	
(rhetorical-pedagogical	 expressions	 of	 Epictetus’	 intellectualism),	 Dihle,	 Dobbin,	 Dragona-
























	and	 Epictetus	 developed	 their	 own	 interpretations	 of	 the	 term	 based	 on	 the	 general	
definition	of	‘choosing	one	thing	before	another’	and	between	them	extended	the	definition	to	give	
greater	technical	meaning	to	the	term.	Epictetus’	use	is	certainly	not	equivalent	to	that	of	Aristotle	
and	 is	 in	several	 respects	divergent.	 	For	example,	 in	the	 interpretation	of	 ‘what	 is	up	to	us’	 (τὰ	ἐφ'	
ἡμῖν)	 as	a	key	element	 in	 the	decision	making	process,	his	objective	 is	 purposely	directed	 towards	
decisions	of	the	will	relating	to	moral	and	immoral	acts	of	choice.		As	Dragona-Monachou	points	out,	
prohairesis	 denotes	 the	 autonomous	 inner	 disposition	 and	 attitude,	 volition,	 moral	 choice	




definition	 inherent	 in	 Epictetus’	 concept	 of	 free	 choice,	 which	 lends	 itself	 well	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 the	










The	 varying	 lines	 of	 argument	 provided	 by	 these	 interpretations	 from	 modern	 scholarship,	
though	 not	 in	 complete	 agreement	 with	 each	 other,	 and	 whilst	 not	 offering	 any	 conclusive	




back	 to	 Epictetus’	 language	 of	 prohairesis,	 from	 a	 ‘what	 depends	 on	 us’	 perspective,	 which	 is	
concerned	with	the	basic	problem	of	dealing	with	our	suffering,	that	is,	controlling	how	we	deal	with	
those	 impressions	that	compel	us	to	be	disturbed.	 	We	should	remind	ourselves	(4.1)	that	the	term	
prohairesis	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 primarily	 being	 used	 to	mean	 a	 faculty	 of	 choice,	 the	
power	to	make	decisions	or	moral	choices	regarding	the	use	of	impressions	and	understanding	their	
use.	 	 Our	 prohairetic	 choice	 is	 for	 us	 to	 determine	 and	 not	 forced	 from	 outside	 unless	 we	 are	 so	























of	 the	 bad	 in	 the	world	 and	 it	 is	my	 judgements	 and	 choices	 that	make	 it	 so.	 	 Seddon	 provides	 a	













our	 choice	 whether	 our	 soul	 is	 moved	 by	 desire	 or	 aversion,
831
	the	 proper	 use	 of	 our	 sense	
impressions	 is	 our	 choice	 under	 our	 control.
832







argue	 that	 even	 Epictetus’	 mantra	 on	 the	 good	 flow	 of	 life	 (‘Seek	 not	 that	 things	 which	 happen	
should	happen	as	you	wish;	but	wish	the	things	which	happen	to	be	as	they	are,	and	you	will	have	a	
tranquil	 flow	 of	 life’)834	is	 consistent	 with	 this	 notion	 of	 prohairetic	 choice	 and	 release	 from	 our	
suffering.		As	Simplicius	interprets	this,	everything	happens	according	to	some	value,	either	of	nature	


































This	 is	 discussed	 in	 Sorabji,	 Long,	 Dobbin	 and	 Braicovich.
837
		 Epictetus’	 unique	 definition	 of	 this	
concept	as	our	moral	agency,	and	its	use	in	the	Discourses,	reveals	a	strong	and	accomplished	line	of	
argument	 that	prohairesis	 is	by	nature	 free	 to	make	 the	 right	choices	about	use	of	externals	whilst	
denying	such	freedom	to	anything	external;	hence	it	forms	the	cornerstone	of	his	teaching	of	what	it	
is	to	be	free	and	how	it	is	to	be	free	from	our	internal	struggles	and	disturbances.		
There	are	various	 features	of	 the	prohairesis	 that	we	will	highlight	and	summarise	here	that	are	
important	to	the	cessation	of	suffering.			
The	first	feature	regarding	the	prohairesis	is	that	it	is	by	nature	a	free	agent	in	the	sense	of	being	
able	 to	 make	 internal	 cognitive	 choices,	 decisions	 and	 judgments	 independent	 from	 external	
influence,	opinion	or	views:	only	the	prohairesis	can	compel,	hinder	and	make	itself	pure	or	 impure;	
nothing	else,	nothing	external,	can	do	this.	The	prohairesis	is	thus	reflexive	and	so	able	to	determine	
its	own	choices	or	 refusals,	 and	 it	 has	 the	 freedom	 to	be	 subordinate	 to	 something/someone	else.		
The	prohairesis	can	contemplate	or	make	a	judgement	about	itself	and	its	choices	or	refusals.		




related	 to	 our	moral	 conditioning	 is	 determined	 and	processed	by	 the	prohairesis	as	 a	 result	 of	 its	
sovereign	 power	 to	make	 choices	 determinative	 of	 its	 own	moral	 state	 and	 quality.	 	 And	 it	 is	 this	
power	 that	 processes	 the	 choices	 that	 relate	 to	 our	 suffering.
	839
		 This	 concerns	 choosing	 a	 path	
towards	virtue,	that	is,	making	the	right	choices	and	preferring	the	right	things	as	regards	the	good	









and	 rule	 itself,	 free	 to	 reason	 what	 choices	 to	 make	 and	 free	 to	 choose	 whether	 to	 suffer,	 with	
reference	 to	 nothing	 else	 than	 itself.
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The	 three	 features	 of	 the	 prohairesis	mentioned	 above	 convey	 the	 essence	 of	 being	 sovereign	
over	 our	moral	 character	 and	 being	 able	 to	 rule	 over	 our	 choices	 to	 create	 a	 path	 to	 virtue.	 	 The	
prohairesis	is	a	certain	type	of	moral	state	(pure	or	impure)	based	upon	the	good	or	bad	choices	that	
are	made:	 the	 essence	 of	 the	 good	 is	 a	 certain	 type	 of	prohairesis	 (good	moral	 character)	 and	 the	
essence	of	the	bad	is	another	type	of	prohairesis	(bad	moral	character).		For	Epictetus,	any	strict	and	
formal	debate	about	free-will	and	determinism	was	not	on	his	agenda;	it	did	not	fit	into	his	scheme	of	





































the	power	 to	get	 rid	of	 them.	 	So	we	can	create	 the	problem	of	 fearful	 thoughts	and	we	solve	 the	
problem	of	our	fearful	thoughts.		So	in	applying	prohairesis	in	the	sense	of	making	a	moral	choice	of	
choosing	one	thing	before	another,	desiring	or	avoiding	this	thing	over	that	thing,	in	deciding	what	is	
good	 or	 bad	 in	 such	 an	 individualised,	 subjective	 way	 then	 the	 possibility	 of	 suffering	 arises	 or	
otherwise	as	the	case	may	be,	linked	to	our	moral	character.		So	it	should	be	clear	that	the	prohairesis	






An	 interesting	 aspect	 of	 Epictetus’	 theory	 of	 the	 prohairesis,	 as	 noted	 above	 and	 discussed	 by	
Sorabji
848











related	 to	 prohairesis	 and	 the	 hēgemonikon,	 the	 governing	 principle.	 	 This	 latter	 term	 could	 be	
interpretated	as	 synonomous	with	 that	of	 the	prohairesis	as	 in	 the	Discourses	 they	appear	 to	 share	
many	common	aspects,	for	example,	purity	of	function,	accord	with	nature,	use	of	impressions.	 	As	
discussed	and	argued	by	Long,	Epictetus	preferred	prohairesis	to	the	hēgemonikon	with	regard	to	the	
concept	 of	 the	 mind	 and	 rationality,	 despite	 many	 common	 points	 of	 reference.
851
		 	 It	 is	 in	 this	
context	that	this	thesis	supports	prohairesis	as	a	primary	focus	and	as	a	dynamis	–	a	faculty	of	control,	






























Something	composed	out	of	 a	 certain	kind	of	external	 impressions.	 	Thus	 it	 comes	naturally	 to	be	
also	 self-contemplative.	 	 Once	 more,	 what	 are	 the	 things	 that	 wisdom	 has	 been	 give	 us	 to	
contemplate?	 	Things	good,	bad	and	neither	good	nor	bad.	 	What,	 then,	 is	wisdom	 itself?	A	good.		
And	what	is	folly?	An	evil.		Do	you	see	then,	that	wisdom	inevitably	comes	to	contemplate	both	itself	
and	 its	 opposite?’
856		We	 can	 compare	 the	 similar	 description	 in	 Marcus	 Aurelius:	 	 ‘It	 sees	 itself,	









		 	Prohairetic	choice	 is	a	qualitative	 judgement	based	on	 the	quality	of	views,	
thoughts	and	opinions	and	so	forces	us	to	be	disposed	in	a	particular	direction:	 it	 is	our	choice	that	








being	 and	 my	 suffering.	 	 No-one	 else	 can	 control	 my	 judgements	 and	 only	 I	 can	 control	 my	
judgements.		In	a	rather	interesting	turn	of	phrase	Epictetus	says:	
’You	fail	 to	realize	that	the	 judgement	overcame	 itself,	 it	was	not	overcome	by	something	
else;	and	nothing	else	can	overcome	moral	purpose,	but	it	overcomes	itself’.860			
This	 self-conquering	aspect	of	 the	prohairesis	can	overcome	 the	 judgements	 it	makes	 including	
the	 judgements	 of	 itself.	 	 We	 (prohairesis)	 are	 what	 our	 (prohairesis)	 makes	 us,	 we	 are	 self-








if	your	prohairesis	 is	 inclined	to	the	bad	then	you	are	compelled	by	the	bad.	 	Your	prohairesis	 is	not	
being	 compelled	 by	 anything	 outside	 of	 your	 prohairesis	 but	 only	 by	 you,	 your	 prohairesis	 is	 your	
moral	master.		If	your	prohairesis	wishes	to	involve	you	in	the	bad	then	that	is	the	direction	you	will	be	



















dominate	 over	 itself	 like	master	 and	 slave,	 and	 like	 reasoning	 can	 contemplate	 itself.
864
		 Nothing	
outside	 the	 province	 of	 our	 prohairesis	 has	 this	 power	 to	 hinder,	 harm,	 injure	 or	 control	 our	
prohairesis.865			
4.4.4	Suffering	is	a	Personalised	Judgement	of	Reality		
As	discussed,	 the	prohairetic	 choice	 is	a	qualititative	 judgement	 that	 is	 responsible	 for	whether	
we	suffer	or	live	in	peace:	this	prohairetic	choice	plays	a	decisive	role	in	our	experience	of	suffering.		
This	prohairetic	choice	is	that	sovereign	power	we	have	to	make	judgements	and	decisions	based	on	
our	 beliefs	 and	 perceptions	 of	 reality	 regarding	 our	 impressions.	 	 Long	 suggests	 that	 Epictetus’	
emphasis	on	our	use	of	 impressions	provides	an	interpretation	of	the	individuality	of	the	perceiving	




peace	 is	 personalised	 and	 based	 on	 internal	 decisions.	 	 Our	 suffering	 is	 personalised	 also	 by	 the	
relationships	of	 the	passive	and	active	 language	 (3.3)	and	the	pathology	of	our	 language,	 thoughts	
and	moral	disposition	(2.3).		Now	the	subjective	quality	of	our	prohairetic	choice	means	not	only	that	



































bad	prohairesis.	 	 As	 indicated	 by	 Epictetus,	 it	 is	 probable	 that	 two	 individuals	 confronted	with	 the	
same	situation	may	arrive	at	different	conclusions	and	judgements	about	the	situation	depending	on	
their	beliefs,	 attitude	and	experience	of	 similar	 situations	 in	 the	past	and	so	a	 situation	may	cause	
suffering	in	one	individual	and	not	in	the	other.	 	The	fear	manifested	in	one	individual	regarding	an	
external	 situation	may	not	manifest	as	 fear	 in	another	 since	 fear	 is	merely	a	matter	of	 judgement.		
The	anger	of	one	individual	regarding	an	external	situation	may	not	manifest	as	anger	in	another;	it	is	
merely	a	matter	of	judgement	based	on	ignorance.		







He	also	comments	 ‘Where	 is	the	nature	of	good	and	evil	 to	be	found?	Where	truth	also	 is’.
870
		Such	

















the	 case	 of	 assent	 the	 feeling	 (pathein)	 that	 a	 thing	 is	 so,	 and	 in	 the	 case	 of	 dissent	 the	
feeling	 (pathein)	 that	 it	 is	 not	 so	 […]	 in	 the	 case	 of	 suspended	 judgement	 the	 feeling	
(pathein)	 that	 it	 is	 uncertain,	 so	 also	 the	 case	 of	 impulse	 towards	 a	 thing,	 the	 feeling	















in	 Oldfather	 but	 can	 equally	 be	 translated	 to	 mean	 ‘persuasion’,	 or	 ‘to	 be	 acted	 upon	 by	 an	
impression’.		This	passage	thus	refers	to	us	being	persuaded	that	a	thing	is	so	or	is	not	so.		Epictetus’	
aim	here	is	to	illustrate	that	the	very	nature	of	the	prohairesis	is	this	individualised	view	of	the	world	
where	we	persuade	ourself	 that	 a	 thing	 is	 so	 or	 is	 not	 so;	 this	means	 that	 through	 this	 process	 of	
thoughts	and	actions	having	their	origin	in	our	feelings,	we	can	persuade	ourself	into	a	state	of	mind	
of	 being	disturbed	or	 undisturbed.	 	 This	might,	 for	 example,	 lead	 us	 to	 having	 a	 feeling	of	 fear	 or	
anxiety	 because	 we	 have	 persuaded	 ourself	 that	 a	 certain	 thing,	 an	 impression	 we	 have	 of	
something,	 is	 something	we	should	be	 fearful	or	anxious	about	 irrespective	of	 the	 true	nature	and	
essence	of	the	thing	itself.		We	can	be	persuaded	and	acted	upon	by	our	prohairesis	to	be	affected	in	a	
certain	 way	 so	 as	 to	 experience	 suffering,	 a	 disturbance	 of	 the	 mind.	 	 The	 strength	 of	 our	 own	
persuasive	powers	should	be	beyond	doubt	as	Epictetus	says:	














Once	 again	 Epictetus	 brings	 us	 back	 to	 what	 the	 self-determining	 and	 reflexive	 nature	 of	 the	
prohairesis	can	surrender	us	to,	or	deliver	us	from,	a	state	of	suffering;	we,	our	prohairesis,	have	the	
means	to	rescue	us	from	our	anxiety.		Of	course,	rescuing	one’s	self	from	suffering	requires	effort	and	
strength	 of	 mind	 and	 willingness,	 which	 requires	 education	 and	 training.	 	 As	 discussed	 in	 4.2,	
recognising	 and	 accepting	 the	 existence	 of	 your	 suffering	 is	 the	 first	 step	 in	 transforming	 your	
suffering,	 then	showing	yourself	a	willingness	 to	change	and	rescue	yourself.	 	We	need	to	build	up	



















There	 is	nothing	more	powerful	 than	the	prohairetic	dialogue	with	the	self,	 reacting	to	the	self,	
convincing	and	persuading	the	self,	willing	the	self,	acting	upon	the	self.		This	self-reflective	dialogue	
holds	the	secret	of	both	our	destruction	(towards	suffering)	and	our	deliverance	(from	suffering).	
So	 our	 suffering	 is	 firmly	 embedded	 in	 the	 supreme	 power	 and	 capability	 of	 the	prohairesis	 to	
make	choices,	to	make	decisions,	because	that	is	where	we	transfer	judgement	about	the	good	and	
bad	 whereas	 that	 which	 is	 neither	 good	 nor	 bad	 lies	 outside	 the	 province	 of	 the	 prohairesis	
(aprohairetos).	 	 If	 I	persuade	myself	the	good	is	 in	desiring	something	aprohairetos	then	it	 is	not	my	
good	that	I	wish	to	attain	but	that	of	someone	else	which	I	have	no	authority	over	and	so	it	is	likely	
that	 I	will	 fail	 to	attain	this	good	which	 is	outside	of	my	prohairesis.	 	 Inevitably,	our	suffering	arises	
when	we	 fail	 to	 get	what	we	 choose	 to	 have	 or	we	 get	what	we	 choose	 to	 avoid;	 this	 situation	 is	
certain	to	distress	us.		Likewise	with	any	situation	where	the	choices	we	make	in	desiring	or	avoiding	
things	aprohairetos	will	 inevitably	 lead	 to	us	 suffering	 in	 some	way	or	other.	 	 ‘Apply	 the	 rule’,	 says	
Epictetus,	 ‘Is	 it	 outside	 the	province	of	 the	prohairesis,	 or	 inside	 (ἀπροαίρετον	ἢ	 προαιρετικόν)?	877		
He	 claims	 that	 if	 we	 ‘transfer	 <our>	 judgements	 to	 matters	 that	 lie	 within	 the	 province	 of	 the	
prohairesis,’	we	shall	not	be	disturbed	by	external	things	we	cannot	control.878											
4.4.5	Moral	Character	and	Integrity		
So	 far	 we	 have	 observed	 that	 the	 prohairesis	 plays	 the	 central	 role	 in	 our	 personal	 decision-
making	 in	 respect	 of	 our	 moral	 choices,	 it	 provides	 freedom	 of	 choice	 and	 independence	 from	
externals.	 	 Can	we	 now	 draw	 the	 conclusion	 that	 the	prohairesis	 is	defined	 as	 or	 determinative	 of	
moral	character?	 	 It	certainly	can	be	said	that	Epictetus	supposes	that	it	acts	as	an	agency	enacting	
our	 moral	 responsibilities	 and	 making	 the	 proper	 moral	 choices	 (4.4.2).	 	 This	 would	 point	 to	 the	
conclusion	 that	 our	 moral	 character	 is	 active	 when	 we	 are	 making	 choices,	 deciding	 on	 a	 path	
towards	virtue	and,	in	one	way	or	another,	prohairesis	 is	the	embodiment	of	our	moral	character.		If	
we	 followthe	 line	 of	 argument	 of	 Rist	 we	 can	 think	 of	 the	 prohairesis	 not	 primarily	 as	 an	 act	 of	





















881	and	 holds	 that	 the	 prohairesis	 is	 our	 ruling	 principle	 and	 the	 supreme	 governing	
authority;	it	constitutes	our	moral	character:	
‘Consider	 who	 you	 are.	 	 To	 begin	 with,	 a	 Man;	 that	 is	 one	 who	 has	 no	 quality	 more	
sovereign	 than	moral	choice	 (prohairesis),	but	keeps	everything	else	subordinate	 to	 it,	and	
this	moral	choice	(prohairesis)	itself	free	from	slavery	and	subjection’.882					






		 	 Extending	 this	 line	 of	 argument,	 it	 becomes	 clear	 that	 suffering	 is	 a	
matter	of	morality	and	our	moral	character	is	the	result	of	the	good	or	bad	choices.		And	again,	what	
clearly	 underpins	 Epictetus’	 intentions,	 is	 that	 suffering	 is	 an	 ethical	 imperative	 in	 our	 control	 and	








by	 continuously	 applying	 acts	 of	moral	 choice	 appropriately	 to	 each	 and	 every	 thing	we	do,	 every	



































Long’s	 account	 of	 Stoic	 integrity	 goes	 on	 to	 to	 point	 out	 various	 factors	 human	 beings	 are	







our	 prohairesis	 we	 are	 capable	 of	 conscience	 and	 self-consciousness;	 to	 fully	 know	 ourselves;	 and	
to	reflect	 and	 contemplate	 the	 mind.	 	 Another	 quote	 from	 Epictetus	 brings	 some	 of	 these	 ideas	
together:	‘Pay	attention,	therefore,	to	your	sense-impressions,	and	watch	over	them	sleeplessly.		For	
it	 is	no	small	matter	 that	you	are	guarding,	but	self-respect,	and	 fidelity,	and	constancy,	a	state	of	
mind	undisturbed	by	passion,	pain,	fear,	or	confusion—in	a	word,	freedom’.893		




• Transparency:	 (as	 regards	 value-beliefs,	 attitudes,	 actions)	 between	 inner	 intention	 and	
outer	behaviour,	between	personal	commitments	and	social	engagement;		






these	 two	 achievements	 go	 hand	 in	 hand).’
894
		 There	 is	 an	 interesting	 comparison	 here	 with	
Buddhism	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 wholesomeness.	 	 Buddhists	 talk	 of	 wholesome	 (kusala)	 and	
unwholesome	(akusala)	 thoughts	and	attitudes,	concentrating	on	healthy	or	wholesome	events	 for	
the	 development	 of	 well-being.
895
































Epictetus	 talks	 about	 the	 prohairesis	 in	 different	 ways	 and	 from	 alternate	 perspectives,	 the	 scope	
remains	the	same,	defined	by	what	is	in	our	control	and	by	our	being	absolutely	free	to	make	moral	
choices.	 	He	asks,	 ‘What	 is	 it	 that	destroys	 the	whole	man?	 	 Prohairesis.’900		Making	 the	prohairesis	
wholesome,	consistent	and	united	is	achieving	our	moral	purpose,	preserving	its	integrity.901		We	can	
relate	 this	 notion	 of	 moral	 character	 to	 Buddhist	 thinking,	 in	 particular	 to	 the	 five	 aggregates	
(khandas)	 and	 disposition	 (sankhara),	which	 fabricates	 a	 sense	 of	 personal	 identity;	 and	 through	





function	 which	 can	 be	 used	 to	 illustrate	 the	 nature,	 cause	 and	 cessation	 of	 suffering.	 	 We	 have	
already	had	presented	 in	Chapters	2	and	3	many	examples	of	his	use	of	 language	 in	relation	to	our	
experiences,	 thoughts,	 feelings	and	needs.	 	The	purpose	of	our	discussion	here	 in	 is	 to	explore	 the	




view	 of	 our	 impressions	 or	 lead	 us	 into	 having	 the	 wrong	 intention	 behind	 how	 we	 use	 our	
impressions	 or	 into	 making	 the	 wrong	 choices,	 all	 of	 which	 is	 not	 conducive	 to	 cessation.	 	 The	



















a	 range	of	 thoughts	 (ideas,	opinions,	concepts,	 images	that	appear	 in	 the	mind)	 (1.5).	 	This	 flow	of	
subjective	 experiences	 in	 the	 conscious	 mind	 can	 and	 does	 produce	 an	 inner	 dialogue	 that	 is	
sometimes	unsettling:	 thinking	 in	words	 that	are	negative,	 critical	and	harmful	 to	our	 inner	peace,	
leaving	us	anxious	and	uneasy.		Likewise	this	inner	voice	is	associated	with	thinking	that	we	identify	






















‘good’	and	bad’.	 	Ellis	 remarks	 that	 in	 terms	of	his	work	on	REBT,	 ‘people	habituate	 themselves	 to	









		The	 inner	voice	 	can	be	persuasive,	 terrorising	and	have	a	powerful	
influence	over	us;	it	appears	that	we	have	an	inner	tyrant	talking	to	us,	taking	control	of	our	feelings,	
and	transforming	these	into	emotions	and	passions.		This	inner	voice	projects	our	negative	thoughts	




























notion	 of	 a	 person	 (prosōpon)	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 ‘what	 a	 person	 is’	 and	 ‘what	 a	 person	wants	 to	 be’,	
taking	on	the	role	assigned	to	us	or	taking	on	a	role	beyond	our	control	or	measure.		Again	and	again	
we	 are	 cautioned:	 ‘Be	 not	 elated	 at	 any	 excellence	 which	 is	 not	 your	 own.’
911





		 	On	 the	 other	 hand,	 one	 should	 not	 	 let	 one’s	 inner	 voice	 be	 abusively	 disparaging	
about	one’s	self.		Does	our	inner	voice	ask:	‘What	conceit	am	I	cherishing	regarding	myself?	How	do	I	
conduct	myself?	Do	I	for	my	part	act	like	a	wise	man?	Do	I	for	my	part	act	like	a	man	of	self-control?’		
These	 are	 self-checking	 thoughts	 that	 Epictetus	 advises	 us	 to	 use.913		 Our	 prohairesis	 must	 be	
employed	to	guard	itself	against	being	carried	away	by	impressions	and	imaginations.
914			





		 This	 is	 a	 call	 against	 yearning	 for	 things	 outside	 of	 our	 control,	 things	 that	 our	
thoughts	 and	 imagination	 make	 attractive	 or	 repulsive.  Our	 own	 individualised	 thoughts	 can	
destroy	us	with	our	own	suffering	or	deliver	us	 from	our	own	suffering	–	 the	 language	of	our	 inner	




		 As	 Epictetus	 rightly	 makes	 the	 point:	 ‘…talk	 to	 yourself,	 the	 man	 most	 likely	 to	 be	
persuaded,	 to	whom	no	 one	 is	more	 pursuasive	 than	 yourself.’
917









Wishing,	 wanting	 and	 needing	 are	 all	 driven	 by	 our	 desire	 for	 this	 or	 that	 to	 happen	 or	 not	


















are	 not	 ceasing	 our	 suffering;	 we	 are	 creating	 it	 through	 our	 mistaken	 belief	 that	 our	 wants	 and	
desires	and	identified	goals	will	bring	us	happiness.						
In	general,	we	define	or	 identify	ourselves	 in	 terms	of	what	we	do,	say	and	think,	based	on	our	
wants	and	desires.		Similarly	Buddhists	talk	about	kammic	volition,	wishing	and	wanting	us	to	do,	say	















		 Self-serving	 thoughts	 and	 personal	 pronouns	 are	 internalised	 and	 dictate	 the	 choices	 and	
decisions	we	make.	 	 For	 Epictetus,	 our	 faculty	 of	 choice	 (prohairesis)	 is	 used	 to	 choose	 something	
with	 a	 goal	 and	 objective	 in	 mind;	 something	 is	 chosen	 to	 reach	 some	 goal	 and	 in	 the	 case	 of	
Epictetus	 this	 goal	 is	 the	 path	 to	 virtue.	 	 Conflict	 arises	 when	 Epictetus’	 goal	 is	 at	 odds	 with	 our	
internalised	 wants	 and	 desires.	 	 The	 language	 and	 psychology	 of	 personal	 pronouns	 as	 used	 in	
everyday	 life	 can	 produce	 conflicts	 of	 interest	 as	 personal	 benefits	 are	 derived	 from	 actions	 or	
decisions	 which	 are	 different	 to	 the	 goal	 of	 chosing	 a	 pathway	 to	 virtue	 (the	 right	 goal	 of	 the	





































our	 thoughts	 if	 we	 ‘want	 something	 it	 does	 not	 happen’	 and	 when	 we	 ‘do	 not	 want	 it,	 it	 does	
happen’,






at	haphazard	 seemed	best	 to	me’	 as	 this	 is	 dangerously	near	being	 shameful	 and	 ignoble.928	If	 life	
were	to	accommodate	every	individual’s	whims	it	would	be	madness	and	not	freedom.		
Do	 you	 think	 ‘I	 wish	 to	 be	 tranquil,	 unhampered,	 unconstrained,	 free’?	 	 If	 so	 then	 Epictetus’	

















about	 your	 wishes	 and	 wants	 you	 need	 to	 exercise	 your	 sense-impressions	 and	 develop	 your	




In	 Seneca	 and	 Marcus	 Aurelius,	 we	 can	 find	 thinking	 complementary	 to	 that	 of	 Epictetus	
























and	 to	 form	 relationships	 with	 others.	 	 To	 have	 control	 over	my	 thoughts	 and	 imagination	 is	 the	
domain	of	my	prohairesis	and	 ‘control	over	the	prohairesis	 is	my	true	business.’936		With	this	we	can	





lie	outside	 the	prohairesis	but,	as	Epictetus	argues,	we	 should	be	cautious	of	our	 thoughts	and	our	







our	own	doing,	our	 individual	sense	of	things	 is	 in	our	control.	 	Further	Epictetus	warns	us	to	be	on	
our	guard	 regarding	our	 individual	 sensibilities	 to	other’s	words	and	views	of	us:	 ‘It	 is	not	 the	man	
who	reviles	or	strikes	you	that	insults	you,	but	it	is	your	judgement	that	these	men	are	insulting	you	
…	when	 someone	 irritates	 you,	 be	 assured	 that	 it	 is	 your	 own	 opinion	which	 has	 irritated	 you.’	941			
Good	advice	to	all	of	us	not	to	get	carried	away	by	external	 impressions.	 	What	happens	 is	that	we	
have	thoughts	generated	by	these	words	of	others	that	touch	us	in	a	personal	way;	they	touch	upon	
our	feelings	and	sensibilities,	and	encroach	on	our	identity	and	sense	of	self.		As	with	the	‘The	soul	is	
something	 like	 a	 bowl	 of	 water’
942
	(4.4.4)	 the	 cause	 of	 our	 doing	 or	 not	 doing	 (the	 individual	
sensibility	of	our	thoughts)	is	‘only	our	opinions	and	the	decisions	of	our	will’	(our	judgements).943		As	
Marcus	Aurelius	puts	it,	‘when	you	fret	at	any	circumstance’,	remember	‘that	all	is	as	thinking	makes	
it	 so’,944	and	 in	 this	 context	 he	 is	 referring	 to	 the	 fact	we	 have	 something	within	 us	 stronger	 than	
emotion;	 it	 is	 thinking	 that	 creates	 the	 emotion	 by	 our	 subjective	 judgement	 and	 so	 effaces	 this	
opinion,	 this	 judgement,	 which	 we	 have	 the	 power	 to	 do	 whenever	 we	 will	 or	 wish
945
	by	 our	







































miserable.”’949		We	have	 from	Marcus	Aurelius	 that	 this	man	should	be	 in	 the	place	where	his	own	
self-sufficient	 faculty,	 his	 prohairesis,	 should	 be	 in	 charge	 where	 his	 judgements	 are	 reasoned	
directing	 his	 thoughts	 to	 be	 free	 of	 suffering.
950





We	can	draw	a	number	of	parallels	between	Marcus	Aurelius	 and	Epictetus	on	 thinking	and	 its	
effect	 on	our	 peace	of	mind	and	 suffering.	 	 The	 language	we	use	 influences	our	 thoughts	 and	our	
thoughts	in	turn	can	drive	us	to	make	either	subjective	or	objective	judgements.		Marcus	Aurelius	in	
an	uncompromising	stance	asserts:	‘All	is	as	thinking	makes	it	so	…	and	you	can	control	your	thinking	
…	 so	 remove	 your	 judgements	 whenever	 you	 wish	 and	 then	 there	 is	 calm.’
952
		 His	 claim	 is	 clear:	
subjective	judgements,	influenced	by	our	personal	thoughts,	may	be	positive	or	negative,	and	affect	




























soul	 takes	 its	 dye	 from	 the	 thoughts;	 so	 you	 dye	 your	 own	 with	 a	 succession	 of	 thoughts	 like	













Epictetus	 asks:	 ‘Can	 it	 be	 that	 the	 thoughts	 themselves	 are	 unexercised	 and	 unaccustomed	 to	
face	 the	 facts?’959		This	 is	 a	 reminder	 that	 we	 must	 examine	 and	 exercise	 reason	 as	 part	 of	 the	
thinking	process	to	avoid	the	inner	voice	leading	our	thoughts	towards	unrest.	 	 	So	what	happens	if	
we	 remove	 our	 judgements	 about	 our	 feelings?	 	Epictetus	 and	Marcus	 Aurelius	 believe	 that	 if	 we	
‘remove	the	judgement’,	then	we	 	 ‘have	removed	the	thought	(I	am	hurt),	remove	the	thought	and	
<we>	have	removed	the	hurt’.960	
In	addition,	what	 I	say	to	myself	about	myself	may	be	 influenced	by	what	 I	 think	or	hear	others	
think	or	say	about	me.		Am	I	persuaded	by	the	opinions	of	others?		Again	Epictetus	argues	that	the	
secret	of	knowing	 is	closer	 to	home:	 ‘No	one	 is	closer	 to	myself	 than	 I	am,’
961	and	urges	us	 to	start	
exercising	 our	 thoughts	 through	 reasoning	 and	 to	 avoid	 the	 belief	 that	 our	 feelings	 are	 a	 true	
reflection	 of	 how	 things	 are	 in	 reality.	 	 If	 we	 regularly	 say	 and	 think	 to	 ourselves	 negative	 things,	
these	 can	 become	 strong,	 habitual	 and	 fixed	 in	 our	 mind,	 ‘for	 everywhere	 judgement	 is	 strong,	
judgement	 is	 invincible’
962	consequently	the	more	we	stray	away	from	things	as	they	really	are,	 the	


























	in	 other	 words	 the	 sovereign	 power	 to	make	 choices,	 that	 is,	my	 prohairesis.966		 I	 can	
shape	it	to	my	liking;	I	can	make	it	whatever	I	wish	it	to	be;	it	can	gather	for	itself	the	fruit	it	bears;	it	










our	 prohairesis.	 	 The	 quality	 and	 integrity	 of	 our	 life	 is	 determined	 by	 how	 our	 prohairesis	
distinguishes	 between	 those	 things	 that	 are	 ‘mine’	 rather	 than	 ‘not	mine’.	 	Our	prohairesis	builds,	
develops	 and	maintains	 an	 inner	 (cognitive	 and	 emotional)	world,	made	 up	 of	 a	 sovereign	 faculty	
that	rules	over	whether	there	should	be	suffering	or	peace.		This	faculty	is	an	inner	sanctum	fortified	
against	 outside	 interference;	 it	 is	 a	 stronghold	 of	 authority	 and	power	 over	 its	 choices	 of	whether	
there	 should	 be	 suffering	 or	 peace	 within	 its	 walls.	 	 Our	 cognitive	 and	 emotional	 life	 involves	 a	
continuum	of	inner	voices,	perceptions,	thoughts,	judgements,	impulses	and	actions.		The	prohairesis	
with	 its	 power	 to	 persuade,	 compel,	 hinder	 and	 disturb	 itself	 directs	 this	 inner	 world	 and	 has	 the	
capability	peculiar	 to	 itself	 to	be	 the	victim	of	 its	own	 reflexive	nature;	 it	 can	be	dysfunctional	and	









passion	 warps	 and	 perverts	 the	 mind	 even	 for	 the	 best	 of	 men.
969
		 	 Epictetus	 expresses	 similar	



































sometimes	 the	same	tyrants	…	here	 is	where	we	must	begin,	and	 it	 is	 from	this	 side	 that	we	must	
seize	 the	 acropolis	 and	 cast	 out	 the	 tyrants’;
973




yourself?	 Can	 you	 secure	 for	 me	 aversion	 proof	 against	 encountering	 what	 it	 would	
avoid?’
974			
What	 is	 Epictetus	 actually	 saying	 here?	 The	only	 thing	 that	 compels	 the	prohairesis	 is	 itself:	 it	 can	
save	itself	and	destroy	itself;	it	is	its	own	worst	enemy,	a	personalised	tyrant	inside	us.		In	other	words	
the	prohairesis	can	act	as	a	conceited	inner	tyrant,	with	the	ultimate	power	to	control	us	with	threats	











































The	 ability	 of	 the	 prohairesis	 to	 project	 different	 dispositions	 means	 that	 there	 is	 always	 the	
opportunity	for	a	state	of	harmony	or	disharmony,	peace	or	conflict	to	manifest	itself	within	us.		So	in	
this	 way	 we	 might	 view	 this	 inner	 tyrant	 as	 an	 agent	 of	 the	 dysfunctional	 prohairesis	 causing	
disharmony	and	conflict	within	us	in	its	quest	to	drive	our	choices	and	decisions	towards	its	own	self-













suffering	 mind	 and	 of	 its	 cessation.	 	 Again	 this	 continues	 our	 comparison	 of	 Epictetus	 with	 the	
Buddhist	 approach.	 If	 we	 use	 and	 exercise	 our	 faculty	 of	 choice	 (prohairesis)	 to	 make	 the	 right	
decisions,	have	 the	 right	views	and	 intentions	 regarding	our	use	and	understanding	of	 impressions	
then	the	prognosis	for	progression	towards	cessation	is	good.					















we	 make	 a	 prognosis	 of	 whether	 a	 patient	 will	 recover	 from	 their	 diagnosis.	 	 A	 doctor	 makes	 a	
prognosis,	of	 the	patient’s	 state	of	health	or	 illness	based	on	current	knowledge	of	 the	strength	of	
their	disease	(nosos)	and	of	their	nature/character.984		It	is	clear	then	that	recovery	is	dependent	upon	
the	 degree	 of	 strength	 of	 the	 disease	 and	 the	 infirmity	 (arrostēma)	 and	 on	 the	 strength	 of	 the	








was	Hippocrates	 of	 Cos:	 ‘Disturbed	 awakenings	with	 over-boldness	 and	derangement	 of	 the	mind	
are	 a	 bad	 sign,	 and	 announce	 convulsions’.





















































































	related	 to	our	practice	and	 training	 indicate	
where	our	failings	lie,	what	has	been	neglected	or	ruined,	all	of	which	can	be	used	to	determine	the	
likely	course	of	our	disease	and	progress	towards	recovery.		Our	training,	says	Epictetus,	should	not	
divert	 into	 things	 unnatural	 but	 only	 consists	 in	 training	 in	 the	 things	 conducive	 to	 success	 in	
achieving	 our	 goal	 of	 securing	 a	 good	 condition	 of	 our	 soul:
997
	we	 should	 not	 let	 our	 training	 turn	
outwards	to	things	not	 in	our	control,	as	our	desire	and	aversions	will	 inevitably	fail,	but	we	should	
focus	 our	 training	 solely	 inwards.	 	 Epictetus	 says,	 ‘but	 in	 the	 affairs	 of	 life	 there	 are	many	 things	
which	 draw	 us	 away’,	 so	we	 should	 not	 let	 our	 education,	 training	 and	 exercises	 stray;	we	 should	
follow	 the	 ‘law	of	 life’	 and	 ‘do	what	 nature	demands’.	 	Carrying	on	with	 this	 focus	 of	 our	 training,	











observe	what	 is	 in	 accord	with	nature,	 it	 is	manifest	 that	 in	 everything	we	 should	make	 it	 our	 aim	
neither	 to	 avoid	 that	which	nature	demands	nor	 to	 accept	 that	which	 is	 in	 conflict	with	nature’.
998
	


















makes	our	 infirmity	stronger	which	can	only	prolong	our	problem	and	makes	recovery	 less	 likely	 in	
the	short	term.			
‘But	 count	 also	 the	 fact	 that	 you	 have	 fed	 your	 incontinence,	 you	 have	 given	 it	 additional	
strength.	 For	 it	 is	 inevitable	 that	 some	 habits	 and	 faculties	 should,	 in	 consequence	 of	 the	






aversions,	will	 repeat,	 arise	more	quickly	with	 ease,	 unhindered	 and	not	 challenged	by	us.	 	As	 the	
following	 passage	 recognises	 and	 makes	 clear,	 our	 infirmity	 can	 grow	 stronger	 and	 stronger,	
overcoming	us	and	the	power	of	our	mind	to	recover	and	break	free:	our	desire	for	money	is	a	certain	
weakness	that	can	easily	become	habit	forming;	the	more	we	get	the	more	we	want.		As	is	the	case	
with	many	 passions,	 our	 weakness	 becomes	 an	 obsession,	 feeding	 on	 itself	 annihilating	 common	

















our	 fear,	desires,	greed	and	anxieties	are	all	 stronger	 than	us	 then	we	shall	be	compelled	to	 follow	
these	things:	their	strength	powerfully	affects	our	ability	to	deal	with	the	state	of	our	diseased	soul	
and	prolongs	 the	 absence	of	 reason,	which	overcomes	our	moral	weakness.	 	 The	 advice	Epictetus	
applies	 is:	 ‘you	 will	 follow	 that	 which	 is	 stronger	 than	 you	 are,	 ever	 seeking	 outside	 your	 self	 for	
peace,	 and	 never	 be	 able	 to	 be	 at	 peace’.
1003











might	 lead	 them,	 continue	 as	 they	 are	 and	 as	 if	 they	 are	 content	 to	 live	 with	 their	 disease.	 	 The	




		 It	 is	 interesting	to	note	that	 in	Buddhism,	 ignorance	 is	






ourselves?	 	As	 Epictetus	 continues	 to	 say,	 ‘Do	 you	 see	 the	 sort	 of	 thing	 that	 ignorance	 of	what	 is	
expedient	leads	to?’
1008		The	prognosis	of	man’s	disease	is	poor	if	our	moral	weakness	is	stronger	than	
our	 moral	 capacity	 and	 faculty	 to	 deal	 with	 its	 causes	 and	 such	 a	 balance	 of	 strengths	 and	
weaknesses	is	prolonged	and	protracted	with	time.			
Failure	to	recognise	the	truth	behind	our	suffering,	to	acknowledge	its	existence	all	adds	up	to	a	
poor	 prognosis	 –	 it	 is	 also	 a	 failure	 to	 address	 the	 moral	 imperative	 to	 deal	 with	 our	 suffering.		
‘Against	 the	 ignorant,	against	 the	unfortunate,	against	 those	who	have	been	deceived	 in	 the	most	
important	 values’,
1009




















































































• Right	 view	 (sammā-diṭṭhi)	 -	 having	 the	 right	 perspective,	 outlook	 or	 understanding;	 this	
explicitly	includes	our	actions	(kamma)	and	their	consequences	(vipaka).	
• Right	 intention	 (sammā	 sankappa)	 -	 having	 the	 right	 thoughts,	 resolve,	 aspiration	 and	



























morally	 fulfilling	 life,	 a	 ‘pathway	 to	awakening’.	 	They	are	 strikingly	 similar	 in	 spirit	 and	purpose	 to	












	self-contemplation,	 self-circumspection	 of	 matters	 in	 life,
1014
	
and	 paying	 attention	 to	 everyday	 aspects	 of	 our	 life	 as	 it	 unfolds,	 prosochē.	 	 This	 section	 is	 a	























suffering.	 	 Right	 View	 is	 an	 understanding	 of	 what	 is	 wholesome	 and	 unwholesome,	 which	 in	









Exercise,	 practice	 and	 training	of	Right	View	are	 clearly	 evident	 throughout	Epictetus’	work,	 in	
particular	 regarding	 the	 prohairesis	 and	 that	 this	 becomes	 right	 prohairesis	 (cf.	 kamma-kusala).1018		
Right	 View	 and	 right	 prohairesis	 relate	 to	 his	 major	 teaching	 themes:	 opinions,	 beliefs	 and	
judgements;
1019






The	 other	 aspect	 regarding	 wisdom	 is	 Right	 Intention
1023
	(or	 Right	 Thoughts,	 Aspiration,	
Thinking),	 which	 again	 we	 see	 in	 Epictetus	 when	 he	 discusses	 having	 the	 aim	 and	 purpose	 of	
renouncing	or	 abandoning	ourselves	 to	 those	 things	we	get	 attached	 to	 that	 cause	 us	 to	 suffer:	 it	
concerns	 having	 the	 right	 desire	 and	 aspiration	 to	 realise	 freedom	 from	 suffering	 and	 ill-will;	
wholehearted	commitment	and	willingness	to	exercise,	practice	and	training	of	the	Noble	Truths	(the	
three	disciplines	of	the	soul	in	Epictetus’	case	–	1.3,	5.3.3);	the	attitude,	intention	and	will,	not	from	an	
intellectual	 perspective,	 but	 as	 deep-rooted	 aspiration	 within	 our	 soul,	 to	 perfect	 and	 make	






























(kusala-kamma).	 	 For	 example,	 it	 involves	 partaking	 of	goodwill	 (metta	 in	 Pali)	 towards	 others,	 as	
opposed	to	acting	with	 ill	 feeling	towards	someone	(akusala-kamma).	 	 In	fact,	metta	means	 loving-	
kindness,	 friendliness,	 goodwill,	 benevolence,	 fellowship	 and	 this	 becomes	 the	 basis	 of	 our	
relationships	with	others	and	our	role	and	responsibility	in	society.		‘If	the	good	is	something	different	
from	 the	 noble	 and	 the	 just’	 remarks	 Epictetus,
1026 then	 ‘all	 relationships	 simply	 disappear’.	 	 So,	
advocates	 Epictetus,
1027
	our	 good	 should	 be	 placed	 in	 our	 right	 moral	 purpose,	 so	 preserving	 our	
relationships	and	taking	care	of	our	duties,	with	the	Right	View	and	Right	Intention.		Right	Intention	












the	 good	 and	 the	 bad?	 	 Right	 View	 and	 Right	 Intention	 correspond	 in	 purpose	 to	 that	 given	 in	
Epictetus’	 first	discipline	of	 the	 soul	 (5.3.3.2),	which	deals	with	having	 the	 right	 view	and	 intention	
about	desires	and	aversions.	 	His	 coverage	of	Right	View	and	Right	 Intention	 is	 shown	 in	Table	5a	
(5.2.4).	
5.2.2.2	Ethical	Conduct	(Moral	Discipline)	




corresponds	 in	 purpose	 to	 that	 given	 in	 Epictetus’	 second	 discipline	 of	 the	 soul	 and	 is	 related	 to	



























Right	 Action	 includes	 abstaining	 from	 killing,	 abstaining	 from	 stealing,	 abstaining	 from	 sexual	
misconduct. With	 a	 strong	 social	 conscience	 and	 feeling	 Epictetus’	 discourses	 advocate	 leading	 a	













Buddhist	 perspective.	 	 Epictetus,	 in his	 attack	 on	 Epicurus,1040 argues	 against	 taking	 pleasure	 in	
things	of	the	body.	He	accuses	Epicurus	of	declaring	that	getting	caught	for	theft	was	evil	but	not	the	






1043 and	to	preserve	the	purity	of	your	sex-life.1044  He	
draws	 our	 attention	 to	 doing	 noble	 deeds	 rather	 than	 actions	 that	 are	 base	 and	 without	 moral	
purpose.		We	should	be	adopting	principles	of	conduct	that	are	not	bad,	subversive,	and	destructive	
to	us	or	to	others:	it	is	our	duty	as	citizens	of	the	universe.	
Verbal	 misconduct	 is	 an	 unwholesome	 action	 (akusala-kamma)	 that	 causes	 harm	 and	
suffering.
1045		Right	 Speech	 is	 also	 classed	 as	 abstention	 and	 includes	 abstaining	 from	 lying,	 from	
divisive	speech,	from	abusive	speech,	and	from	idle	chatter:	this	principle	holds	that	we	should	speak	
the	truth,	we	should	speak	with	the	aim	of	creating	concord	and	not	disagreement,	we	should	speak	

























some	 examples	 of	 how	 to	 talk	 in	 public.	 	 The	main	 direction	 that	 he	 points	 to	 is	maintaining	 the	
prohairesis	in	a	fit	state	so	that	it	attends	to	Right	Speech	or	Wrong	Speech.		We	should,	as	Epictetus	
reminds	 us,	 think	 about	 what	 we	might	 be	 losing	 and	 gaining	 as	 regards	 Right	 Speech	or	Wrong	















Epictetus	 is	 resolute	 in	directing	attention	to	the	moral	aspect	of	our	 livelihood,	pointing	out	again	








basic	needs	to	survive	and	to	live	a	well-flowing	and	comfortable	 life.	 	 It’s	 in	our	power	to	choose	a	
livelihood	 that	 is	morally	 sound	 and	 provides	 for	 our	 own	well-being.	 	 Yet	 again	 we	 should	 recall	
Epictetus’	 words, ‘No	man	 is	 master	 of	 another’s	 moral	 purpose,’	 and	 so	 therefore,	 ‘No	 one	 has	






























meditation	but	 are	 functionally	different.	 	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 concentration	 is	 what	 the	 Buddhists	







anxieties	and	suffering,	and	 they	observe	how	they	create	 that	suffering.	 	Mindfulness	enables	 the	
individual	 to	 see	 right	 through	 the	 layers	of	 lies,	delusions	and	 ignorance	and	 to	 see	what	 is	 really	
there	 below	 the	 surface	 and	 this	 leads	 to	 a	 state	 of	 knowing,	 understanding	 and	
wisdom.		Mindfulness	 is	not	an	action	as	 it	 is	not	 trying	 to	achieve	or	do	anything,	but	merely	 just	
looking,	observing	and	watching	the	state	of	mind	and	the	movements	and	changes	to	this	state.		
Concentration	 is	 exclusive	in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	 settles	 upon	one	 item,	 focuses	 on	 it	 and	 ignores	
everything	else,	whereas	Buddhist	mindfulness	is	inclusive	in	the	sense	that	it	stands	back	from	the	
focus	 of	 attention	 and	 watches	 any	 change	 that	 occurs.	 	 These	 two	 qualities,	 concentration	 and	
mindfulness,	work	together	as	part	of	the	job	of	meditation	to	penetrate	into	the	deepest	level	of	the	
mind	 and	 this	 cooperation	 achieves	 insight	 and	 understanding	 of	 our	 suffering.	 	Epictetus	 talks	 of	
various	 ways	 that	 are	 essential	 to	 disciplining	 of	 the	 mind such	 as	 examining	 and	 observing	 our	
thoughts	 and	 actions	 through	 self-contemplation,	 circumspection	 and	paying	 attention.	 	 These	 all	




desire	 or	 unsuccessful	 aversion.












and	 focusing	 one’s	 awareness	 on	 the	 present	 moment.	 	Whilst	 this	 popularised	 modern	 view	 of	
mindfulness	 has	many	 applications	 such	 as	 in	 cognitive	 therapy	 and	 popular	meditation	 practices,	




as	more	 than	merely	an	awareness	of	what	 is	 immediately	given	 in	experience,	but	understanding	
the	 present	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 past,	 and	 using	 this	 as	 the	 basis	 of	 dependent	 arising,	 a	 means	 to	
awaken	 insight	 and	 the	 search	 for	 truth	 and	 reality.
1056
		 The	 modern	 mindfulness	 movement,	 in	
comparison	to	the	Buddhist	concept,	does	nothing	more	than	merely	‘scratch	the	surface’	in	relation	
to	 this	 important	 Eastern	 philosophical	 notion:	 contemporary	 analysis	 of	 the	 concept	 lacks	 any	
formal	 rigour,	 depth	 of	 technical	 understanding	 and	 appreciation	 to	 do	 the	 Buddhist	 concept	 full	
justice.			













‘Do	you	not	 realise	 that	when	once	you	 let	your	mind	go	wandering,	 it	 is	no	 longer	within	
your	 power	 to	 recall	 it,	 to	 bring	 it	 to	 bear	 upon	 either	 seemliness,	 or	 self-respect,	 or	
moderation?	 	 But	 you	 do	 anything	 that	 comes	 into	 your	 head,	 you	 follow	 your	






















he	 does	 refer	 to	 reflecting	 upon	 our	 situation,	 examining	 our	 habits,	 and	 being	 attentive	 to	 those	





















‘All	 experience	 is	 preceded	 by	 mind,	 led	 by	 mind,	 made	 by	 mind.	 	 Speak	 or	 act	 with	 a	
corrupted	mind	and	suffering	will	follow.		As	the	wagon	wheel	follows	the	hoof	of	the	ox.	








Epictetus	 encourages	 us	 to	 turn	 our	 thoughts	 to	 the	 question	 ‘What	 sort	 of	 a	 thing	 do	 you		
imagine	 the	 good	 to	 be?’
1070
	 And	 the	 answer	 he	wants	 to	 lead	 us	 to	 is	 that	 of	 living	 a	 life	 where	
serenity,	 happiness	 and	 freedom	 from	 suffering	 is	more	 important	 than	 anything	 else.	 	 Expressed	
another	way,	 our	 aim	 is	 that	 our	 end	goal	 in	 life	 is	 to	 secure	eudaimonia	 (happiness,	well-being	or	



















the	 true	 nature	 of	 the	 good	 and	 the	 failure	 to	 understand	 that	 his	 pleasures	 and	 desires	 for	 the	
external	 world	 will	 lead	 to	 unhappiness,	 which	 means	 having	 no	 control	 over	 his	 desires	 for	 the	
















moral	wellbeing,	which,	 in	the	case	of	Epictetus,	means	maintaining	our	prohairesis.	 	Right	Effort	 is	
conducive	to	being	moral,	virtuous,	noble,	honourable,	righteous,	decent,	just	and	upstanding	in	our	
own	 lives	 and	 in	 our	 relations	 with	 others.	 	 In	 this	 respect,	 Epictetus	 talks of	 our	 needing	 to	
concentrate	 our	 efforts	 on	 eradicating	 unwholesome	mental	 states,	 as	 he	 argues	 against	 making	












‘good’	 or	 ‘evil’,	 ‘benefit’	 or	 ‘injury’.	 	 Long	 remarks	 that	 showing	 no	 emotional	 response	 to	 other	
people’s	 problems	 might	 seem	 repellent,	 inhumane	 and	 lacking	 sympathy.
1075



























or	 noble.	 	Applying	Right	View,	Right	 Intention	 and	Right	Effort	 to	 our	 situation	 is	 the	 foundation	
upon	 which	 we	 build	 our	 moral	 life.	 	 A	 life	 founded	 on	 human	 emotion,	 temporary	 pleasure	 and	
enjoyment	and	misplaced	dispositions	 is	one	 lacking	objective	moral	basis.	 	Epictetus	adds	that	we	
should	 have	 put	 away	 or	 reduced	 a	 malignant	 disposition,	 and	 reviling,	 or	 impertinence,	 of	 foul	
language,	recklessness,	or	negligence’.1079	    













































we	 can	 realise	 the	 cessation	 of	 our	 suffering.	 	 The	 Eightfold	 Path	 is	 not	 in	 a	 true	 one-to-one	
correspondence	 with	 the	 three	 disciplines	 of	 the	 soul,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 display	 an	 exact	
equivalence	 of	 presentation	 and	 ordering	 of	 ideas.	 	 They	 do,	 however,	 share	 a	 kindred	 spirit	 and	




theme	 2	 (choice	 and	 refusal)	 in	 Epictetus.	 	 However,	 the	 correspondence	 between	 the	 other	 two	
groups	 -	 wisdom	 (prajñā)	 and	mental	 discipline	 (samadhi)	 -	 and	 exercise	 theme	 3	 (judgement	 and	
assent)	and	theme	1	(desire	and	aversion)	is	not	so	clearly	defined.		Certainly	theme	3	does	relate	to	
wisdom	(prajñā)	but	there	are	aspects	of	theme	1	also	present	within	this	wisdom	group.		The	training	
group	 consisting	 of	 mental	 discipline	 (samadhi)	 is	 about	 Buddhist	 meditative	 and	 mindfulness	
practice	and	and	so	there	are	differences	to	the	Stoic	therapeutic	exercises	that	cut	across	all	three	
exercise	 themes	 of	 Epictetus.	 	 This	 latter	 observation	 nevertheless	 does	 not	 detract	 from	 the	 fact	
that	 Epictetus	 covers	 the	mental	 discipline	 aspect,	which	 is	 significant	 for	 our	 claim	 regarding	 the	
close	relation	between	Epictetus	and	the	Four	Noble	Truths.	 	 If	we	 look	at	 the	bigger	picture	of	 the	
Four	Noble	Truths,	 taking	account	of	what	we	have	discussed	 in	Chapters	2-4	regarding	the	parallel	
thinking	between	Epictetus	 and	Buddhism,	 the	 three	disciplines	of	 the	 soul	play	a	 similar	 role	 and	
function	to	those	of	the	Buddhist	truths.		
Both	philosophies	argue	that	our	 freedom	is	a	moral	choice	between	things	 ‘in	our	control’	and	
things	 ‘not	 in	 our	 control’.	 	 Recognising,	 understanding,	 practising	 and	 living	 a	 life	 with	 this	




in	 accord	with	 nature	 and	 his	moral	 purpose	 and	 can	 accept	what	 happens	 as	 it	 happens,	 neither	

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































The	 Greek	 therapeia	 variously	 means	 ‘service’,	 ‘attendance’,	 ‘medical	 treatment’,	 ‘remedy’	 or	
‘cure’,	and	in	the	latter	context	plays	a	significant	part	in	the	medical	analogy	already	discussed	(1.4).		
Many	 Greek	 and	 Roman	 writers	 and	 philosophical	 schools	 discussed	 the	 practice	 of	 therapy.		
Nussbaum	 (1994)	 provides	 an	 excellent	 and	 useful	 comprehensive	 account	 of	 the	main	 schools	 of	
thought	regarding	therapeia.	 	From	a	Buddhist	perspective,	the	n0tion	of	therapy	is	a	key	aspect	of	
the	cessation	of	our	suffering	as	discussed	in	5.2	and	comparatively	with	the	practices	and	exercises	
of	 Epictetus	 as	 discussed	 in	 1.3.	 	 Several	 scholars	 have	 discussed	 the	 philosophical	 foundations	
behind	therapeutic	practices	in	Stoicism	and	Buddhism	including	Murguia	and	Diaz	(2015),	Goerger	
(2017)	and	Ferraiolo	(2010).								






and	 others	 used	 and	 exploited.	 	 It	 is	 clear	 that	 Epictetus’	 thinking	 aligns	 with	 these	 views,	 as	 is	
evident	 in	 his	 deployment	 of	 various	 remedies.	 	 The	 following	 from	 the	 lesson	 on	 ‘How	must	 we	
struggle	 against	 our	 external	 impressions?’ illustrates	 one	 of	 the	 medical	 usages	 of	 the	 term	
therapeia	as	a	remedy	to	cure	the	ills	of	the	soul:  




impression,	 it	 bursts	 into	 the	 flame	 of	 desire	 more	 quickly	 than	 it	 did	 before.	 And	 if	 this	
happens	 over	 and	 over	 again,	 the	 next	 stage	 is	 that	 a	 callousness	 results	 and	 the	 infirmity	















communing	 with	 oneself,	 conversing	 with	 one	 self,	 spending	 time	 devoted	 to	 ourself	 considering	
how	we	have	acted	towards	things	that	happen	and	how	we	act	now,	what	continues	to	distress	us	
and	 what	 needs	 to	 be	 remedied	 (therapeuthēi)	 through	 exercising	 reason.	 	 As	 Gill	 remarks,	 self-
examination	 (between	 the	person	and	his	 impression)	 is	 an	 interpersonal	dialogue,	as	 such	private	
thought	 or	 meditation	 was	 conceived	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 internalisation	 of	 practical	 teaching	 and	
















































The	 flow	 of	 thoughts	 that	 streams	 through	 our	 conscious	 mind	 embodies	 our	 experiences,	
perceptions,	 impressions	 and	 ideas.	 	 The	 phrase	 ‘stream	 of	 consciousness’	 appears	 in	 modern	
psychology,	 and	was	 originally	 coined	 by	 James	where	 he	 used	 it	 in	 a	 broader	 study	 of	 the	mind	
referred	to	as	‘stream	of	thought’.1100	Generally	this	idea	refers	to	a	person's	thoughts	and	conscious	
reactions	 to	 events,	 perceived	 as	 a	 continuous	 flow.	 The	 phrase	 also	 appears	 in	 early	 Buddhist	




help	 us	 understand	 the	 background	 of	 what	 is	 triggering	 mental	 events	 that	 are	 causing	 our	
suffering.	 	We	 should	also	acknowledge	 that,	 as	discussed	 (5.2.1,	 5.2.2.3),	 the	Buddhist	 concept	of	
mindfulness	goes	beyond	 just	 this	 aspect	and	covers	both	 internal	 and	external	experiences	 in	 the	
present,	 leading	 to	 a	 deeper	 attention	 to	 the	 three	 marks	 of	 existence:	 impermanence,	
unsatisfactoriness	(suffering)	and	the	‘non-self’.				
Although	 Epictetus	 does	 not	 employ	 the	 phrase	 ‘stream	 of	 consciousness’	 as	 such,	 he	 does		
prescribe	therapy	akin	to	that	of	Buddhist	mindfulness	and	contemplation	(5.2.1,	5.2.2.3).			Epictetus	
recommends	 that	we	 contemplate	 and	 be	 attentive	 to	 the	 present	moment	 and	 to	 our	 thoughts,	
feelings,	 beliefs,	 actions	 and	 reactions	 to	 events.	 	On	 several	 occasions	Epictetus	warns	 about	 the	
lack	of	care	and	attention	such	as	not	to	get	carried	away	by	our	impressions	(by	lack	of	attention).		
He	 speaks	 of	 examining	 our	 impressions,	 warning	 us	 to	 be	 conscious	 of	 this	 to	 avoid	 errors	 of	










the	 senses	when	 it	 acts	 in	 concert	with	 them,	 as	 is	 shown	by	people	 closing	 their	 eyes	when	 they	
want	to	collect	themselves	and	turn	inwards	and	rouse	the	attentive	part	of	the	soul.’1104		Our	inner	
voice	 is	 forever	 talking	 to	 us	 as	 movements	 of	 thought	 reflecting	 a	 continuum	 of	 impressions	
received	 through	 our	 senses	 and	 mental	 experiences;	 the	 inner	 voice	 is	 a	 window	 into	 our	
conditioned	mind	(3.2.2,	1.7,	2.3.2).	 	We	can	argue	that	Epictetus	would	advise	us	to	be	attentive	to	
this	inner	voice,	to	understand	it	and	what	it	expresses	and	represents.	
Epictetus	acknowledges	 that	 life	 is	 like	a	 continuous	 stream	of	 subjective	experiences	and	 that	
within	this	continuum	there	is	nothing	that	does	not	need	our	attention.1105		 	Like	the	Buddhists,	he	
recognises	 that	 life	 is	 a	 ceaseless	 flow	 of	 states	 of	 existence	 and	 impermanence:	 ‘changes	 of	 a	











whatever	we	have	made	up	our	mind	about.	 	Epictetus	also	makes	clear	 the	 importance	of	paying	
attention	 (prosochē)	 to	 our	 thoughts	 and	 activities	 and	 not	 letting	 our	 thoughts	 go	 wandering	 by	
deferring	our	 attention:	 ‘There	 is	 no	part	of	 the	activities	of	 your	 life	 excepted,	 to	which	attention	
does	not	extend,	 is	 there?	 	What,	will	 you	do	 it	worse	by	attention,	and	better	by	 inattention?’1108.		
Epictetus	remarks,	‘Each	man’s	master	is	the	person	who	has	the	authority	over	what	the	man	wishes	
or	does	not	wish,	so	as	to	secure	it,	or	take	it	away.’1109		As	is	frequently	seen	in	his	discussions	and	
debate,	 the	 stream	 of	 thoughts,	 feelings	 and	 inner	 voices	 reflects	 what	 we	 sense	 from	 the	
impressions	of	the	external	world;	we	can	have	these	under	control	or	they	can	place	our	minds	in	a	
flux	of	emotional	 turmoil	and	disturbance.	 	Life	 itself	 is	 in	a	constant	state	of	 flux,	unpredictability,		















free	 and	 so	 we	 can	 initiate	 mental	 change	 within	 us,	 transforming	 our	 suffering	 through	 our	
prohairesis,	whilst	at	the	same	time	accepting	the	constant	flux	of	the	external	world	and	our	need	to	
accept	 things	 as	 they	 happen.	 	 With	 ‘here	 and	 now’	 awareness	 and	 attention	 to	 our	 ‘stream	 of	
consciousness’,	we	 can	 overturn	 our	 judgements,	 putting	 a	 halt	 to	 a	 bad	 judgement	 overcoming	
good	 judgement.1110		We	can	make	 internal	mental	 changes	 to	 stop	a	perverted	prohairesis	 placing	
our	attention	on	externals	and	projecting	the	self	and	our	identity	in	externals,	risking	the	freedom	of	
our	 prohairesis	 being	 slave	 to	 the	 externals.	 	 Epictetus’	 definition	 of	 internal	 mental	 change,	
prohairesis	and	freedom	come	together	in	the	following	passage:	‘He	is	free	who	lives	as	he	wills,	who	












































Contemplation	 of	 our	 mental	 formations	 is	 a	 powerful	 technique	 because	 of	 its	 self-reflective	
aspects.		It	is	deployed	in	many	Buddhist	practices,1112	is	one	of	the	parts	of	the	Eightfold	Path	(5.2),	
and	 is	often	used	as	part	of	mindfulness	and	meditative	practices.	 	As	an	example,	 it	might	 include	
contemplation	to	gain	insight	and	understand	the	interdependent	nature	of	the	subjects	and	objects	
of	the	mind,	the	contemplation	of	impermanence	and	looking	deeply	into	the	nature	of	things.		The	
Buddhist	notion	of	contemplation	 is	a	mental	discipline	associated	with,	but	not	equivalent	 to,	 the	
notion	that	includes	Right	Concentration/Meditation	and	Right	Mindfulness.		Our	particular	concern	




and	 anywhere,	 used	 continuously	 throughout	 our	 daily	 lives	 as	 part	 of	 our	 awareness	 and	






















but	 it	 can	also	 contemplate	 itself.1116		Dobbin,	 in	his	discussion	of	 this,	makes	 the	observation	 that	
this	faculty	is	thus	self-correcting	and	self-regulating	and	so	is	capable	of	enlightenment	independent	
of	 outside	 interpretation	 or	 counsel.1117		 Consequently	 through	 self-contemplation	 we	 can	 reflect	
upon	and	remedy	the	bad	decisions	of	our	prohairesis.		‘What	more	masterful	faculty	do	you	yourself	
possess?	 What	 isthat	 thing	 within	 you	 which	 takes	 counsel,	 which	 examines	 into	 all	 things	
severally?’1118		We	might	interpret	Epictetus	as	meaning	that	our	faculty	of	reasoning	makes	us	into	
our	own	 therapist	 -:	 ‘No	one	 is	 closer	 to	myself	 than	 I	 am’,1119	–	and	 so	we	are	doctoring	ourselves	
towards	 recovery	 from	 our	 suffering.	 	 Further,	 in	 Discourses	 1.20,	 Epictetus	 brings	 in	 the	 ethical	
aspect:	 ‘Once	more,	what	 are	 the	 things	 that	wisdom	has	 been	 given	 us	 to	 contemplate?	 	 Things	
good,	bad,	and	neither	good	nor	bad.	 	What,	 then,	 is	wisdom	itself?	A	good.	And	what	 is	 folly?	An	
evil.	Do	 you	 see,	 then,	 that	wisdom	 inevitably	 comes	 to	 contemplate	 both	 itself	 and	 its	 opposite?	
Therefore,	the	first	and	greatest	task	of	the	philosopher	 is	to	test	the	 impressions	and	discriminate	









recognise	 that	 our	 inner	 voice	 and	 language	 can	 influence	 our	 sense	 and	 sensibility	 of	 what	 is	
happening	in	the	present	moment.			
Epictetus	remarks,	 ‘It	 is	not	the	word	that	I	fear,	but	the	emotion,	which	produces	the	word’.1122		
This	 remark	 is	 made	 is	 in	 the	 context	 of	 freedom:	 he	 calls	 no	 one	 master,	 but	 the	 cognitive	
impression	of	the	master	conjures	up	certain	feelings	and	emotions.		Our	sensitivity	and	sensibility	to	
words	 and	 language	 are	 underpinned	 by	 emotions	 and	 thus	 can	 have	 an	 overriding	 affect	 on	 our	
experiences	of	 suffering.	 	Language,	words	and	emotions	co-exist;	 the	 language	conveys	emotion.		















We	 have	 in	 this	 thesis	 indicated	 that	 language	 can	 affect	 and	 afflict	 our	 thoughts	 in	 many	
different	 ways	 such	 as	 experiencing	 great	 excitement,	 laughter	 and	 shouting	 about	 something	 or	
being	 aroused	 by	 some	 spectacle,1123	presenting	 feelings,	 sufferings	 and	 subsequent	 passions.	 	 As	
discussed	 our	 language	 and	 what	 we	 say	 to	 ourself	 	 (cf.	 1.5,	 4.5.1,	 4.6.3)	 can	move	 our	 soul;	 our	
language	can	set	our	mood	or	 tone	of	 thought	with	 the	alluring,	attractive	and	charming	words	of	
desire,	 pleasure	 or	 lust,	 or	 the	 repelling,	 repulsive,	 disgusting	 words	 that	 create	 thoughts	 of	 fear,	
distress	and	anxiety.		We	observe	in	Epictetus	words	of	applause,1124	words	of	praise,	admiration	and	
flattery1125	and	on	other	occasions	we	observe	a	combination	of	words	expressing	fears	and	anxieties	
with	 a	 voice	 which	 is	 trembling,	 nervous	 and	 unsteady	 and	 sometimes	 we	 utter	 an	 explosive	
combination	 of	 harsh,	 terrifying	 or	 angry	 words1126	and	 inhuman	 sentiments	 and	 threats1127	(‘I	 am	
ready	to	tear	out	the	eyes	of	the	man	who	stands	in	my	way’).		
Again	 in	 Epictetus	 we	 see	 language	 portraying	 thoughts,	 which	 can	 be	 critical,	 unjust	 and	
vicious,1128	censorious	and	accusing,1129	and	 sometimes	kind-hearted,	gentle1130	and	 forgiving.	 	 	Our	
language	and	thoughts	reflect	the	state	of	our	 inner	soul:	we	harbour	an	abject	or	broken	spirit,1131	
ignoble	 thoughts1132	and	disgraceful	 and	 shameless	words	 and	 thoughts;1133	the	 spirit	 of	 the	 soul	 is	
disturbed1134	or	 at	 peace1135	with	 our	 thoughts.	 	 Our	 thoughts	 can	 reflect	 strong	 desires,	 lustful	
designs	 and	 unseemly	 deeds.1136		 We	 can	 act	 and	 be	 acted	 upon	 (3.3),	 and	 this	 feature	 of	 our	
existence	can	create	a	state	of	mind	and	soul	that	 is	 in	a	good	condition	or	a	bad	condition,	and	as	
discussed	our	inner	voice	(4.5,	4.6)	can	be	strongly	persuasive	to	incline	us	towards	a	certain	way	of	
feeling	 good	 or	 bad,	 even	 though	 as	 we	 discussed	 (3.5.3,	 2.4.2)	 our	 passions	 are	 dominated	 by	
particular	beliefs	and	judgements,	and	conditioned	by	ignorance	(cf.2.2.3,	3.2.5).		
It	is	clear	that	our	thoughts	can	be	influenced	by	our	inner	voice	(4.5)	and	can	continuously	project	
notions	 of	 good	 and	 bad,	 sometimes	 directly	 and	 indirectly,	 sometimes	 consciously	 and	
subconsciously.	 	 The	 extent	 of	 this,	 influences	 our	 decision-making,	 our	 judgements	 and	 our	
qualitative	assessment	of	people,	things,	and	events	related	to	us.		We	often	in	our	language,	words	



























us	fearful	or	anxious,	or	make	us	calm	and	peaceful.	 	Expressions	such	as	 ‘I	am	the	mightiest	 in	the	
world’1139	might	be	terrifying	to	some	but	not	to	others.		Do	we	have	the	feeling,	are	persuaded,	that	
such-and-such	a	 thing	 is	 so	or	not	so	or	perhaps	so?1140		 In	general,	 Epictetus	would	advise	dealing	
with	 the	 uncertainties	 and	 risks	 of	 life	 with	 both	 confidence	 and	 caution;	 he	 devotes	 a	 complete	
discourse	to	these	two	key	aspects.1141		The	language	of	thought	we	use,	especially	how	we	express	
ourself	 through	our	 inner	voice,	anticipates	our	 fear	and	thoughts	of	uncertainty.	 	Epictetus	argues	




































in	our	use	of	 impressions,	 the	thoughts	we	construct	and	the	 judgements	we	make,	the	words	and	
language	 that	 generate	 our	 fears.	 	 With	 Right	 Effort	 and	 practice	 we	 should	 aim	 to	 abandon	 all	
wrong,	 evil	 and	 harmful	 thoughts	 that	 cause	 us	 our	 fears	 and	 replace	 these	 with	 thoughts	 of	
confidence	and	indifference	about	things	outside	our	control	that	cause	our	suffering.			
As	regards	social	 intercourse,	Simplicius’	view	is	that	 ‘The	soul	 is	distracted	towards	the	outside	
by	 the	 senses	 when	 it	 acts	 in	 concert	 with	 them	…	 uttered	 speech	 diffuses	 the	 soul	 towards	 the	
outside	 even	 more,	 since	 in	 that	 case	 it	 is	 not	 acting	 in	 concert	 with	 the	 senses,	 but	 acting	 as	
itself’.1145		 	For	instance,	social	intercourse	constitutes	an	example	when	our	thoughts	and	emotions	
may	be	swayed	in	concert	with	others	and	their	irrational	thoughts	and	feelings.		Epictetus’	advice	is	
to	 turn	 the	 soul	 back	 to	 itself	 so	 that	 it	 can	 live	 its	 own	 life,	 without	 the	 undue	 influence	 of	 the	
external	world.1146					
5.3.5.2	Emotive	Attachment		




Feelings	 result	 in	 emotional	 attachment	 or	 aversion	 (3.2),	 whether	 it	 is	 lust	 (epithumia)	 or	 fear	
(phobos),	 or	 pleasure	 (hēdonē)	 or	 distress	 (lupē).	 	 As	 discussed,	 such	 attachment	 is	 a	 wanting	 to	
identify	 and	 take	 possession	 of,	 for	 example,	 the	 subject	 of	 our	 fear.	 With	 a	 pathos	 such	 as	 fear	
(phobos)	 irrational	thoughts	about	future	evils	are	at	play,	as	 in	the	case	of	death;1148	such	a	feeling	
does	not	add	precision	about	how	and	when	death	might	occur.	
Epictetus	 says	 we	 should	 act	 with	 caution	 regarding	 our	 thoughts	 and	 feelings	 about	 some	
impression	of	pleasure;	as	with	impressions	in	general,	we	should	guard	ourself	against	being	carried	
away	by	it,	do	not	allow	‘its	enticement,	and	sweetness,	and	attractiveness’	to	overcome	you.1149		
The	 security	 of	 the	mind	 is	 dependent	 upon	 properly	 responding	 to	 impressions,	 as	 Epictetus	
frequently	 attests;	 we	 should	 guard	 ourselves	 against	 the	 ‘very	 slippery	 nature	 of	 sense	
impressions’1150	that	might	allure	us	with	some	pleasurable	experience	into	a	false	sense	of	the	good,	















all	 what	 you	 appear	 to	 be’;1152	our	 thoughts	 and	 feelings	 about	 objects	 and	 things	 in	 the	material	






Finally,	Simplicius’	view	 is	 that,	 if	 the	soul	neglects	 its	prohairesis	and	 inclines	towards	the	body	
and	 an	 irrational	 life	 it	 does	 so	 because	 it	 prefers	 the	 intensity	 of	 pleasure	 from	 irrational	 desires	
rather	than	the	pure	and	gentle	pleasures	from	rational	desires.1154		 	Emotional	attachment	pulls	us	
towards	some	irresistible	desire	that	Buddhism	refers	to	as	an	unwholesome	state	of	mind,	and,	as	
was	 discussed	 in	 4.3.5,	 leads	 to	 a	 weakening	 of	 our	 moral	 integrity.	 	 Long	 refers	 to	 emotional	
attachment	as	being	incompatible	with	our	rational	autonomy	and	integrity.1155			
A	particular	Buddhist	perspective	on	this	comes	from	Kalupahana	who	reports	that	in	some	cases	
we	 can	 accommodate	 excessive	 and	 overextended	 emotional	 attachment	 by	 using	 an	 impersonal	
form	of	language	which	can	bring	about	change	in	the	emotive	content	and	hence	the	pathological	
effect.1156		He	remarks	that	our	 feeling	adds	character	to	our	perception,	not	precision	or	clarity.1157		
Emotional	attachment	 is	 comparable	 to	 the	grasping	or	 clinging	 to	 the	emotive	content	of	human	
experience	of	the	five	aggregates.1158	
5.3.5.3	Moral	Sense	and	Sensibility		
Epictetus	 argues	 that	 to	 be	 insensible	 is	 to	 act	 against	 one’s	 own	nature.1159		 From	 this	we	 can	
conclude	that	thinking	and	doing	things	without	sense	or	reason	is	to	be	in	an	insensate	or	insensible	
(anaisthētos)	 state	 of	 mind	 regarding	 our	 own	 nature.	 	 Marcus	 Aurelius,	 taking	 the	 same	 line	 of	




ease	 in	 keeping	 with	 our	 rational	 nature.	 	 Rist	 considers	 pathē	 a	 pathological	 disturbance	 of	 the	
personality.1161		
















neglect	 of	 our	 duties	 as	 a	 human	 being.1162		 He	 further	 remarks	 that	 ‘A	man’s	 true	 work	 is	 …	 to	
disdain	the	motions	of	the	senses,	to	diagnose	specious	impressions.’1163		Is	it	our	mental	obtuseness,	
stupor	or	deliberate	lack	of	sense	that	we	are	unaware	of	what	I	myself	possess	in	matters	of	freedom	






From	our	dispositions	 (2.3)	and	volitional	actions	 (4.4)	 (cf.	sankhara	 -	1.2.3,	 1.7.2,	2.3.2)	arises	a	
conditioned	mind	creating	the	good	and	the	evil	(cf.	kusala	and	akusala	2.4),	within	us.		As	with	good	
and	 bad	 prohairesis,	 in	 Buddhism	 kusala-kamma	 (good	 kamma)	 and	 akusala-kamma	 (bad	 kamma)	




be	offended	by	others’	comments,	 to	be	 jealous	of	others,	or	to	be	angered	by	others.	 	Distracting	
and	 emotive	 thoughts	 connected	 to	 desires,	 greed,	 hatred	 and	 delusion	 are	 unwholesome	moral	
states	of	mind,	akusala-kamma.			Simplicius	remarks,	‘It	is	impossible	for	those	who	have	their	senses	









there	 is,	 internal	 or	 external,	 gross	 or	 subtle,	 inferior	 or	 superior,	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	 conditioned	
aggregates	 of	 the	mind	 (like	 feelings)1169	that	 cause	 craving	 and	 clinging	 and	 hence	 emotions	 and	
suffering.		















of	our	 senses.1170		 Frequently	Epictetus	 reminds	us,	 in	 relation	 to	our	 actions	 and	perceptions,	 that	
some	 are	 profitable	 and	 some	 unprofitable,	 some	 are	 appropriate	 and	 some	 not	 appropriate.1171		
Moral	 sense	 and	 sensibility	 consist	 in	 applying	 reason	 to	understand	and	 realise	what	 is	 evil.1172		 It	 is	
clear	 from	this	 that	men	need	 to	be	sensible	 to	observe	and	distinguish	 that	by	virtue	of	which	men	
become	philosophers.1173	
We	err	 in	our	 impressions	and	 judgements	and	 this	makes	us	believe	 that	we	are	discontented	
and	dissatisfied	with	 life.	 	The	pathē	 are	universal	 emotions;	however,	 the	way	 they	 relate	 to	us	 is	
entirely	unique	to	us:	they	are	personalised	and	individualised	by	us	through	conditioned	phenomena	
and	mental	 formations	 (cf.	 aggregates,	 sankhara	 and	 kamma)	 and	 these	 personalised	 experiences	
become	us,	we	identify	with	them.		If	we	have	a	feeling	that	a	thing	is	so	then	we	feel	(are	aware	of)	
this	feeling,	and	we	have	a	thought	that	a	thing	is	so.1174		 If	we	feel	the	presence	of	this	feeling	and	
this	 is	an	unpleasant	 fearful	awareness	 (fearful	 thought)	 then	we	are	 turned	 into	a	 fearful	mess.1175		
Our	thoughts	and	feelings	provide	powerful	insight	and	a	window	into	our	inner	world,	of	sense	and	
sensibilities;	contemplating	our	 thoughts	and	 feelings	enables	us	 to	bear	witness	and	 testimony	 to	
our	moral	sense	and	sensibilities	against	externals.1176		
The	 practice	 of	 Right	 Mindfulness	 and	 Right	 Concentration	 provides	 the	 means	 of	 having	 an	
awareness	of	our	 feelings	and	emotions,	observing	and	witnessing	 them.	 	Are	we	to	be	martyrs	 to		




Buddhists	have	 the	notion	of	 ‘letting	go’,	which	 is	an	ongoing	practice	 to	help	us	gain	 freedom	
from	 our	 attachments	 and	 suffering.	 	 	 It	 is	 ongoing	 as	 it	 requires	 our	 continuous	 attention	 and	





















proper	mental	 discipline	 and	 attention	we	 tend	 to	 grasp,	 attach	 and	 identify	 ourselves	 to	 the	 five	




the	 problem	 of	 grasping:	 we	 grasp	 and	 attach	 ourself	 to	 thoughts	 of	 ‘I’	 and	 ‘mine’	 (see	 1.2.3).1179			
Buddhists	stress	that	what	they	call	cessation	is	not	destruction	or	annihilation	of	the	conditions	that	
cause	dukkha:	cessation	is	the	natural	ending,	the	death	of	those	conditions	that	have	been	born	in	
the	 conditioned	 mind;	 for	 the	 individual	 obsessed	 with	 the	 ‘I’	 attachment,	 cessation	 raises	 the	





we	 can	 safely	 argue	 that	 Epictetus	 shares	with	Buddhism	 this	 need	 to	 gain	 insight,	 understanding	
and	knowing	in	dealing	with	the	conditioned	phenomena:	listening	and	conversing	with	ourselves;1181	
unexercised	 thoughts; 1182 	testing 1183 	and	 examining 1184 	our	 impressions;	 interrogation	 of	
impressions;1185	observing,1186	visualising1187	and	 contemplating	 feelings,	 cravings,	 attachments	 and	
actions.			The	notion	of	practising	for	letting	go	manifests	in	different	ways	in	Epictetus	based	on	the	
insight	 gained	 into	 conditioned	 phenomena:	 the	 abandoning	 and	 giving	 up	 of	 things	 outside	 our	
control;1188	indifference;1189	circumspection;1190	proper	 use	 of	 impressions.1191		 Both	 the	 Buddhist	



























methods,	 are	 distinct	 from	 the	 philosophical	 content,	meaning	 and	moral	 imperatives	 behind	 the	
method	 and	 technique.	 Hence,	 Buddhist	 psychology,	 and	 that	 of	 Epictetus,	 go	 way	 beyond,	 for	
example,	mindfulness-based	methods	and	because	of	their	philosophical	and	ethical	objectives,	are	
more	 broadly	 applicable	 (see	 5.2.2.3).	 	 Several	 studies	 have	 compared	 Buddhism	 with	 CBT	 and	



























consideration	 of	 Epictetus’	 thinking:	 Chapter	 2	 (Epictetus	 and	 the	 truth	 of	 suffering),	 Chapter	 3	
(Epictetus	 and	 the	 causes	 of	 suffering),	 Chapter	 4	 (Epictetus	 and	 the	 cessation	 of	 suffering)	 and	
Chapter	 5	 (Epictetus	 and	 the	 path	 to	 liberation).	 	 This	 research	 has	 revealed	 significant	 areas	 of	
parallel	 thinking	 between	 Epictetus	 and	 Buddhism	 in	 many	 subjects	 that	 are	 fundamental	 to	 the	
problem	 of	 suffering	 including	 ignorance,	 cravings	 and	 attachments,	 volition	 and	 action,	 mental	
formations,	dispositions	and	the	moral	self.		Using	this	model	has	proved	invaluable	in	advancing	our	
understanding	and	comparison	of	the	similarities	and	differences	between	Epictetus	and	Buddhism.		
This	 model	 has	 provided	 a	 systematic	 method	 of	 analysing	 the	 various	 stages	 of	 the	 suffering	
presented	 in	 the	 four	 truths	 in	 the	 light	 of	 Epictetus’	 ideas.	 	 We	 have	 also	 gone	 beyond	 the	





One	 of	 the	 major	 themes	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 is	 the	 role	 of	 language	 in	 regard	 to	 the	
psychology	of	suffering	and	the	relationship	between	language	and	our	conditioned	mind,	reflecting	
our	perceptions,	thoughts,	feelings	and	cognitions.		Language	can	have	a	persuasive	influence	on	us	
and	 shape	 our	 thoughts.	 	 Our	 use	 of	 language	 can	 reveal	 a	 great	 deal	 about	 our	 personality	 and	




active	 (poieō)	 and	 the	 passive	 (paschō),	and	 the	 examination	 and	 analysis	 of	 this	 language	 using	 a	
diverse	 range	of	examples	and	citations	 from	Epictetus’	 teachings.	 	This	aspect	of	 language	brings	
recognition	 of	 the	 causes	 and	 effects	 of	 our	 conditioned	mind	 and	 resulting	 suffering	 and	moves	
forward	our	comparison	with	Buddhist	thinking	in	the	use	of	the	active/passive	sankhara	(disposition)	
and	 related	cetanā	 (volition)	and	kamma	 (action/doing).	 	 In	 this	 research	 I	have	also	addressed	 the	
pathology	 of	 the	 soul	 and	 those	 pathologicial	 elements	 that	 underpin	 how	 we	 are	 disposed	 and	
inclined	towards	suffering;	again	this	has	identified	many	areas	of	common	thinking	with	Buddhism,	
in	particular	regarding	sankhara	(disposition)	and	human	personality.			







the	 importance	of	moral	choice	and	volition	to	the	development	of	a	 life	that	 is	 flowing	well	and	 is	
virtuous	and	has	inner	peace	and	contentment.		
Finally	 throughout	 the	 thesis	 the	 medical	 paradigm	 of	 diagnosis,	 aetiology,	 prognosis	 and	
therapy	 in	 regard	 to	 human	 suffering	 has	 been	 used	 as	 a	 tool	 of	 instruction	 and	 comparative	
explanation	in	Epictetus	and	Buddhism.		
So	 what	 has	 been	 learnt	 through	 this	 journey	 of	 research?	 	 Firstly,	 there	 have	 been	 many	




included	 offering	 a	 more	 systematic	 methodology	 and	 procedure	 to	 study	 Epictetus’	 orientation	




Language	 in	 terms	 of	 what	 we	 say	 to	 ourselves	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 his	 teaching	 approach	 and	
indeed	the	active	language	we	use	and	the	thoughts	have	an	effect	on	our	passive	state	in	terms	of	
an	 irrational	 neurotic	 state	 or	 a	 calm	 and	well-balanced	 rational	 state.	 	 This	 investigation	 into	 the	
language	 of	 Epictetus’	 thinking	 has	 proved	 invaluable	 in	 regard	 to	 many	 questions	 regarding	
suffering	and	has	brought	out	a	broad	perspective	of	suffering	far	beyond	just	the	Stoic	passions.			




Both	 Buddha	 and	 Epictetus	 would	 in	 unison	 conclude	 that	 our	 thoughts,	 views	 and	 opinions,	
shrouded	in	ignorance	that	exists	in	the	conditioned	mind,	lead	us	to	grasping	and	attachment	to	this	
mind	and	this	gives	birth	to	our	suffering:		‘It	is	not	the	things	themselves	that	disturb	men,	but	their	
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Appendix	A:	Glossary	of	Pali	Terms	
The	following	is	a	glossary	of	Pali	terms	used	in	this	thesis	derived	from	various	sources.1199		These	
terms	are	presented	in	concise	form	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis.		Generally	the	meaning	given	
here	and	in	the	main	body	of	the	thesis	is	in	the	Buddhist	sense.		
akusula:		 kammically	unwholesome;	demerit;	bad	action;	unskilful	
anusaya:	 proclivity;	the	persistance	of	a	dormant	or	latent	disposition;	predisposition;	
tendency	
avijjā:	 not	knowing,	ignorance;	it	also	means	‘darkness	without	illumination’;	illusory	
phenomena	
bhava:	
	
habitual	or	emotional	tendencies;		conditioned	arising	of	beings;	it	is	also	
sometimes	translated	as	being;	experience	or	becoming	
cetanā:	 thinking	as	active	thought;	intention;	purpose;	will;	volition;	one	of	the	seven	
mental	factors	
ditthi:	 view;	belief;	dogma;	theory;	speculation	
dukkha:	 disease;	dissatisfaction;	unsatisfactory	nature	and	the	general	insecurity	of	all	
conditioned	phenomena;	suffering	and	pain	(body	and	mind);	distress;	
discontent.		Antonyms:	ease;	pleasant;	agreeable;	satisfactory	
kamma:	 action;	correctly	speaking	denotes	the	wholesome	and	unwholesome	volitions	
(kusala-	and	akusala-cetanā);	kammical	volitions	(kamma	cetanā)	become	
manifest	as	wholesome	or	unwholesome	actions	by:	body	(kāya-kamma),	speech	
(vacī-kamma),	mind	(mano-kamma).	
khanda:	 group;	aggregate;	heap;	term	for	the	five	aggregates,	which	constitute	the	
entirety	of	what	is	generally	known	as	‘personality’.		They	are:	form	(rupa);	
sensation	(vedanā);	perception	(sannā);	mental	formations	(sankhāra);	and	
consciousness	(vijñāna).	
klesa:	 mental	defilement;	impurity;	delusion	
kusula:	 kammically	wholesome	or	profitable;	salutary;	morally	good;	(skilful)	
paticasamippada:	 dependent	orgination;	dependent	arising	–	‘if	this	exists,	that	exists;	if	this	ceases	
to	exist,	that	also	ceases	to	exist’.		Twelve	links	-	avijjā	(ignorance),	sankhāra	
(formation),	vijñāna	(consciousness),	rupa	(form),	saḷāyatana	(senses),	phassa	
(contact),	vedana	(feeling/sensation),	tanhā	(craving),	upādāna	(clinging),	bhava	
(becoming),	jāti	(birth),	jarā-maraṇa	(death)	
rupa:	 form;	figure;	appearance;	principle	of	form	
sankhāra:	 conditioned	things;	dispositions;	mental	imprint	[passive	sense]	
kammically	active	volition	or	intention	[active	sense]	
sannā:	 perception;	sense;	discernment;	recognition;	assimilation	of	sensations;	
awareness;	cognition	
tanhā:	 thirst;	craving;	desire	
upādāna	 clinging;	grasping;	holding	on;	grip;	attachment	
vedana:	 feeling;	sensation;	pleasant	(sukkha),	unpleasant	(dukkha),	indifferent	(adukkha-
m-asukhā) 	
vijñāna:	 consciousness;	life	force;	mind;	discernment	
																																																																				
1199	Wisdom	Library	(https://www.wisdomlib.org/buddhism);	Concise	Pali-English	Dictionary	
(https://www.budsas.org/ebud/dict-pe/);	Rhys	Davids,	T.W.	and	Stede,	W	(1921);	Pali	Canon	E-Dictionary	
Version	1.94	(PCED)	(http://dictionary.sutta.org)	
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Appendix	B:	Frequency	Analysis	of	Legō		
The	tables	below	provide	a	frequency	analysis	of	the	word	legō	as	found	in	Epictetus’	Discourses		
	
LEGO	
	 Discourses	 Freq.	
PRESENT	
legō	 1.1,	1.2,	1.4,	1.10,	1.15,	1.17,	1.18,	1.19,	1.25,	1.26,	1.29,	
1.30,	2.1,	2.2,	2.3,	2.4,	2.10,	2.12,	2.13,	2.17,	2.18,	2.20,	
2.21,	2.23,	2.24,	2.26,	3.1,	3.17,	3.23,	3.24,	3.5,	4.1,	4.4,	
4.6,	4.7,	4.11	
51	
legeis	 1.1,	1.2,	1.3,	1.9,	1.12,	1.18,	1.19,	1.22,	1.24,	1.25,	1.28,	
1.29,	1.30,	2.6,	2.7,	2.8,	2.9,	2.10,	2.12,	2.15,	2.17,	2.19,	
2.20,	2.23,	2.24,	3.1,	3.5,	3.10,	3.21,	3.22,	3.23,	3.24,	3.25,	
4.1,	4.4,	4.5,	4.6,	4.7,	4.8,	4.9,	4.10,	4.12,	4.13	
75	
legei	 1.1,	1.4,	1.7,	1.14,	1.17,	1.19,	1.22,	1.24,	1.25,	1.26,	1.28,	
1.29,	2.2,	2.3,	2.5,	2.6,	2.8,	2.12,	2.13,	2.14,	2.16,	2.17,	
2.19,	2.20,	2.23,	2.24,	3.1,	3.2,	3.5,	3.7,	3.9,	3.10,	3.11,	
3.13,	3.14,	3.15,	3.18,	3.19,	3.20,	3.21,	3.22,	3.23,	3.24,	
4.1,	4.4,	4.6,	4.10,	4.11,	4.13	
111	
legomen	 1.9.22,	1.19.18,	1.24.14,	1.29.31,	2.16.13,	2.19.23,	4.1.25,	
4.1.26,	3.7.18,	3.8.2,	3.3.17,	3.13.3		
13	
legete	 2.1.24,	2.17.37,	2.21.20		 3	
legousi	 2.22.14,	2.1.23,	2.19.22,	1.5.10.	4.6.38,	3.13.5			 6	
leges	 1.17.5,	1.15.7,	1.18.7,	3.14.14,	3.23.6,	3.7.14,	Ench.6	 7	
lege	 1.29.5,	1.29.6,	1.26.14,	1.29.31,	2.20.4,	4.11.24,	4.11.36,	
3.22.64,	3.26.22,	4.7.30,	Ench.42	
12	
legein	 	 49	
legōn	 	 11	
legousa	 1.28	 1	
legon	 1.1	 1	
	
IMPERFECT	
	 	
elegon		 1.10.3,	2.16.16,	4.1.73,	4.8.6,	4.8.20	 5	
eleges		 2.9.17,	2.19.19,	1.30.3,	2.19.16,	3.14.12,	3.23.11,	4.5.19,	
3.9.9			
10	
elege	 2.2.15,	3.6.10	 2	
	 	 (366)	
	
Table	6	Frequency	Analysis	of	Legō	
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Appendix	C:	Frequency	Analysis	of	Paschō-Poieō		
The	tables	below	provide	a	frequency	analysis	of	the	verbs	paschō	and	poieō	as	found	in	
Epictetus’	Discourses		
	
PASCHŌ	
	 Discourses	 Freq.	
PRESENT	
paschein	 2.16.27,	3.22.18		 2	
paschōn	 3.8.7,	2.10.18,	4.286.127	 3	
paschō	 2.22.8,	3.22.56,	4.1.38,	4.258.47,	4.1.57	 5	
pascheis	 4.6.19	 1	
paschei	 4.1.35,	4.1.39,	4.1.26,	1.11.31,	3.24.7,	4.1.59,	4.1.27		 6	
paschomen	 2.16.7,	2.19.12,	2.1.8,	2.1.15,	2.16.11,	1.11.6,	4.13.6		 7	
FUTURE	 	 	
peisesthai	 1.14.17	 1	
peisēi	 1.30.6,	1.15.1	 2	
peisei	 4.11.24	 1	
peisetai	 1.2.9	 1	
AORIST	 	 	
pathein	 1.18.1,	1.18.2,	1.28.13,	4.1.96,	4.7.3		 5	
pathōn	 2.1.27,	2.20.35,	2.5.23,	2.15.8,	2.18.11	 5	
epathes	 3.25.7	 1	
PERFECT	 	 	
peponthenai	 1.20.12	 1	
pepontha	 4.13.8,	1.29.7	 2	
peponthe	 2.13.12	 1	
	 	 (44)	
	
Table	7a	Frequency	Analysis	of	Paschō	
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POIEIŌ	
	 Discourses	 Freq	
PRESENT	(Active)	
poieō	 1.29.31,	2.1.31,	2.3.5,	1.17.21,	2.5.12,	4.5.17,	4.1.15,	4.8.25	 8	
poieis	 3.21.24,	3.23.1,	3.5.2,	4.9.18,	4.11.15,	3.5.16,	3.13.22,	3.14.6,	1.24.11,	2.8.6,	2.8.14,	
2.15.7,	2.20.28,	3.21.13,	3.22.13,	4.6.27,	4.11.26,	4.12.6,	4.13.19,	3.9.8	
20	
poiei	 2.26.1,	2.26.3,	2.26.5,	2.26.6,	3.1.5,	3.1.6,	4.8.2,	4.8.3,	4.8.5,	3.13.19,	3.13.23,	1.19.11,	
1.19.12,	2.18.4,	3.6.18,	4.7.26,	3.8.6,	1.25.17,	2.23.14,	3.18.9,	3.21.24,	3.22.30,	3.23.1,	
4.1.88,	4.2.9,	4.4.1,	4.5.35,	3.4.8,	4.9.4,	4.9.18,	4.11.24,	3.12.9,	3.14.9,	1.14.10,	
1.19.21,	1.28.20,	1.29.3,	1.29.39,	2.5.21,	2.11.12,	2.13.13,	2.18.12,	2.20.10,	2.23.11,	
2.24.23,	3.17.5,	3.22.82,	3.24.50,	3.25.10,	4.1.19,	4.1.62,	4.1.92,	4.1.108,	4.7.1,	3.5.6,	
4.11.10,	3.7.11,	3.13.5	
62	
poioumen	 3.7.18,	1.28.33,	1.22.16,	2.4.2,	2.5.10,	1.3.3,	2.9.4,	1.12.13,	3.1.21	 9	
poieite	 2.17.35,	1.4.15,	1.27.20,	3.22.26	 4	
poiousi	 4.1.19,	1.6.10,	4.7.33,	4.8.7	 4	
poiein	 2.15.15,	2.15.16,	2.8.14,	2.18.4,	1.11.28,	3.22.5,	3.22.7,	2.1.2,	2.12.17,	2.23.38,	1.8.3,	
3.4.35,	3.7.27,	1.16.15,	1.19.15,	1.27.9,	1.2.25,	2.6.16,	2.9.14,	2.14.13,	2.17.21,	2.26.3,	
1.7.14,	3.1.24,	3.23.6,	3.23.38,	3.24.40,	3.25.5,	4.1.11,	4.1.46,	4.1.120,	4.1.122,	
4.1.147,	4.1.155,	4.4.29,	4.8.13,	4.12.15,	3.5.13,	3.10.13	
44	
PRESENT	(Middle)	 	
poioumai	 4.1.152	 1	
poieitai	 2.23.29	 1	
poiōn	 4.10.12,	4.10.13,	3.5.6,	1.20.6,	2.1.15,	3.2.3,	2.8.14,	2.15.17,	1.12.30,	3.15.10,	3.20.10,	
3.24.53,	3.24.116,	4.5.6,	3.5.14,	3.7.18,	3.1.9	
17	
poioun	 4.1.62-63,	2.22.28,	1.6.11,	3.1.5	 4	
poiēsai	 1.29.33,	1.11.40,	3.12.1,	3.24.103,	4.7.5	 5	
IMPERFECT	 	 	
epoioun	 4.8.17,	1.17.20,	4.8.20	 4	
epoieis	 3.9.8,	2.16.34,	1.11.21	 3	
epoiei	 3.22.88,	2.12.5,	1.6.33,	3.22.33,	3.26.33	 5	
epoioumen	 3.3.16	 1	
epoioun	 3.4.2,	3.4.7,	4.8.17,	1.17.20,	4.8.20	 5	
FUTURE	 	 	
poiēsein	 1.14.17	 1	
poiēso	 3.20.12,	3.20.15,	4.10.1,	3.9.19,	1.24.11,	1.27.8,	1.7.25,	3.21.13,	4.1.95,	4.6.23,	3.1.10	 11	
poiēseis	 3.20.13,	3.22.14,	4.12.2,	3.16.4,	3.5.4,	3.6.6,	4.11.13,	3.1.9,	1.19.28,	2.16.34,	1.10.3,	
1.25.29	
12	
poiēsei	 1.28.8,	1.29.30,	4.7.27,	4.7.28,	3.26.37,	3.22.71,	4.1.166,	4.2.5	 8	
poiēsomen	 2.4.5,	3.23.4	 2	
poiēesete	 3.8.7	 1	
poiēsousi	 1.12.19	 1	
AORIST	 	
poiēsai	 2.11.3,	2.14.19,	2.16.31,	2.16.40,	1.17.25,	1.27.8,	2.1.10,	2.2.6,	2.5.12,	1.4.3,	1.9.21,	
3.22.20,	4.1.69,	4.1.100,	4.1.146,	4.6.5,	4.13.8,	3.7.36	
20	
epoiēsa	 2.20.31,	1.1.10,	1.29.47,	2.6.29	 4	
epoiēsas	 2.6.29,	1.7.31,	3.21.10,	3.24.97,	3.26.10	 5	
epoiēse	 3.7.10,	1.2.19	 2	
epoiēsan	 1.13.33,	1.13.35,	1.1.8	 3	
PERFECT	 	
pepoiēkenai	 1.16.3,	1.11.5	 2	
pepoiēka	 1.25.31,	2.14.21	 2	
pepoiēkas	 2.21.11,	4.4.8	 2	
pepoiēke	 1.24.26,	1.16.4,	4.1.102	 3	
	 	 (330)	
	
Table	7b	Frequency	Analysis	of	Poieō	
 Epictetus	on	Human	Suffering		
Edward	James	Humphreys	
Page	223	of	223	
 
	
